Achieving Good Governance and Development in Nigeria Through Decentralization: A Case Study of Ondo State by Benedict O., Koledoye
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
Achieving Good Governance and Development in Nigeria Through
Decentralization: A Case Study of Ondo State
   
Koledoye, Benedict O
   
 
 
 
 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
Koledoye, Benedict O (2017)  Achieving Good Governance and Development in Nigeria Through Decentralization: A
Case Study of Ondo State. Doctoral thesis, Swansea University.
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa40712
 
 
 
 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference
above.)
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/
  
 
Achieving Good Governance and Development in Nigeria 
through Decentralization: A Case Study of Ondo State 
 
 
 
 
 
By  
 
Benedict Oladipo Koledoye 
 
Submitted to Swansea University in fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
Swansea University 
2017 
 
  
 
 
          
THESIS SUMMARY 
 
This summary sheet should be completed after you have read the accompanying notes.  The 
completed sheet should be submitted by you to your Head of School at the time of submission 
of your work and the supporting documentation.   
 
Candidate's Surname / Family Name: KOLEDOYE 
Candidate's Forenames: BENEDICT OLADIPO 
Candidate for the Degree of: PhD 
Full title of thesis: ACHIEVING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
NIGERIA THROUGH DECENTRALISATION: A CASE STUDY OF ONDO STATE. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Summary: 
Decentralization through the political theory of federalism has been at the centre of policy 
experiments in the last six decades in Nigeria where development and governance institutions 
have embraced federalism, as a part of the process of political reform, based on the 
constitutional foundation for its adoption. Federalism is perceived to be the panacea for 
improvements in efficiencies of the public sector so satisfying the needs of the citizenry, 
ethnic, religious and political divides notwithstanding.  
 
By transferring decision-making powers closer to the grass roots, federalism improves 
governance, results in an equitable division of the national wealth and encourages critical 
development. Whilst the structure and process of government is crucial, it is not the sole 
determinant of what is considered to be good governance. Other factors that impact include 
the political culture in which subsidiary features such as corruption and civic activism 
influence the quality of federal governance.  
 
Federalism has largely failed to engender political stability and socio-economic development 
in Nigeria. This research examines the major shortcomings in its implementation and a 
detailed analysis of such factors may help in laying the foundation for improvements in the 
system.
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Background to the Study 
 
1.0 Introduction 
It is generally considered that decentralization is an effective and reliable means of achieving 
good governance, political stability and sustainable development. This view might be 
corroborated by an examination of the level of governance and development in countries 
using decentralized systems. Examples include the United States, Australia, Canada, 
Australia, Switzerland and Indonesia, which can be said to have attained good governance 
and development. It is likely that the noted achievements of such countries, and the 
recommendations of development institutions such as the World Bank, informed and 
influenced the decision of some African countries to attempt decentralisation as its form of 
governance model; there is however little or no positive evidence to suggest that such 
attempts have been altogether successful.   
 
A case in point is Nigeria where decentralization is yet to produce the desired results as 
observed in the USA and Indonesia et al, and various reasons have been advanced for such 
perceived failures. Whichever approach one adopts in analysing the failure of decentralisation 
in Nigeria, it is clear that the structure of decentralisation, leadership of the Government, the 
entire citizenry and the political network of the country have prominent roles to play either in 
the success or otherwise of decentralisation as a way of bringing about good governance in 
any country.  
 
This chapter conceptualises decentralisation, outlines the objectives of the study and explains 
Nigeria’s federalism and the challenges to full implementation. In addition there is discussion 
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of the statement of the research problem, the research questions, the significance, scope and 
theoretical framework of the study and limitations of the research; these challenges are 
discussed under two broad categories of political and economic issues. The organization of 
the thesis is enumerated at the end.  
 
There is a generally and widely held belief that decentralization stimulates good governance 
and development because its policy interventions are closer, more responsive and effective in 
recognising and meeting the local needs of the citizens. Similarly decentralisation is 
considered to be an important element of participatory democracy. Representing this view is 
Vansant (1997) who sees decentralisation as an important institutional setting that could 
enhance good governance. The Word Bank (2001) also supports the view that 
decentralisation is a global phenomenon that could no longer be ignored by any development-
minded country.  However scholars such as Prud’homme et al (1995), Turner and Hulme 
(1997), Manor (2001) and Smoke (2003) have pointed out that there are also some associated 
negative aspects of decentralisation. These include political elitism, the hijack of political 
power and financial resources of the state and inter-regional income, development disparities 
and an increase in corruption. 
 
In the view of Smoke (2003:7) it is important to stress that decentralisation is not, in itself, an 
inherently positive or negative concept. The varying outcomes depend on the design and the 
implementation of the set policies. These include the extent to which political, fiscal and 
administrative powers are devolved, de-concentrated or delegated. Smoke (ibid) opines that 
an appropriate design takes into consideration political, institutional, fiscal and cultural 
characteristics of the particular country implementing decentralisation. The political 
institutions, particularly the nature and competitiveness of political parties, their power at 
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local levels and the strength of civil society play a significant role in the design and 
implementation of decentralization policies (ibid: 13).  
 
It is essential to emphasise that the design factors identified by Smoke vary from country to 
country. It therefore becomes compelling for the design of decentralization to be country and 
context specific. For example what promotes a positive outcome in one country may not 
necessarily produce the same result in another. It therefore follows that if these contextual 
factors are not taken into consideration, a poorly designed decentralized system may arise and 
possibly lead to a fragile or failed state. A classic example is the observation of Brancatti 
(2005:3-4) that decentralisation was very successful in curbing ethnic conflicts and 
secessionism in Belgium, India and Spain, but much less successful in curbing similar 
situations in Nigeria and the former Yugoslavia. What could be deduced from this failure is 
that the policy makers failed to take into account or give adequate consideration to the 
sociology of both Nigeria and the former Yugoslavia when designing templates for the future 
governance of the two countries. Conversely, in the cases of India, Belgium and Spain, full 
cognisance of the citizenry, its fundamental characteristics and requirements was taken into 
consideration, resulting in infinitely more successful outcomes.  
 
Major outcomes of any poorly designed decentralisation include the undermining of the state 
macroeconomic control, worsened inter-regional income disparities and an increase in the 
risk of political or elite seizure of the government, Smoke (2003:11). Perhaps this is what 
informed the World Bank on its Decentralization Net to emphasise that decentralisation 
might not always be efficient if poorly designed. Further the World Bank holds that poorly 
designed decentralization can also result in the loss of economies of scale and control over 
scarce financial resources by the central government. Considering the advantages and 
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disadvantages of decentralization, and having regard to the submission of Smoke (2003:12), 
the concept of decentralisation could be seen largely as “ . . . an unambiguously desirable 
phenomenon that can alleviate many problems of the public sector or, sometimes, as an 
invariably destructive force that frustrates effective government” (Smoke ibid). Therefore, to 
reach a conclusion on the merits, or otherwise, of decentralisation, it is imperative to ensure 
that an appropriate design is in place with leadership commitment to the implementation of 
its policies and set objectives, and fair share of power between the central and sub tiers of 
government. 
 
The above submission was largely stressed by Tanzi (1996), Litvack et al. (1998) Wunsch 
(2001), Peterson (2001) and Smoke (2003) who emphasised that the structure of government 
and the design of the decentralization arrangement reflective of such design are vital factors 
to the success or failure of any form of decentralization. This being the case the peculiarity of 
each country will determine the mode of its decentralisation (Brancatti 2005:3) so that 
decentralization is not a monolithic concept Smoke (2003: 8). To this extent the context of 
the state, the rationale for the adoption of decentralisation, the structure of government and 
the environment and the political network remain critical factors in any decentralisation 
design so that decentralisation becomes a difficult phenomenon to study especially when a 
‘grand design’ approach is adopted by the study nation. It is with these factors in mind that 
the political structure of the Nigerian state is examined. 
 
The literature on Nigerian federalism generally claims that the federal system arrangement 
has not been able to effect and enhance good governance and the pertinent question is why 
the federal system in Nigeria has failed to engender good governance, poverty reduction and 
socio-economic development in the country. This question becomes even more significant if 
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one considers the example of Indonesia, a country with similar socio-economic and political 
conditions which has been relatively successful in managing its political and socio-economic 
problems through decentralisation. This study, in seeking to answer this question, investigates 
the major challenges facing the Nigerian State through an examination of the institutional 
factors and political network factors
1
 and how these factors interact and influence the 
outcome of a federal system of government in the specific context of Nigeria.  
 
There are two approaches to understanding federalism. The first approach is to view the 
subject federal system in terms of static institutional rules and normative settings. The second 
is to visualize the federal system as a dynamic system of political networks. This research 
focuses on federalism as a political process, and how political interactions are embedded in 
the federal system arrangement in Nigeria. Using Ondo State as a case study, this approach 
will provide a more much comprehensive explanation of the reasons why the federal system 
has not generally been instrumental in enhancing social and political development in Nigeria.  
 
1.1  Statement of the problem 
According to Watts (2002) a federal system is adjudged to be a viable institutional framework 
that stimulates progress, prosperity, development, better standards of living and long-term 
economic growth. Underpinning this position Adamolekun and Kincaid (1991) and De 
Figuerido Jr and Weingast (2005) argue that the federal system creates a consistent, credible, 
                                                 
1
Institutions refer to the legal framework of the federalism which is the constitution and other formal institutions 
of state. The constitution sets the rules of engagement. Political network factors refers to all the types of 
political interactions between politicians, between citizens, and all other interactions, which do not always 
follow existing institutions, but may also be clientelistic in nature or characterized by informal institutional 
behaviour. These interactions may arise as the result of either too much leeway that federal institutional factors 
give to political actors (insufficient reach of institutions), or because of other causes to be explored herein. In 
this sense, institutional and political factors and their respective explanatory power are strongly intertwined. 
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and financially sensible line of authority between the centre and regions, and ensures efficient 
allocation of resources capable of promoting political stability and socio-economic 
development across the whole nation. However, surveys on the federal system and the varying 
degrees of performance across federal states, suggest that Watts’ position is not universally 
applicable. De Figuerido Jr and Wiengast (2005) argue that whilst some federal systems 
experience sustained growth (including the richest economies in the world, such as the USA, 
Australia and Indonesia) others, such as Nigeria, remain economically stagnant, exhibiting 
persistent recession and poverty. De Figuerido Jr. and Wiengsat (2005) assert that the success 
or failure of the federal system depends on the context in which it is practiced. It is, therefore, 
important that each federal state is examined on its own merits in order to determine the issues 
or factors that enhance political stability and economic growth on the one hand and those that 
undermine the capacity of the system to engender robust institutions of democratic and 
economic development on the other. Within that context, this study is based on the context of 
Ondo State.  
 
The federal system was adopted in Nigeria as a framework for national development, 
accommodation and peaceful co-existence in a multi-ethnic society. Adebanwi and Obadare 
(2010) suggest that the federal system is presumed to be a potential solution to the challenges 
of ethno-regional diversity, resource accumulation and distribution, citizenship, individual 
rights and collective responsibility. However, from the review of the performance of the 
Nigerian federal system by Ekeh and Osaghae (1981), Adamolekun (1991), Nnoli (2008), 
Elaigwu (2007), Suberu (2010), Okpanachi (2010), Osaghae (2010) Adebanwi and Obadare 
(2010) there seems to be a consensus that the federal system has not sufficiently fulfilled the 
essential rationale for its adoption as a system of government. 
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Based on the findings of Osaghae (2010) the Nigerian federal system is also said to be 
responsible for the country’s political and socio-economic failures. Corroborating this notion, 
Suberu (2010:249) suggests that “the contemporary debates about Nigeria’s political and 
economic failures have routinely implicated the presumed pathologies, incongruities and 
liabilities of the country’s federalism.”  In other words, the conception, evolution and practice 
of Nigerian federalism appear to be defective and unfit for purpose. A general overview of the 
trends and effects of the defective federal system is summarized by Osaghae (2010) who argues 
that Nigerian federalism is seen as a long-drawn-out process of decay or decline, whose 
empirical elements are political instability, a low level of national cohesion, and economic 
crisis, all of which are mutually reinforcing. Consequently, there have been persistent 
demands for the restructuring of the Nigerian system, namely:  
 restructuring of fiscal arrangements; 
 agitation for power rotation amongst the ethnic nationalities; 
 agitation for creation of more states and local government autonomy; 
 agitation for a loose confederation is predominant; 
 agitation for State Police; that each State should maintain and control its Police 
In the extreme situation, there is also demand for secession. 
 
These issues and agitations have necessitated varied institutional transformation, reforms, and 
restructuring of the Nigerian federal system before and after Nigerian Independence in 1960. 
The findings of Elaigwu (2007) and Osaghae (2010) reveal that the many attempts to 
transform, reform and restructure seem to support the notion that the practice of federalism in 
Nigeria is at the root of Nigeria’s political and economic failure. Regrettably such 
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transformations and reforms carried out to date do not seem to have resolved the political and 
socio-economic challenges of Nigeria. Suberu (2010) too suggests that despite (and often 
because of) the massive transformation and reorganization it has witnessed since national 
independence, the Nigerian federal system is often denounced as the source of, rather than a 
viable solution for, the country’s multifaceted crises of poor governance, ethno-political 
conflict and socio-economic underdevelopment.  
 
Scholars such as Suberu (2010), Elaigwu (2007), and Okpananchi (2010) however have 
attempted a balanced federalist debate on the performance of the Nigerian federal system and 
argue that, despite the challenges it faces, it has also recorded some major achievements. 
These conclusions are premised on the argument that the Nigerian system represents a 
reasonably viable and successful mechanism for managing inter-ethnic conflict and 
preventing ethno-political disintegration. Further, despite the numerous challenges and 
violent conflicts which plague Nigeria, and which includes a thirty month civil war, Nigeria 
still remains a united country. Both of those conflicts in arguments represent valid 
standpoints in the context of the economic and political situation in contemporary Nigeria. 
That duality of debate raises critical questions such as; (1) how long can the present federal 
system sustain unity and cohesion of Nigeria; and (2) can the present system resolve the 
lingering socio-economic crisis and offer a robust and conducive environment for future 
development. 
 
Both questions become even more relevant when considering the present challenges to 
development and the disruptive activities of the Islamic insurgent group Boko Haram, and 
underscore the report of the International Crisis Group (2006) which notes that whilst 
federalism has permitted entitlements to be spread more widely across the society, it has also 
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fuelled a proliferation of states and local institutions that has made governance fragmentary 
and unwieldy. The inability to fairly obtain a fair share of the country’s wealth has left most 
citizens with two choices: fatalistic resignation or greater identification with alternative 
hierarchies based on ethnicity, religion or other factional identities.  
 
The International Crisis Group report concludes as follows: 
“Nigeria’s federal system and politics are deeply flawed, contributing to the 
rising violence that threatens to destabilise one of the Africa’s leading 
countries. Failing to encourage genuine power sharing, they have sparked 
dangerous rivalries between the centre and the 36 states of the country over 
revenue from the country’s oil and other natural resources; promoted no-
holds-barred struggles between interest groups to capture the state and its 
attendant wealth; and facilitated the emergence of violent ethnic militias, 
while politicians play on and exacerbate inter-communal tensions to cover 
up their corruption (2006:1).” 
 
The strong inference of this report, coupled with contemporary debate, is that federalism, as 
practiced in Nigeria, constitutes a great threat to socio-economic growth, national development 
and national integration and cohesion. It is important, therefore, to examine all the underlying 
issues which include the structure of central, state and local government, power sharing, fiscal 
arrangements and the specific tensions which impact on such elements.  
 
According to research by Elaigwu (2007), Adamolekun (1991), Amuwo et al (1998), Falola 
(1994), Ndibe (1999), Olowu (2001), Osaghae (2010) and Suberu (2010), the Nigerian 
federalism is, fundamentally a product of three factors, namely: 
(1)  colonialism and the impact of colonial administrative policies on present 
political administration; 
  
10 
 
(2)  the military heritage and its impact on the Nigerian political economy (the 
transformation of, and centralisation of the Nigerian federation by soldiers; and, 
(3)  the emergence of oil exports (rent economy) as the dominant source of foreign 
exchange earnings; in this context the rent economy has a significant effect on 
the structure and workings of the system.  
These three factors are both inter dependant and inter active. They are major contributors to the 
problems inherent in the Nigerian system and the consequences are largely exhibited in three 
forms. Firstly Elaigwu (2007), Adamolekun (1991), Suberu (2010), and Olowu (2001) argue 
that the structure of the federal system tends towards increased centralisation and the 
concentration of resources and power at the centre. This creates a crisis of fiscal federalism 
with a negative effect on development. Secondly the perpetuation of reactionary or negative 
forms of ethnicity and group solidarity promotes the emergence of elite competition for the 
purpose of power and capital accumulation which is excessively parochial, and reliant on 
prebendal and patrimonial processes. Thirdly the interaction of these factors has weakened the 
fiscal cohesiveness and socio-economic development of Nigeria as a whole. This is largely due 
to the problems arising from intergovernmental relations, such as uncoordinated tax raising 
powers and the conflict in the responsibilities/ functions of the tiers of government in essential 
service delivery. Based on the challenges highlighted, this study analyses the institutional and 
political contexts within which the federal system operates. In doing this, the research 
specifically examines the four key factors referred to below. 
The nature of the federal system  
The nature of the system is relational, based on the constitution. This is the relationship 
between central government and the sub national units and is defined by the assignment of 
power, functions and responsibility. However simple this may appear, there is always the 
problem of the delineation of these functions and it is necessary to determine where the 
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boundaries lie as to how much power and responsibility is to be retained by the central 
government and how much is to be assigned to the sub national units.  
Federalism and fiscal arrangements 
Fiscal arrangements are statutorily defined between the tiers of government in a federal 
arrangement. According to Onimode (2000: 15) they essentially deal with the theoretical and 
institutional issues of intergovernmental relations and how these relations impinge on sound 
macroeconomic management. The financial relationship is, equally, tied to expenditure 
assignment. To this end, Oates (1999) argues that fiscal federalism fundamentally deals with 
understandings in which functions and instruments are best centralized and which are best 
placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government.  
 
This relates largely to how competences and resources are allocated. However, underpinning 
the fiscal arrangement, particularly as it pertains to the sharing of revenue amongst the tiers 
of government and the implementation of physical and social programmes, are factors that 
raise the questions of ‘who gets what, when and how?’ These are important considerations in 
the analysis of this research and the equitable division of the national wealth between the 
citizenry of Nigeria. 
The impact of the oil economy  
The oil economy is otherwise referred to as rent economy. Scholars have identified the 
impact of the rent economy in mostly negative terms, i.e. the Dutch disease. This research 
will examine the impact of the oil economy on the Nigerian federal arrangement  
Politics, party system and politicians  
These factors are of critical importance because politics, the party system and the politicians 
themselves constitute the informal aspects of governance. Given that many attempts to 
transform, reform, and restructure the Nigerian federal system as a means of engendering good 
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governance in Nigeria have failed, there is need for determining the primary reasons leading to 
such failure and to determine strategies to attain good governance and development.  
 
This study explains why decentralization in Nigeria has failed to engender political stability and 
socio-economic development and to what extent the current structure and practice of 
federalism has contributed to the poor governance and underdevelopment. Its aim is to 
provide an empirical, mostly qualitative contribution that highlights the relevance and 
importance of what is referred to as the informal factors in the political networks in the 
workings of decentralisation. Federalism and decentralisation literature typically looks more 
at the legal frameworks of divisions of responsibilities but perhaps pays less attention to the 
informal factors referred to above. 
 
1.2  Research Objective and Research Questions 
The main objective of this study is to reveal the extent that the current structure and practice 
of federalism has contributed to the current status of governance and development in Nigeria. 
This is done with the intent to explain that the poor level of governance in Nigeria cannot be 
excluded from the nature and character of its decentralisation design and political network 
factors. The overarching question is therefore ‘Why the system of decentralization in Nigeria 
has routinely failed to engender political stability and socio-economic development. In 
pursuit of a definitive conclusion, this thesis examines: 
1. the major shortcomings in the structure of Nigerian federal structure; 
2. the institutional and political factors that explain the poor performance of 
decentralisation in Nigeria; 
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3. the problems of encountered in the implementation of decentralisation in Nigeria local 
government system; 
4. the necessary conditions for effective decentralisation for effective decentralisation in 
the Nigerian local government system; and, 
5. the measures to be adopted in improving the decentralisation in the Nigeria local 
government system.  
 
1.3  Scope and Significance of the study 
The theoretical significance of this research underscores the importance of effective 
decentralisation. Its scope is to examine why the system of decentralization in Nigeria has 
apparently failed to engender good governance and socio-economic development. It 
investigates the major challenges of Nigerian federalism using Ondo State as a case study. 
Ultimately this thesis investigates local government as the basis of development and the 
people's participation in governance at the local level. This is attained through an 
examination of the Nigerian federal structure and its framework, the relationship between 
Federal, State and Local Government, the bureaucracy inherent in the process and the system 
of sharing and managing political, fiscal, and administrative powers.  
 
Analysing decentralisation in Nigeria will contribute to an understanding of the factors that 
have contributed to the failures of the Nigerian state to produce good governance in the first 
instance. In principle, this research explores the relationship between political structure and 
development in Nigeria. It also explores the ways through which an appropriate political 
structure to support national development could be achieved; the supposition is that an 
appropriate political structure would, in turn, produce policies and programmes that could 
engender political stability, economic growth and sustainable development. Invariably there 
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is emphasis on the fact that the structure of local government matters in decentralisation but 
the research progresses to focus attention on the area that is largely ignored in the concept of 
decentralisation- the political networks.   
 
The first step in the analysis is to determine the nature and character of Nigerian 
decentralization and review the debate on several aspects of Nigerian federalism that are 
directly related to development. Although it could be argued that Nigerian federalism has to 
some extent brought some political stability and socio-economic development, this study 
critically examines whether such levels of stability and development are commensurate with 
the natural and human resources available in Nigeria. Against that premise is an assessment 
of the effect of the nature and character of insurgencies in the Eastern, Southern and Northern 
parts of the country. 
 
Local government is a product of decentralized administration and in a developing country 
like Nigeria there is a greater need to strengthen the decentralization in the local government 
as a means of bringing rapid national development.  It is hoped that this study will be of 
immense contribution to academic research on the central thesis. Furthermore the findings of 
this study may assist other research in the same or similar topics. 
1.4 Ondo State 
Ondo State was one of the three states created out of the former Western State on 3rd 
February 1976 by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (Fatusin, 2015). It covers the 
total area of the former Ondo Province, which was created in 1915, with Akure as the 
provincial headquarters. Ondo State officially started its operations on 1st April 1976. Today 
Ondo State has eighteen local government councils. According to Fatusin (2015) the main 
local government areas include Owo, Akoko, Okitipupa, Akure and Ondo. Its governance 
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structures do not differ from those of other states of the federation and is continually evolving 
to seek to meet its obligations.  
 
According to Aribigbola, Folami, Williams-Adewinle and Karimu (2013) the need to free 
local governance from the restraints of the state government has become a challenge to 
politicians and scholars and citizens alike. For example, between June 2015 and May 2016, 
the National Economic Intelligence Committee (NEIC) revealed that a total sum of N71 
billion has been allocated to Ondo State. However, despite the enormous resources available, 
people at the grassroots are worse off and are still suffer from poverty. The issues to be 
considered is therefore is the nature of the responsibilities and duties of the local government 
to the people, how they are performed and to what extent. If, despite the huge revenue 
allocation from the centre there is still poverty, the relevance of local governments to the 
people in terms of good governance must be called into question.  
 
Olowu and Wunsch (2004) provide two methods for evaluating the effectiveness of local 
governance. The first is to determine whether the transfer of authority, resources, and 
accountability and the development of an open local political process and local political and 
administrative institutions are working in ways that suggests local prioritisation.  The second 
is to focus on the output and outcomes to determine whether local governance delivers the 
expected tangible benefits in terms of better schools, health systems, water supply, or roads, 
and the intangible benefits inherent in such delivery such as empowerment and social service 
delivery that enhance people’s welfare.   
 
It is also of interest to note that since 1996, the World Bank has made it possible to measure 
governance performance in a more scientific ways by voice and accountability, political 
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stability, absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. Some of these six indicators provide the basis for the evaluation of the 
performance of local governments in Ondo State, Nigeria.  
 
1.5 Guiding Theoretical Framework 
Recognition of and respect for the political and economic authority among separate levels of 
government is fundamental to the success of decentralization. National and sub-national 
governments are entitled to significant autonomy in relation to political administration, 
expenditure and revenue and initiatives for development. Wildasin (2004) argues that the 
level of this autonomy enables the levels of government to; 
“. . . provide highly-valued public goods and services to their residents, 
financed by revenue systems that impose little waste through deadweight 
losses and that distribute the burden of government finance in a manner not 
offensive to widely-shared notions of equity and fairness.” 
The presumed outcome of decentralization is effective and efficient governance which, in 
turn, fulfils the true purpose of government.   
 
The increasing global interest in decentralization and federalism enhances the position of 
Wildasin (2004). The analysis of the levels of government and their capacity to bring political 
stability and development however remains a critical issue. The analytical framework of this 
research is based on two theoretical frameworks, namely functional theory and legislative 
theory. The two are intertwined in the process and implementation of decentralization design 
and are considered below. 
Functional theory 
This identifies the distinctive areas of competence of each level of government (Oates 1972; 
Brown and Oates 1986; Paterson, Rabe and Wong 1986;Stein 1990; Elazar 1991Burns1994). 
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It divides the economic purpose of government into two aspects namely developmental and 
redistributive aspects.  
Legislative theory 
This postulates that the political incentives that shape the decision of policymakers induce 
them to make wrong choices. Legislative incentives imply many things but principally that 
the primary aim of government is for the general good of the society or, alternatively or in 
addition, for political gain by the politicians or policy makers. Peterson (1995:41) suggests 
that the primary goal of the political representative is re-election, albeit in support of their bid 
to satisfy the social demands of their constituents, regardless of the overall benefits to the 
federal system. He states further that; 
“Constituents easily recognize spatially concentrated costs and 
benefits, but that spatially dispersed costs and benefits are less 
perceptible. Legislators therefore support projects that have 
geographically concentrated benefits but diffuse costs as oppose to 
policies that have diffuse benefits but spatially concentrated costs.” 
In other words, legislators may allocate more money to projects benefitting their constituency 
(or, for that matter, their ethnic group) rather than to projects that would benefit the country 
or region as a whole.  
The personal aspirations of politicians and the pressures of their constituency upon them 
therefore can play a significant role in the policies and working of government. In many cases 
the goals of politicians are personal and self-serving. It also appears that on occasions the 
personal aspirations of politicians outweigh constituency needs. Furthermore, the theory 
holds that whilst incentives are important as a motivation in policy making it is, nevertheless, 
the successful implementation of projects that is the most important factor in the development 
of the State. On the issue of the redistribution of resources the legislative theory assumes that 
redistribution is strongly influenced by the pressure of the constituency legislators (who may 
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represent a low-income or needy population/constituency) who are likely to favour the 
expansion of redistributive programs. Those who represent middle-income constituents are 
less likely to need government aid and are more likely to resist redistribution on the basis of 
the social need of others. Political support for redistribution is therefore expected to be 
greater in cities and states with higher poverty rates. 
 
The sharing of responsibilities for the provision of services is viewed by the legislative theory 
as lacking in balance. The theory propounds that national government takes on 
responsibilities it should avoid and imposes unaffordable burdens on lower levels of the 
system, thereby transferring the burden of responsibility to agencies often less able to 
manage. This appears to imply the primacy of the legislature over the executive arm of the 
government and assumes that the preferences of the executive arm have much less effect on 
domestic public policy than the preferences of the members of the legislative arm (Peterson 
1995: 35). 
 
1.6 Limitations of the study  
This research encountered certain challenges. The main one was the inability to conduct 
interviews in all eighteen local government areas of the state by the researcher. This was 
principally due to the limited time within which the second phase of fieldwork was carried 
out.  However, it is considered that the six local government areas covered by the fieldwork 
did give a balanced representation of the State as a whole. Other challenges included gaining 
the confidence of the respondents especially having regard to the political situation in Ondo 
State where the political party in power locally differs from the party at the centre. 
Additionally the fieldwork was undertaken during a period of gubernatorial elections in the 
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state. However this researcher is satisfied that all challenges were satisfactorily overcome and 
that the validity of the research has not been compromised. 
 
1.7  Organization of the Thesis  
The thesis is organized into seven chapters.  
Chapter one provides an introduction to the study, research problem, research questions and a 
brief discussion of guiding theories and concepts. It also gives an overview of the literature 
on politics, governance and the federal system in Nigeria. It also discusses the research 
design and methods, demonstrating a rigorous approach to the generation of new knowledge. 
 
Chapter two offers a more integrated discussion of federalism, by reference to current 
literature and its use in development discourse. The review covers the large debates, including 
governance, development and theories and models of development relevant for a discussion of 
decentralisation and development in Nigeria. 
 
Chapter three presents and analyses the empirical case study based on significant original 
empirical research. This includes the methodology used and research designs.  
Chapter four discusses the nature and character of governance in Nigerian politics.  The 
chapter explains the relationship between politics, governance, political parties and civic 
engagement in Nigerian context. The chapter lays a foundation for an understanding of the 
dynamics of Nigerian politics, and the issues that keep defining the character and nature of 
the Nigerian federalism.  
Chapter five gives the report of the fieldwork conducted. 
Chapter six analyses and discusses the findings of the fieldwork.  
  
20 
 
Chapter seven summarizes the whole study. It concludes with an exposition of the relative 
shortcomings of the Nigerian federal model and recommends further decentralisation.  
 
  
21 
 
Chapter Two 
 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
2.0  Introduction 
This chapter discusses perspectives of governance, economic development, decentralisation 
and federalism with emphasis on Nigeria. From the literature review it is apparent that there 
is a considerable amount of material dedicated to the issues relating to Nigeria’s political 
structure, governance and development and theories and models of development founding an 
authoritative backdrop to this research. It addresses and is structured in the following order; 
what is federalism and why federalism: differences between federalism and decentralisation; 
debates on good governance and development; federalism in Nigeria and its challenges; local 
governments in Nigeria and the obstacles they represent in the path towards good governance. 
 
2.1  Concepts of Federalism: what is Federalism and why Federalism? 
Before delving into the issue of good governance, it is apposite to shed light on federalism as 
a model of government in order to prepare the platform upon which governance would be 
assessed as either good or bad and the effects of such qualities on development, in this 
specific context, in Nigeria. In other words, this section examines federalism and 
decentralisation in relation to policymaking, interactions of institutions, actors in the process 
and political networks. 
 
The concept of federalism presupposes the fusion of different groups or nations which form a 
federal state without prejudice to the identities of the discrete and differing groups that come 
together for such purpose. K.C Wheare (1964) describes federalism as hinging on the 
association of constituent units of the federation based on principles of justice and equity.  It 
is an aggregation of equals that are being unified by a central federal government. However, 
  
22 
 
this does not reduce the autonomy of the sub-units as the powers of the state are not 
centralised in the federal structure.   
 
Various reasons have been advanced for the formation of federalism and well known 
federalist academics such as K.C Wheare (1964); Friedrich (1964); Riker (1964); Elazar 
(1987); Stepan (1985) seem to agree that explanations for federalism are generally based on 
two theories. The first is the socio-economic theory and the political theory important in the 
formation of a federal state. Riker (1964) in his Political Theory of Federal Formation 
however places greater emphasis on the political theory, perhaps influenced by his American 
milieu, and concludes that every federation is fundamentally a bargain between politicians 
and between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the 
purpose of aggregating territory, the right to levy taxes and raise armies (Riker 1964: 11).  
 
This is largely inapplicable however in respect of Nigeria’s federalism which is a product of 
the colonial administration as reflected in the McPherson 1951 and Lytleton 1954 
Constitutions of Nigeria. Federalism in Nigeria cannot therefore be merely the outcome of 
political bargaining among politicians built on territorial expansionism and militarisation 
conditions, which Riker advanced as critical conditions for the formation of federalism. The 
weakness in Riker’s argument as it relates to Nigeria was highlighted by Stepan (2005) who 
considers that Riker’s view is predominantly based on the (possibly unique) USA model of 
federalism. Providing an alternative view Stepan advances theories as to how federalism 
accrues by ‘coming together’, ‘holding together’ and ‘putting together’ as the typologies that 
determine the mechanics of peoples living in a federal arrangement.  
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Stepan presents the American, Swiss and Australian Federations as typical examples of this 
‘coming together’ model of federalism. He observed that each was comprised of previously 
separate and independent sovereign units that had voluntarily decided to come together as 
one political entity while retaining their individual identities. This is quite different from the 
‘holding together’ model, which occurs when an existing unitary state, usually characterized 
by “historical and political logic” decides to become a federal state. Stepan was close to 
identifying the beginning of the Nigeria’s federalism using his ‘putting together’ model until 
he recognised that it came into force through the instrumentality of the colonial 
administration which merged previously independent regions together through a series of 
conferences and not so subtle persuasion. The view of Stepan that ‘putting together’ involves 
the use of some form of coercion to merge the previously independent states (Stepan, 2005: 
257-8) is not entirely inapplicable in Nigeria’s federalism because of its roots in some form 
of unitary system of government. The ‘putting together’ model forms the basis of arguments 
in this study for the purpose of explaining why the Nigerian state, in spite of its federal 
structure, is yet to engage in good governance for the people.   
 
One major factor that might have influenced the putting together of Nigeria’s formerly 
separate regions could be traced to Elaigwu’s submission on federalism. He posits that 
adopting a federal arrangement is to reflect the diverse political, social, cultural and economic 
interests within a broader framework of unity (2007:6). Elaigwu however might not have 
given sufficient weight to ethnic identities in this broader framework of unity. The question 
of identity cannot be ignored in any federal discourse because it is a very significant issue in 
Nigeria where every ethnic group sees itself as being at the centre of the state. Every such 
group in Nigeria subscribes to Suberu and Osaghae’s assertion on identity, they see identity 
as a series of group attributes that provide recognition, reference, affinity, coherence and 
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meaning for the individual member of the group or the entire group itself (Suberu and 
Osaghae 2005:5). Identity is core to every ethnic group in Nigeria and their communal lives 
and the maintenance and preservation of cultural identities in Nigeria serves as integral 
element of their unity. Any contrary element to such preservation becomes one of the main 
sources of conflict and crisis in Nigeria’s federalism. 
 
Though there have been efforts at stemming crises that often arise from the identity struggles 
in Nigeria, partly the reason for the adoption of federalism in the first instance, the fusion of 
these multiple identities is yet to abate the inter-group suspicion in Nigeria’s federation and 
the fear of loss of cultural identity and independence. The essence of federalism is to put in 
place the means of containing crisis and ensuring peace in a complex heterogynous society, 
features based on institutionalized structures and the rule of law. This is largely absent in 
Nigeria’s federalism as there is still indigenous resistance to the Nigerian state structure in 
virtually all the geo-political zones of the federation. The main objection to the state by these 
various resistant groups is the perceived injustice against their ethnic group inherent in the 
Nigeria’s form of government. 
 
This perception can be contextualised by Elazar (1976) who considers that federalism, in its 
most limited form, has most to do with distribution and sharing of power. Where such 
distribution and sharing are inequitable, the objections of insurgent ethnic groups might be 
the inevitable result. The underpinning factor for the sharing and distribution of power is the 
conception of justice (Wheare: 1964) which holds among other things, that a distribution of 
power is necessary and desirable provided that it is achieved fairly. The type of agitation as 
witnessed in Nigeria is likely to become more intense if the competing groups consider that 
adoption of federalism amounts to acceptance of a justice system without any right of 
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participation in the ensuing political construct, reminiscent of the mantra of the colonies in 
America ‘No taxation without representation’ as a preamble to the war of American 
independence.
2
Federalism is idealistically about structure, power sharing, group autonomy 
within the larger federal state, a guarantee of the rights of all groups especially the minority 
group accommodation and compromise underwritten by justice. In Nigeria however that 
circumstance is yet to materialise.  
 
As Wheare (1964) submits federalism is a method of dividing powers so that the general and 
regional governments are within a sphere, coordinated and independent where neither general 
nor regional is subordinate to the other (Wheare 1964:10). The strength of federalism could 
therefore be premised on the platform that it lies on the desire for cooperation in some areas 
and the right to separation in others. According to Shridath (1979) “it is only federalism that 
fulfils the desire for unity where it coexists with a determination not to smother local identity 
and local power.”3Federalism is essentially a compromise solution in a multinational state, 
between two types of self-determination: one, provided by a national government which 
guarantees security for all in the nation-state; and two, by self-determination of component 
groups to retain their individual identities.  This research   therefore disagrees with the view 
of Adedeji (1971) who states that what is essential in federalism is union and not unity 
because it is a result of compromise between centrifugal and centripetal forces that rest on a 
peculiar attitude on the part of the people of the federating units who desire union and not 
unity (Adedeji 1971; 103). That opinion fails to deal with one of the central dilemmas in 
                                                 
2
Jonathan Mayhew, Old West Church’s Congregational pastor, used the phrase, "No Taxation Without 
Representation" in a sermon in 1750. The phrase revived a sentiment central to the cause of the English Civil 
War following the refusal of parliamentarian John Hampden to pay ship money tax.
.
 
3
 Ramphal Shridath, The Commonwealth Secretary General, “Keynote Address to the International Conference 
on Federalism”, at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. Published in A.B Akinyemi, P, Cole, 
and W. Ofonagoro (eds) Readings on Federalism (Lagos: N.I.I.A., 1979) pp. xiii-xv. 
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federalism which is the decision-making process which manifests itself most often in the 
context of the coordination of fragmented resources amongst a multitude of federating units 
where the question of  “Who should do it” is prioritized over the question ”What has to be 
done” (Pierson 1995, 449). 
 
This then brings the focus on the working mechanisms of federalism in respect of which this 
researcher adopts the characteristics of federalism as espoused by Obinger et al (2005). 
Obiinger et al, in their study on the impact of federalism on the development of welfare states 
in the European, North American, and Australian context, seem to compress the normative 
and theoretical explanations of the early federalists discussed earlier in this section:  K.C 
Wheare (1964); Friedrich (1964); Riker (1964); Elazar (1987); Stepan (1985).  Obiinger et al 
2005 define federalism as a phenomenon with five crucial characteristics:  
(1) institutional arrangements and decision-making rules at the central governmental level 
with a certain degree of veto power to subordinate other levels/branches of 
government; 
(2) jurisdictional arrangements that allocate policy responsibilities between different 
levels of government, including policy formulation and policy implementation; 
(3) territorially-based actors with ideas and interests that may vary greatly in their number 
and heterogeneity (for example, municipalities); 
(4) inter-governmental fiscal transfer arrangements (depending on the type of fiscal 
transfers and to which federal level these belong or are passed on to); 
(5) informal agreements, both at the vertical and horizontal levels, between governments 
and other actors.  
A critical analysis of these five characteristics suggests that federalism could produce a 
complex and problematic system of government. This perhaps results in the view of Law 
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(2013) who indicates that federalism is a complex system with its characteristics overlapping 
with one another in various conflicting ways leading perhaps to negative consequences. The 
relationship of these often-conflicting factors remains contentious and is laden with 
challenges, all too apparent in Nigeria. Resolution of issues such as how the state institutions, 
its various actors and the political network relate to each other emphasises the notion that 
federalism is a continuing and evolving process. This notion is central to this research, 
because the Nigerian federalism is by definition still evolving, still in its infancy.  
 
It is therefore imperative to examine the relationship between state institutions, actors and 
political networks. As noted in the functional and legislative theories of federalism (Peterson: 
1995) political actors can reinterpret federalism as a polity through their interactions in order 
to reach individual or collective goals. These interactions will always entail the establishment 
of different types of relations among political actors. They will be characterized by power, 
resource, and information asymmetries and either follow, violate, or reinterpret existing 
federal rules and/or institutions. State and municipal governments, their bureaucrats, 
politicians, labour unions, elites, and others will fulfil different functions in these relations - 
or networks of relations  often involving hard bargaining processes between competing 
political interests, and overarching goals of macro contexts, such as polity and society.  
 
A fundamental issue that arises from the discussion about politics, institutions, and the 
political actors engaged in the process, is whether institutions shape the actors or that the 
actors shape institutions. It raises the issue as to can mechanisms through which institutions 
shape the behaviour of individuals and through which individuals are able to form and reform 
institutions, are both envisaged and achieved. This is a complex question to which 
institutionalism studies have not found a concluding normative answer, despite certain 
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agreement that interactions between both are not unidirectional because institutions link 
individuals with their context and also between one another.  
 
2.2  Decentralisation and Federalism 
As earlier discussed federalism is about power sharing, group autonomy within the larger 
federal state, guarantee of the rights of all groups especially the minority and group 
accommodation and compromise. All these are elements are geared towards socio-economic 
development of the state with every distinct unit being given the opportunity to adopt 
backward integration that is, using what they have to secure what they need for the 
betterment of the citizens.  
 
A pertinent question is whether the power sharing mechanism, and the notional guarantee of 
everyone’s rights and group accommodation and compromise, could be better achieved 
through decentralisation than federalism. This question arises due to the assumptions of those 
who confuse decentralisation with federalism. Though the two concepts may look alike they 
are not the same. Both theories and concepts advocate the devolution of political and 
economic powers and resources respectively amongst different groups within a state. This 
perhaps informs the position of Rodden (2004) when he argues that the two concepts are 
often assumed to be complementary or even interchangeable. Similarly, Ink and Dean 
(1970:60) say that, “decentralization is an important aspect of an overall effort to streamline 
federal programmes and to reduce programme management cost to a minimum”. 
Nonetheless, the two concepts as observed by Bretton (2000) and Franceschet and Piscopo 
(2012), reveal significant disparities in the way that power and authority are distributed among 
the tiers of government. By means of decentralization central government devolves authority to 
the lower levels. However the central government can also suspend the powers of the lower 
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authority so devolution is not necessarily final even though the lower levels in the government 
derive their powers primarily from the constitution.  
 
The central government mostly deals with issues on the national scale such as defence, foreign 
policy and state ideology. The state and the central governments mutually co-exist and operate 
according to the dictates of the constitution but devoid of any master-servant relationship. The 
constitution defines power limitations of all the federating units and their tiers and as such, 
there is established the relationship of fairness in federalism compared to decentralization. The 
aggrieved party in federalism can challenge power infringement in a competent court of law.  
However, there are some elements of decentralisation in federalism but not all 
decentralisations are federalised. Federalism goes beyond power sharing; it includes some 
degrees of autonomy for the federating units in the areas of resource control, infrastructural 
development, education, labour, etc. As evident by the submissions of Enikolopoy and 
Zhuravskava (2007), Tavares de Ameida (2006) and Schneider, (2003) there are several 
debates surrounding decentralized governance but they all subscribe to its advantages. Such 
advantages include governmental effectiveness and public policy, democratic representation, 
participation and accountability as well as accommodation and representation of the territories 
based on linguistic, cultural and ethnic disparities (Treisman, 2007).  
 
Subjecting Nigeria’s federalism to the litmus test of the decentralisation elements confirms 
the observations of Suberu (2010), Elaigwu (2007), Lewis (2007), Olowu (2001) and 
Onimode (2000) who posit that the structure of the federal system tends towards increased 
centralisation and the concentration of resources and power at the centre. It is this concentration 
therefore that prevents Nigeria as a state from benefitting from the identified advantages of a 
decentralised federal system particularly as Nigeria’s federalism has never been completely 
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centralised except during the military regimes. The issue with Nigeria’s federalism is that most 
vital powers necessary for the adoption of backward integration by the federating states are 
withheld at the centre. This situation perhaps results in the description of Nigeria’s federalism 
by some observers as quasi federalism, pseudo federalism or centralised federalism. 
 
Under a federal constitution, the federating units are fairly independent while the central 
government coordinates and unites all the units but not with a weak authority as Ames (2001) 
postulates. The American federal constitution, for example, ensures that the federating states, 
while coming together, voluntarily combine their authority and safeguard their rights against 
central government encroachment (Samuels, 2000). In Nigeria a critical examination of the 
power distribution by the constitution among the government tiers (the central government, 
the state government and the local governments) is vital in examining good governance and 
development in Nigeria. It is also vital in explaining why Nigeria’s federalism has failed to 
engender economic development and foster democracy in the country.  
 
Decentralisation has its own challenges, part of which was exploited by the then Eastern 
region of Nigeria to shake the foundation of Nigeria’s federalism to its roots between 1967 
and 1970. Challenges associated with decentralisation in the views of Manor (2001), Turner 
and Hume (1997); and Prud’homme (1995) include intensification of forces for secession and 
ethnic identity struggles, political instability, power-hijack by local political elites, inter-
regional income disparities, corruption and macro-economic instability caused by budget 
deficits, local government and fiscal irresponsibility and local government indebtedness. 
Despite these challenges available evidence shows that the positive outcomes of 
decentralisation outweigh the challenges of negative elements in those countries where 
decentralisation has been implemented. Furthermore, analysis of decentralisation shows that 
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the challenges are largely due to either poor design of decentralisation, or poor 
implementation of the process of decentralisation.  
 
All the deficiencies of decentralisation are issues that have been identified by various 
scholars at different times as factors hindering Nigeria’s socio-economic development. Most 
of these problems are associated with the overbearing influence of the federal government of 
Nigeria over its federating states. This position tends one to succumb to the view that those 
challenges are not structural in nature but man-made and which could be avoided if 
federalism and decentralisation principles are fully applied. The Isle of Man, Guernsey, 
Jersey and the United Kingdom, comprising of England, Northern Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland represent various examples of decentralisation though they all belong to what 
Andrew (2006) Schneider (2003) and Watts (199) refer to as a hybrid union type of 
federalism.   
 
It is a reasonably drawn conclusion that decentralisation serves as a reaction to problems 
associated with the centralized system of governance. In most cases it serves as the solution to 
demand by the minority groups for equal participation and recognition in the political affairs of 
the state without any hindrance, inability of the government to finance key services and 
economic decline (Schneider, 2003). Scholars such as Enikopolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) 
associate decentralization with democracy, engagement in decision-making, liberty and 
equality. This is the melting point of federalism and decentralisation because federalism 
without decentralisation may not fulfil the conditions of engagement with democracy, liberty 
and equality and, more importantly, the engagement of the citizenry in the economic sector 
which is most critical in development and governance. Decentralisation could therefore be 
regarded as a pre-condition for federalism in which public sector decisions could be taken at 
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various levels of government with a compromise being reached between the central 
government and the federating units.  
 
To this extent and citing from Work (2002) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) federalism is often 
accompanied by decentralization though federalism is not a necessary condition for 
decentralization or decentralization the only condition for federalism. Contextualising this 
relationship in Nigeria compels an examination of how a decentralised federal system can 
facilitate delivery of good governance and development and why the federal system could do 
this better than a unitary or quasi-federal system that Nigeria currently operates.  
 
2.3.  Types of Decentralisation 
As noted earlier in this review, the question at the centre of the contemporary debate of 
decentralisation is ‘how to decentralize?’ This involves the designs of decentralisation and 
how much to decentralize, in other words by way of identified devolved powers. The design 
for decentralisation will therefore be a mixture of political, administrative and fiscal functions 
and relationships. A design including these three relationships further raises the question of 
how to sequence and synchronize them in order for it to produce the desired result of good 
governance; an example is whether political decentralization should precede or follow fiscal 
decentralization (Sharma, 2005 c: 40-41). On the issue of proportion it raises the question of 
how much political decentralization should be combined with what degree of fiscal 
decentralization. Examining the types of decentralization will illumine our attempt in 
answering these questions. 
Political Decentralization 
In general, political decentralization is understood as an arrangement whereby political power 
and authority is transferred to the local ‘people’, ‘decision makers’ or ‘bureaucrats’ in the sub 
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national levels of government. In this vein it is argued that political decentralization 
necessitates universal participation and new approaches to community institutions and social 
capital (Work 2002: 6). It involves the prerogative of the authority to make political decisions 
among the different tiers in the government. Bird (2000:135) argues that the central question 
in political decentralization is ‘who decides’; the arrangement of decision-making is therefore 
paramount in decentralization. The prerogative of decision-making determines whether a 
system is decentralised or not. Treisman argues that: “if authority to decide all questions 
belongs to the central government, the system is maximally centralised in this sense; if the 
lowest-tier governments have all decision making rights, it is maximally decentralised” 
(Treisman 2002: 7). However, this presents some difficulties in practice; for instance: “how 
rights to decide on specific questions are distributed amongst the tiers, and how decision 
making takes place on a given question” (Treisman 2002:7). The tendency to contest these 
issues is high. The issue of inter-governmental relationship is brought to the fore hence the 
problem of how rights to decide on specific questions are distributed amongst the tiers.  
 
The critical debate in political decentralization is bordered on the process of transfer of the 
authority and the level or extent of transfer.  Such transfer of authority could be by way of the 
electoral process and/or by appointment (Treisman 2002). Of particular significance in the 
Treisman argument is the issue of the political parties. For example, the political party 
controlling the central government has enormous influence on the electoral body. In the same 
vein the party in government in the state also has enormous influence on the state electoral 
body. In this manner, political parties largely determine the process and outcomes of 
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elections.
4
 This situation questions the independence of the electoral bodies ultimately affects 
citizen participation and voice.  
 
In as much as there is transfer of power it is noted by the scholars that the most crucial debate 
in this form of decentralization is the degree of control that the central government exercises 
over the sub units in development planning and administration.
5
 Political decentralization 
however requires a constitutional, legal and regulatory framework to ensure accountability 
and transparency. The legal framework of the political framework of political decentralisation 
is very important for the outcome of decentralisation.
6
 It also necessitates the restructuring of 
institutions and developing linkages with civil society and the private sector (Work 2002: 6). 
Political decentralization is manifested through devolution, which will be discussed later.  
Administrative Decentralization:  
Administrative decentralization is the redistribution of authority, responsibility and financial 
resources among different levels of the government (Rondinelli 1999). It is the transfer of 
                                                 
4
In some of the developing countries, like Zimbabwe, Tunisia and Nigeria, the ruling and dominant parties are 
very powerful to the extent of emasculating their opposition. One of the reasons adduced for being able to do 
this is because the ruling parties control the electoral bodies of the countries. The Independence of the electoral 
bodies is often questioned. For example most of the elections in Nigeria have been characterized by 
manipulation of the electoral process by the parties in government. This is often made possible by the parties in 
government through the use of the security apparatus controlled by the Government to intimidate opponents and 
to rig the elections (Sylvia,Okeke, Idike, 2013). 
5
 Ndegwa (2002) presents the findings of a survey on the level of decentralization in Africa, based on the 
number of elected sub-national tiers, the score for the existence of direct elections for local governments, and 
the score for turnout and fairness of such elections. Thus a country was likely to score high (i.e. 4) if it had more 
levels of sub-national government that were elected rather than appointed, where local governments in particular 
were elected, and where local government elections were adjudged free and fair. The highest score attainable 
was 4, while the lowest was 0.Of the 30 countries analyzed, eight scored high (at least a 3 on the index) 
indicating a high degree of political decentralization (see Figure 1). These were South Africa, Uganda, and 
Namibia (all above 3.0) and Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Ethiopia and Cote d’Ivoire. A second set of countries 
indicated a moderate level of political decentralization, with scores ranging from 2.0 to 2.9; these included 7 
countries (i.e. Nigeria, Rwanda, Madagascar, Zambia, Tanzania, Mali and Malawi). The rest of the countries 
(15) indicated very low levels of political decentralization, although four of these at least held elections in part 
of the territory. 
6
This research, will explore the importance of legal framework of Nigeria and Indonesia, and asses how legal 
framework affects the outcome of decentralisation 
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responsibility for the planning, financing and management of public functions from the 
central government or regional governments and its agencies to local governments, semi-
autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional 
authorities. However, Vito Tanzi (2002) contends that administrative decentralization exists 
when most taxes are raised centrally but funds are allocated to decentralised sub nationals and 
the sub units that are more or less the agents of the central government. In this arrangement 
the central government controls the activities of the sub nationals. Work (2002) contends that 
administrative decentralization is synonymous with a civil service responsible to central 
government. Administrative decentralization takes the form of deconcentration and 
delegation.
7
 Deconcentration is the transfer of authority of sub-national branches of the 
central state, often to the ministry officials based in local areas while delegation is suggestive 
of a principal and agent relationship where the principal is the central authority. .  
Fiscal Decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization is defined as devolution of authority over public revenue and 
expenditure to a lower level of government. It also refers to the resource reallocation to sub-
national levels of government and the capacity of the sub-national government to raise taxes 
and carry out spending activities within the constitutional provisions. (Enikolopov and 
Zhuravskaya 2007; Work 2002; Tanzi 2002; Treisman 2002) analyse the basis of sharing 
and/or redistribution and contends that sharing is based on negotiation between the central 
and local authorities. It is also based on several other key principles amongst which are: (1) 
interregional equity; (2) availability of resources at all levels of government and local fiscal 
management capacity (Work 2002 6). Treisman (2002) argues from the view of fiscal 
                                                 
7
Op.cit. two countries indicated a high degree of administrative decentralization (South Africa and Uganda) 
while ten others indicated a moderate degree of administrative decentralisation (Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Burkina Faso and Eritrea). Of the sixteen countries that 
showed very low degrees of administrative decentralization, six had practically made no effort to decentralize 
the administrative systems. 
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decentralization being the empowerment of sub-units in generating funds through taxation. 
He argues that, fiscal decentralization deals with the way tax revenues and public expenditure 
are distributed among the different tiers of government. 
8
 
 
Critical issues raised by Treisman (2002) about this form of decentralization are: (1) do sub-
national governments have rights over specific taxes, defined shares of specific taxes and 
shares of total revenues, or do they just receive a given sum at the discretion of the central 
government; (2) are taxation rights defined by the constitution or by federal law; (3) if they 
have rights over specific taxes, are these only property rights over the revenue or do they also 
have the right to define tax base and set its rates; and, (4) do they collect the taxes 
themselves, or are taxes collected by federal bodies and then distributed to them.  Some of 
these issues will be discussed later in this thesis.  
 
The implementation of fiscal decentralization varies. Ebel and Yilmar (2002:3) note that the 
definition and implementation of fiscal decentralization differ greatly across developing 
countries due to differences in economic and political structures. They note that the diversity 
creates challenges of measuring and comparing the degree of decentralization across 
countries making generalisation difficult. Wang and Di (2010) opine that the debate on fiscal 
decentralization in developing countries is centred on two sets of questions. The first 
examines the main driving forces and reasons for fiscal decentralization and how its overall 
                                                 
8
 Op.cit In his survey Ndegwa notes that the degree of fiscal decentralization across Africa is best revealed by 
the fact that in 19 of the 30 countries analyzed, local governments control less than 5% of the national public 
expenditure. In fact the highest achievable category indicated in the research (“above 10%”) is lower than the 
average for decentralized systems elsewhere in the developing world – where an average 14% of the public 
expenditure is controlled at the local level.4 Only one country was assessed to have a very high degree of fiscal 
decentralization (South Africa). The countries that scored high (i.e. where local governments control 5-10% of 
public expenditures) are Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Countries with moderate levels of fiscal 
responsibilities anchored at the local level (i.e. where 3-5% of public expenditures are controlled by local 
authorities) included Kenya, Rwanda, Ghana, Senegal, Burundi, and the Congo Republic, and Congo DRC.  
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benefits can be maximized (Dethier, 2000; Shah and Thompson, 2004). The second assesses 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on variables of interests such as corruption (Fisman and 
Gatti, 2002), economic growth (Oates, 1993) and environmental protection (Engel, 1997). 
 
The above analysis of fiscal decentralisation underscores the many faces of the concept of 
decentralisation and further strengthens the argument of the importance of the design of 
decentralisation. Thus the extent of decentralization, and its implementation, remains 
fundamental issues in the concept, theory and practice of decentralization. 
  
2.4 Forms of Decentralization 
(i) Deconcentration 
This form of decentralization falls under the umbrella of political decentralization 
and; 
“ . . . refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility from one 
level of central government to another whilst maintaining the same 
hierarchical level of accountability from the local units to the decentralised 
central government ministry or agency. Deconcentration is the first step in 
the newly decentralising government to improve service delivery” (Robertson 
Work 2002: 6).  
 
Rondinelli (1981) defines deconcentration as local administrations in which all subordinate 
levels of government within a country are agents of the central authority, either appointed or 
responsible directly to central government. In other words, the local/or sub authorities to 
which responsibilities are transferred are accountable to the central government. In this 
context there is no implicit transfer of decision-making authority and financial management to 
  
38 
 
other levels of government, merely the transfer of administrative responsibility for specified 
functions to lower levels within the central government bureaucracy.  
(ii) Devolution 
This is viewed as the gold standard of decentralization by means of which the independence 
of the sub-national units is fully established by legislation. It is said to be; 
“...The full transfer of responsibility, decision making, resources and 
revenue generation to a local level, public authority that is autonomous and 
fully independent of the devolving authority. Units that are devolved are 
usually recognised as independent legal entities and, ideally, are elected 
(although not necessarily)” (Robertson Work 2002: 6).  
The features of devolution are; (a) autonomy; (b) the local governments/sub units have 
constitutional territorial jurisdiction; (c) the local government or sub unit are empowered to 
secure resources for its functions; and  (d) the relationship between the central government 
and local governments is mutual.  
(iii) Delegation 
 This type of decentralization is considered to be partial or indirect control of the sub units 
whilst the central government still retains considerable control of the country in general. 
According to (Robertson Work 2002: 6).the central government effectively, 
“ . . . redistributes authority and responsibility to local units of government 
or agencies that are not necessarily branches or local offices of the 
delegating authority. Whilst some transfer of accountability to the sub-
national level units to which power is being delegated takes place, the bulk of 
accountability is still very vertical and to the delegating central unit” 
It also creates to some extent the relationship of principal and agent in that the authority to 
which responsibilities are delegated is ultimately responsible to its principal as agent. 
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(iv) Divestment 
According to (Robertson Work 2002:7) this occurs when; 
“ . . . Planning and administrative responsibility or other public 
functions are transferred from government to voluntary, private or non-
governmental institutions with clear benefits to and involvement of the 
public. This often involves contracting out of partial service provision or 
administrative functions, deregulation or full privatisation” 
 
As simple as these concepts appear to be, Conyers (1985) propounds that the application of 
decentralization in different countries requires a study of their situations so that the 
appropriate type of decentralization is applied and so that decentralization will not just be a 
label of reference. To this extent, she states that each specific situation should be examined 
by reference to the political structure within which it operates, the functional activities over 
which authority is transferred, the type of authority or power which is transferred with respect 
to each functional activity the level(s) or area(s) to which such authority is transferred and the 
individual, organization or agency to which authority is transferred (Conyer 1985: 89). She 
also notes that this approach provides a detailed description of government and therefore a 
better basis for analysis and comparison than a mere label and it allows for the existence of a 
wide range of models or types of decentralization (by examining each characteristic 
individually).  
 
It is noted that this classification will further help to measure the degree of decentralization in 
a meaningful way. Rondinelli notes that political, economic, spatial and administrative 
concepts of decentralization differ drastically in their meanings, implications and 
consequences. He observes that governments can deconcentrate central government 
bureaucracies without promoting political or economic decentralization. Indeed, 
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administrative deconcentration can appreciably increase the power of the state by creating an 
organisational structure for deeper penetration and control, as was achieved by many political 
leaders of post-colonial African governments (Rondinelli 1990: 493). 
 
2.5  Good Governance and Development 
Government is an important institution for the development or underdevelopment of any 
country. This fact is well recognised by various global organisations that are primarily 
concerned with issues of government, governance and development of every nation. Such 
organisations include the World Bank, the World Health Organisation, the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Development Programme and 
the African Development Bank. They all subscribe to the fact that governance is an 
indispensable factor in the developmental process of the state. To these organisations it is the 
involvement and performance of government in development that is described as governance. 
In essence there can be no governance without government in either complex or traditional 
forms.  
 
Governance, and how it works to engender or impede development, is elaborated in the 
example of the World Bank providing financing support to recipient countries to promote 
development. An analysis of the link between the donor and the recipient countries shows 
that some interventions did not yield the expected results for which the World Bank chiefly 
blamed the recipient governments for the failures. The World Bank (1992) study on 
governance and development asserts government as being central: 
“ . . . to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters strong 
and equitable development, and it is an essential complement to sound 
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economic policies. Governments play a key role in the provision of 
public goods. They establish the rules that make markets work 
efficiently and, more problematically, they correct for market failure.” 
This submission is based on an earlier study by the World Bank (1989) on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, entitled, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa - from Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term 
Perspectives Study’. That study demonstrates that the Bank’s numerous interventions in 
facilitating development in Sub- Saharan Africa (through different programmes and projects) 
failed to deliver the anticipated results for reasons connected to the quality of the recipient 
government action. For example some economic policies such as the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) and different forms of aid have not translated into a remarkable socio-
economic development of the Sub-Saharan region. The failures of such economic policies, 
economic interventions and aids are attributed principally to bad governance.  
 
While the failure of development has been linked to poor governance, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could not be totally exonerated from the failures in 
stabilizing global financial markets coupled with what some commentators describe as the 
arrogant use of aid conditions in developing countries (Lopes 1999: 512). Lopes’s assertion 
brings to the fore the conflict between SAPs in developing countries and globalization and 
economic integration. Although it is claimed that global integration and SAPs became 
mutually reinforcing as the adoption of the SAPs reform measures encourage economic 
interdependence, there are indications that its benefits accrue unequally, resulting in 
polarisation of income between the rich and the poor (Lopes 1999). In the same vein, it has 
also widened the gap between developed countries and the developing countries. The 
developed countries take advantage of the liberalization of privatization policies to the 
detriment of developing countries. Ajakaiye (2004:55) sees the policies and conditionalities 
of SAPs as largely responsible for its failures. He buttresses this view with an assertion that: 
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“. . . an attribute of SAPs is an aversion to planning and regional 
integration. SAPs have lessened the capacity of African states and 
governments to create conditions necessary for economic reforms as they 
require indiscriminate universal expenditure on health, education, water 
supply and infrastructure in an environment devoid of social safety nets.” 
 
Governance is not a new phenomenon in history; it is as old as the history of government. The 
concept enjoys critical attention from scholars and policy makers who place much emphasis on 
the concept of ‘good’ governance, hence the attempts by various commentators and global 
agencies to design templates for what constitutes good governance. In the course of such 
design, the ideal of good governance became exposed to various definitions and understanding. 
While some associate it with democracy, good civil rights, transparency, rule of law and 
efficient public services thereby making it synonymous with government, others describe it in a 
broader notion than government  (Olateju: 2013). Good governance remains a prominent factor 
in measuring the success or failures of governments especially in development in the late 
1980s.  From this period, the concept of good governance became the yardstick for mostly the 
third world countries to access opportunities available at the global institutions.  
 
All international funding agencies and governments have placed emphasis more on building 
and sustaining good governance as the means of attaining development. This view challenges 
those who believe that some of the third world countries such as Nigeria could not successfully 
embark on any developmental journey on their own due to some inherent values in their 
cultures (Huntington and Harrison; 2001). The term ‘good governance’ thus refers to the 
quality and standard to which political and administrative authority is exercised at all levels in 
the management of a country’s human and natural resources. In essence good governance could 
be taken as submitted by the UNDP (1992) as comprising all the mechanisms, processes and 
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institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal 
rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. This supports the assertion above 
that there is no governance without government and reinforces the submission of Olateju 
(ibid) that governance cannot be judged solely on outcomes, but processes and relationships 
that produce it must also be considered. Kaufman et al (1991:1) had earlier expressed this 
view to buttress the relevance of governance to development. It was emphatically stressed by 
Kaufman and his group that there is a need for us to consider governance as: 
“ . . . the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised; the process by which governments are formed, selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the 
state for institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them.” 
To Kaufman et al (ibid), governance represents a robust interaction between the formal and 
informal institutions of government and the significance of such interaction to economic 
growth and development. This understanding of governance appears to have significantly 
influenced the position of development institutions and experts and international 
policymakers such as The World Bank, and the institutions referred to above, so that good 
governance is a prerequisite for sustained growth in the living standards of citizens of any 
country (World Bank 2000; UNDP 2011; Kaufmann et al. 2000; Knack 2003).  
 
It can reasonably be held (for the purpose of this thesis and generally) that good governance 
means the equitable and consensus orientated exercise of power that represents effective and 
efficient state mechanisms, bureaucratic capability, accountability, responsiveness, provision 
of market rights, minimal corruption and overall performance of governments (Manor 1999; 
Johnson and Start 2001; World Bank and IMF 2006; UNESCAP 2006; Kaufmann et al 
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2006). The formal structure that facilitates the core components of governance and overall 
performance for growth and development, as elucidated by development experts, 
international policy makers, and development institutions, remains an important topic in 
development studies.  
 
Perhaps this perception of governance prompts the Canadian International Development 
Agency to accept governance as the institutions, processes and traditions that determine how 
power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say (1997). In this 
context ‘good governance’ becomes synonymous with the effective, honest, equitable, 
transparent and accountable exercise of power at various levels of government. Experts in 
good governance and international affairs such as Wilson  (2000) stress that good governance 
could easily be measured using the relationships between governments and markets, 
governments and citizens, governments and the private or voluntary sector, elected officials and 
appointed officials, local institutions and urban and rural dwellers, legislative and executive 
branches, nation states and institutions etc; Wilson’s view aligns with the World Bank Report 
(1994) where the issue of development was inextricably linked to  good governance.  Good 
governance involves: 
“. . . open and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent 
processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an 
executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a 
strong civil society participating in public affairs; and behaving 
under the rule of law.”  (Word Bank 1994: 8) 
Further, the World Bank refers to good governance as a “. . . public service that is efficient, a 
judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its 
public.”(World Bank 1989: xii). The World Bank (2009) provides six parameters for 
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evaluating good governance using the following indicators to assess good governance in 
different countries: 
 Regulatory quality: this indicator of governance captures the perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
 Government effectiveness: this dimension captures the perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
 Rule of law: this indicator captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
 Control of corruption: this aspect captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
 Voice and accountability: this dimension of governance captures the perceptions of 
the extent to which a country’s citizens participate in government and in the policy 
making process. This includes freedom of expression, press freedom, civil liberty and 
free and fair elections. 
 Political stability in addition to absence of violence or terrorism: this element captures 
the perception of the likelihood of political instability that may result from, for 
example, ethnic or religious conflicts, and politically induced violence, the likelihood 
of a military coup and insurgency or terrorism. 
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In evaluating governance those six measures serve as institutions and conventions through 
which power is exercised. All six indicators contribute to the emerging practical research on 
governance that has offered advocacy tools for reformers and activists to champion as well as 
monitor policy reforms in different countries.  
 
It is pertinent to state here that contrary to the World Bank’s view it is somehow difficult to 
measure good governance with a universally acceptable set of criteria and definition of 
successful delivery. Pierre Landell-Mills and Ismall Serageldin (1991:3) have argued that the 
concept of good governance is a “highly complex one, and [one that] is surrounded by 
intense controversy”. This impression underscores the varied interpretations of the concept of 
good governance, which had been earlier stated in this thesis as being subject to difficulties of 
definition. Stoker (1998) wrestled with the complexity inherent in the universal template for 
measuring good governance; in his submission, he enunciated five propositions from the 
assumed universalism of good governance. These include the elements that refer to 
institutions and actors that are drawn from and, also, beyond government; those elements that 
illuminate the blurred boundaries between the various actors and responsibility of each actor 
in dealing with the social and economic issues; those elements that identify the power 
dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action; 
the elements that deal with the autonomous self-governing networks of the actors and those 
elements that recognise the capacity to get things done independent of the power of 
government to command or use its authority. An evaluation of Stoker’s propositions reveals 
that governance is based on both formal and informal institutions. While formal institution 
represents the structural and legal frameworks of government, the informal institution 
represents the social-cultural context of the people. 
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The state, or government, is central in creating and sustaining an environment that fosters 
strong and equitable development. It is also an essential and complementary factor leading to 
sound economic policies. However, the role of government is not limited to the provision of 
public goods. Government also has the obligation of creating a robust environment that seeks 
to achieve equity, transparency, participation, responsiveness, accountability and the rule of 
law. A point is raised by scholars such as Fristchak (1994) and Van Dok (1998) on the usage 
of the adjective ‘good’ to qualify governance in that they regard that term to be subjective 
and relative to the specific context. They argue that the notion of what is good is defined by 
the desired outcome, which varies from one situation to another. In other words, an objective 
interpretation of the term ‘good governance’ could vary on a case-by-case basis. 
Notwithstanding that point of view, for present purposes there is an acceptable general 
standard and benchmark of measuring what constitutes good and bad governance as set out 
herein.  
 
The World Bank study on governance and development (1992) tries to separate symptoms of 
good from poor governance deserves close scrutiny in order to see whether such 
classification is sufficient to determine good from poor governance. The World Bank 
identifies factors such as the failure to make a clear separation between what is public and 
what is private in this context. Hence there may be a tendency to divert public resources for 
private gain resulting in a failure to establish a predictable framework of law and government 
behaviour conducive to development, or arbitrariness in the application of rules and laws; 
excessive rules, regulations and licensing requirements, which impede the functioning of 
markets and encourage rent-seeking; priorities inconsistent with development, resulting in a 
misallocation of resources and excessively narrowly based or non-transparent decision 
making as signals for poor governance in any country.   
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In apparent agreement with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme 
(2012) did not hesitate to capture its own view of good governance as earlier stated in this 
chapter as the exercise of:  
“ . . . .economic, political and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, 
processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
obligations and mediate their differences.” 
For the United Nations Development Programme therefore, governance is the way 
government uses its authority to provide services, to make laws and enforce them.  
 
Good governance, by reference to that serves as both a means and an end. It is a means to 
achieve the goals of human development, the main elements of which are articulated through 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Programme focus on the mechanisms that promote good governance, the 
processes used in achieving good governance and the outcomes achieved. The outcomes at 
least for UNDP are peaceful, stable and resilient societies, where services delivered reflect 
the needs of communities, including the voices of the most vulnerable and marginalized. 
Following this definition will reveal that both the World Bank (1992) and the United Nations 
Development Programme approach to governance and development is purely an institutional 
approach, which focuses solely on institutional reforms in terms of the intuition of Public 
Sector Management (PSM). The reforms of the PSM came in various ways to the developing 
countries. For example, most of the public sector reform programmes that have taken place in 
developing countries during the last two decades were introduced as part of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank in the 1980s. Unfortunately, public 
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reforms within this period were deemed to be inefficient and often ineffective, because they 
led neither to cost containment nor to quality improvement (ibid). 
 
A World Bank study on public sector management notes that: “. . . when the capacity of the 
public sector to manage the economy and deliver public services is weak, the prospects for 
development are poor” (World Bank 1992:12). Special attention is given to public 
investments, budget planning and the civil service. Improving public sector management is 
about developing effective policy processes and systems that enable governments to manage 
public revenues, expenditure and debt within agreed fiscal targets. It is also about allocating 
fiscal, administrative and functional authority across levels of government in a way that 
ensures cooperative and constructive engagement (World Bank: Governance and Public 
Sector management).  
 
The 1992 World Bank report indicates that the public sector in many developing countries 
has been characterised by “uneven revenue collection, poor expenditure control and 
management, a bloated and underpaid civil service...and weaknesses in the capacity of core 
economic agencies to design and implement policies that would address these problems” 
(World Bank 1992:12). The issue arising from the problems enumerated by the World Bank 
report is the need to put in place structures and mechanisms that would enhance effective 
public sector management. The Governance Indicators of the World Bank define government 
effectiveness as “measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and the 
implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” 
(Kaufman, Aart and Mastruzzi 2008:7).  
 
  
50 
 
The above analysis shows that the means of achieving of good governance in PSM is 
predicated on the public servants, politicians and bureaucrats. The failure of the PSM reforms 
was later attributed to factors such as lack of efficiency, lack of accountability, ineffective 
management practices, and corruption (ibid). In essence these failures were largely traced to 
the same public servants, politicians and bureaucrats that were expected to deliver good 
governance through public sector management in the first instance. This development 
therefore elicits the need for a new approach to the management of the public sector that 
would stimulate good governance. In response to that imperative the debate on public sector 
management shifted to New Public Sector Management (NPSM), the arguments for which 
arise largely from the political, economic and fiscal pressures on government from the 
international donor agencies for good governance and development, especially in the 
developing countries. The economic and fiscal deficits in such countries required a rethink of 
the structure of government and roles of each tier of government in the management of the 
public sector. These pressures were stronger in the political sector where calls for full 
democratisation of the state and decentralisation of responsibilities were very strident, 
especially in the African countries, Nigeria included. Such demands provided a fertile ground 
for the emergence and consolidation of NPSM, driven by the combination of economic, 
social, political and technological factors. These factors, as mentioned above, were mostly 
triggered by the pressures from the international agencies on state governments for efficiency 
and reduced cost of delivering public services. Unfortunately the pressures for change were 
all within the neo-liberal economic and political context. 
 
Achieving the objectives of the NPSM requires both or any of Larbi’s (2003) submission. 
Larbi highlights the paths that the affected countries must follow as management 
decentralisation, desegregation and downsizing of government, creating leaner and flexible 
  
51 
 
organisational structures and systems, and giving managers more freedom to manage on a 
local or central basis. The alternative is the path that emanates from new institutional 
economics, which emphasizes market and competition as a way of giving choice and ‘voice’ 
to users and promoting efficiency in service delivery. Larbi’s strategies constitute a 
fundamental plank of investigation in this study, in particular the first strategy as he 
enunciates.  
 
This study investigates the extent to which the structure of decentralization engenders or 
inhibits good governance and development in Nigeria. It is postulated that the state, and the 
people who were supposed to drive governance, and serve as beneficiaries of the outcomes of 
such governance, respectively, were largely ignored by the World Bank, UNDP, PSM and 
NPSM due to their seemingly neo-liberal character. Their institutional approach to 
governance and development focuses solely on institutional reforms in terms of public sector 
management. This approach tends not only to take control of the economic sector away from 
both the state and the people; it also turns the people into passive spectators in the political 
sector. The state can, in such circumstances, became a tool in the hands of the private sector 
operators through which policies that were favourable to private maximization became the 
priorities of the state. The efforts of the state at directing resources to where it considers vital 
for the stability of the polity was completely eroded by the profit maximization drive of the 
private organisations whose sole interest is based on large returns from less inputs.  
 
This therefore calls for the alternative paradigm, which this thesis attempts to prove. While it 
is accepted by the author that there is a need for institutional reinvigoration of the state, 
particularly in Nigeria, focus on what made such institutions unable to deliver in the first 
instance is critical. The major challenge in Nigeria doesn’t lie in the institutions but mainly in 
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the nature of such institutions, which, if modified and empowered, may be able to positively 
contribute to good governance countrywide. This is where the issue of decentralisation of 
powers and responsibilities become vital in the search for good governance and development 
in Nigeria. That alternative paradigm (for the explanation of good governance and 
development) is necessitated by the belief that development is the main agenda of good 
governance.  
 
In the view of Soares Jr. and Quintella (2008), countries have differing development levels. 
Enriching this argument are Bjornskov, Gupta and Pedersen, (2008) with a submission that 
technical, cultural, economic and social factors influence development in any country. 
Development issues take a key role in governance and the major yardstick in evaluating the 
success of governance is development. Consequently the concept of, and the debate about, 
development becomes a major contention that exerts enormous pressure on the socio-political 
structure of any nation in particular and world politics in general.  Scholars such as Leftwich 
(2007) and Wunsch and Olowu (1990) hold that many causes and conjectures for the 
incidences of underdevelopment and uneven developments in the nations are linked not only 
to the political structures but also to global economic politics. Invariably, development in 
terms of economic growth, human and social capital is woven around governance and market 
forces. Growth and decline of development is therefore linked to political considerations and 
arrangements. 
 
In effect the factors and values that determine the kind of structure of government and 
institutions equally affect the policies, planning and execution of developmental programmes. 
To this extent it is noted that in many developing countries local services and infrastructures 
are either provided by central governments ineffectively and inefficiently, or by community 
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organisations and private businesses sporadically (Rondinelli et al 1989: 57). They argue that 
the inefficiency is caused by the gap between government, which should be responsible for 
the holistic development of its citizens, and the people themselves. Consequently, the 
aspirations and desires of the people are not realised.  
 
Although the neo-liberalist approach to governance advocates a shift from the public to the 
private sector for the provision of goods and services, what has not been demonstrated is the 
extent to which the free market can efficiently engender development in developing poor 
economies. The role of government in bringing about development is, therefore, fundamental 
if the optimum and desired outcome is to be achieved. Development, in the view of Degutis, 
Urbonavičius and Gaižutis (2010), simply refers to improvement in the quality of life, human 
welfare and social wellbeing. Assessing development may involve comparing one nation with 
others or comparing past and present levels in similar countries (Barro, 2000). Development 
is principally measured in two ways; human development and economic development (Jacobs 
and Šlaus, 2010; Degutis, Urbonavičius and Gaižutis, 2010). Economic development 
quantifies the wealth and means of wealth generation in the country (e.g. banking or 
information indicates more advancement compared to agriculture, fishing and mining). On 
the other hand the concept of human development quantifies population accessibility to 
education, wealth, leisure, security, health, employment opportunities, nutrition, cultural and 
political freedom (Barro, 2000). Leisure and health could be regarded as ‘quality of life’ 
indicators while nutrition and wealth are indicators of standards of living. To determine if 
individual needs and wants are satisfied, there are several social and economic parameters 
that could be employed to determine the level of satisfaction (Soares Jr and Quintella, 2008; 
Barro, 2000). 
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Bjornskov, Gupta and Pedersen, (2008) and Jacobs and Šlaus, (2010) were of the view that 
development usually occurs unevenly. Whereas a nation may have high Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) derived from petro-dollar exploitation, as in the case of Nigeria, some 
population segments may still remain in poverty, lacking essential access to decent housing, 
basic education, good health, a care delivery system and so on. These negative aspects are 
true reflection of the Nigerian reality, compelling a thorough examination of Nigeria’s 
federalism for the purpose of explaining its impact on the socio-economic development (or 
lack thereof) of the country. With the foundation laid for what could be considered as good 
governance using Stoker’s assumed universal criteria, efforts are geared towards the 
navigation of Nigeria’s development using key indicators such as social cohesion, poverty 
level, unemployment rate, infrastructural facilities etc; to see whether the Nigerian 
governments, especially at the local level, are actually engaged in good governance.  
 
2.6 Federalism in Nigeria and its Challenges 
Federalism in Nigeria appeared to be successful from 1954 to the end of the first Republic 
(1960 – 66). In contemporary Nigerian however there are challenges that render the federal 
arrangement unsuccessful. Olasupo and Fayomi (2012) outline different forms of corruption 
causing the failure of Nigerian federalism. They include diversions, duplications, 
multiplications and the withholding of similar resources during project execution by distinct 
government agencies. The federal government is reported by Olasupo (2005) as having 
deducted statutory transfer funds allocated to the local government so wiping out local 
government entitlements thereby causing zero allocations by local governments to local 
government. Since the local governments rely upon fiscal transfers made by the federal 
government to finance services, absent such transfers they cannot then provide services to 
ensure development, the position of “zero allocation” .As to diversions of resource, Olasupo 
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(2005) reports that state governments, in most cases, withhold statutory contributions made 
for the local government, depriving them of the required revenue. In other cases, state 
governments divert statutory allocations for personal use by draining the federal accounts. 
Duplication during project execution causes inter-agency, inter-nongovernmental and inter-
governmental problems (Olasupo and Fayomi 2012).  
 
A study by Abdulhamid and Chima (2016) reveal that the federal system of government was 
firstly introduced to Nigeria in 1954 through the Lyttleton Constitution within three distinct 
regions; the western region, the eastern region and the northern region. These regions were 
free of the grip of the central government especially in the areas of resource control, police 
and foreign affairs. Every region had its regional flag that served as the identity symbol for 
their peoples and each had its town councils as opposed to the current system of local 
government councils. The major functions of the town councils was to collect taxes on behalf 
of the regional governments and to also ensure quick delivery of government essential 
services such road maintenance, provision of public water, primary health care and sanitary 
inspection services etc. As such it delivered services to where they were needed in a straight 
line, unlike the present system that has added layers of bureaucracy, all of which hampers 
rather than helps service delivery. 
 
It is important to stress at this point that the structural framework of the Nigerian federal 
system has evolved over the years, from a highly devolved federal structure to a highly 
centralised federal structure. The structure of states as against the regional set up has been a 
consistent feature in the Nigeria federal arrangement. The breakup of the three regions in 
1966 necessitated the reorganisation of fiscal relations. The federal government was given the 
control over the Distributable Pool Account, which consisted of different percentages of each 
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state’s export revenues. Between 1976 and 1979, the system was further centralised and 
federal control extended to almost all revenue collected in the Federation account from where 
it was then distributed to the subsidiary levels of government.   
 
This shift resulted in   the gradual movement from the 100% derivation in the first republic to 
the present sharing formula, which ‘promote[s] inter-ethnic inclusiveness and discourage[s] 
sectional imbalance and bias in the decision-making process’ (Suberu. 1996:71-72). At the 
inception of the federal arrangement in 1954 there was fiscal autonomy for the regions both 
over expenditure decisions and the local revenue base. The latter consisted primarily of 
mining rents, personal income tax and receipts from licenses. Centrally collected revenues, 
mainly from export, import and excise duties, was distributed to the regions according to the 
derivation principle. That principle was modified in the national interest when Nigeria 
attained independence. (See table 1). At that point the economy of the country shifted from 
the traditional agro base to an oil based economy.  Following from this critical juncture, the 
evolution of Nigerian federal system has taken place along the path the path of fiscal 
centralisation, in which most federal states depend on the disbursements from the centre that 
largely draw on the country’s oil economy. 
 
Table 1: Derivation Formula 1960-Till Present. 
Years Producing States % Federal Government % Distributable Pool % 
1960-67 50 20 30 
1967-69 50  50 
1969-71 45  55 
1971-75 45 minus off-shore  55 plus off-shore 
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proceeds proceeds 
1975-79 20 minus off-shore 
proceeds 
 80 plus off-shore 
proceeds 
1979-81   100 
1982-92 1 ½   98 ½  
1992-99 3  97 
199- 13  87 
Source: Adapted from Sagay, 2001: From 1967, the Federal government shares from the 
distributable pool. 
 
2.7 Local Government system in Nigeria and their Challenges  
Olowu and Wunsch (2004) reveal that the goal of creating local governments is to bring the 
government closer to the people at grass root level. Local government changes in Nigeria, as 
observed by Abdulhamid and Chima (2016) sought to quicken development as well as 
facilitate participation of the local population in government, holding individuals in authority 
accountable based on job descriptions. Nonetheless, in spite of broad confirmation of the 
local government system as potentially having the power to mobilise people in ensuring local 
participation in governance, this tier of government in Nigeria has not succeeded. A number 
of scholars have investigated that position and found key challenges hindering the 
performances of the local government system in Nigeria. The primary challenges are poor 
funding (George, 2010; Gboyega, 1987), corruption (Adamolekun, 1979; Ekpo and Ndebbo, 
1998; Olasupo and Fayomi 2012), poor service delivery and scarcity of human capital and 
resources (Bamidele, 2013; Oyediran, 2001).  
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With regard to the constitutional framework, deficiencies as well as reforms which shape 
contemporary local government operations, researchers like Abdulhamid and Chima (2016) 
have focused on studying such deficiencies. According to Aribigbola, Folami, Williams-
Adewinle and Karimu (2013), local government reforms of 1976 and military intervention in 
state politics explain how the Nigeria’s local government system operated in the 20thCentury. 
Abdulhamid and Chima (2016) also agree that military intervention in the state politics 
changed the roles of the local government system. With the constitution introduced in 1976 
serving as the legal model for reforms in 1979, Nigerian local governments have suffered 
from an identity crisis. Since then the local government has searched for its relevance in the 
central government having for a long time been subject to federal and state government 
whims.   
 
According to Abdulhamid and Chima (2016), local government lacks a well-founded 
constitution even with the benefit of historic constitutional developments. To improve 
governance in the local government system Aribigbola, Folami, Williams-Adewinle and 
Karimu (2013) suggest amendments to the constitution by creating guarantees of local 
government autonomy and identity as a constitutional third tier of government. Such 
amendments would overcome the mandatory State Joint Local Government Accounts 
(SJLGA) system, a key factor in the process that ties the operations of local governments to 
the apron string of the state governments.  
 
Observers such as Adamolekun (1979), Ekpo and Ndebbo (1998), Oyediran (2001), George 
(2010), Gboyega (1987) and Bamidele (2013) focused much attention on local governments 
as vehicles for good governance in Nigeria. While government practitioners and scholars 
have suggested different reasons for the success and failure of federalism in ensuring 
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development in Nigeria (Abdulhamid and Chima, 2016), others blame gaps in reforms before 
1976that promoted administration but failed to promote local government as the third tier of 
Nigerian government (Wilson, 2013). When Nigeria gained independence Wilson (2013) 
asserts that the local governments were reduced to simple regional governance agents but 
with the 1976 reforms, the local government started to experience changes based on the wish 
of the federal government operators. For example, in spite of the colonial history and rule in 
Nigeria, the contemporary local government system that started with the 1976 local 
government reforms, as Olanipekun (1988) observes, contained good objectives that included 
attaining uniformity in the local governance system in the Nigerian federation and the 
extension of the principles of federalism through expanding the reach of government to the 
grassroots level for participation by the local populations. This view was further corroborated 
by Abdulhamid and Chima (2016) who explained that the reforms sought to reorganise and 
modernize the local government system making it the best system of governance in Africa. 
Abonyi (2010:90) observes that the state governments, alongside the federal government, 
from thereon had made extensive changes to the local government system, expanding its 
functions and structure. The collaboration encouraged multiple purpose functions of the local 
government, a government tier having devolved status, responsible for ensuring rural 
development, mobilizing development in remote areas by improving communication, 
infrastructure and empowering participatory democracy (Wilson 2013: 137).  
 
This was quite unlike the position in 1954 when according to Ikeanyibe (2009) each region 
had complete control over its government structure, government type and local government 
functions. Even though the ordinance rule of 1950 promoted democratic and participatory 
elements in local governments, Abdulhamid and Chima (2010) found that the rule also 
initiated regional or federal dominance over the local government administrative system. 
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Federal dominance, according to George (2010) was apparent throughout the British colonial 
period, and has also endured all the way through post-colonial period to the modern Nigeria. 
Some researchers agree that federalism was successful in Nigeria previously, especially in the 
first Republic due to the robust relationship between the regional governments and their local 
governments. Ekpo and Ndebbio (1998) observe that in 1988 the local government 
underwent additional changes as the federal military government introduced changes in civil 
service. The changes, according to Abdulhamid and Chima (2010) were meant to 
professionalize some of the services delivered by the local government through the 
establishment of officers (for example the auditor general, treasurer, councillors and 
secretaries) and mandatory service delivery departments such as supply, finance and 
personnel. In addition, the Local Government Service Commission was given explicitly 
defined functions for instance in its monitoring local government. 
 
To encourage good governance through federalism in Nigeria, Wilson (2013) contend that 
the constitution passed in law in 1979 empowered the local government as the third tier of 
government with devolved functions. All such reforms gave legal capacity to the local 
government to use the available resources (funds and humans) in actualizing the function of 
ensuring democratic governance in Nigeria Abdulhamid and Chima (2016) and Wilson 
(2013), That the successes of the 1976 reforms couldn’t be replicated in successive 
administrations raised a number of questions such as what happened to a formally successful 
system and how the federal government in three regions (East, West and Northern Nigeria) 
operated successfully to enhance good governance and development immediately after the 
civil war when in theory the conditions that followed might have been more conducive to 
good governance. Furthermore, issue arises as to the lessons that the current government can 
adopt from previous implementation of federalism to ensure successful decentralization, thus 
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guaranteeing development, answering these questions provides an understanding of the 
deficiencies in the current federal structure of Nigeria.  
 
Using secondary data to examine several local government reforms to bring about good 
governance through the local government revealed that although the 1976 reforms and the 
1979 constitution formally recognized the local government, the local governments were left 
without independent political authority. Consequently the unequal correlation between the 
Nigerian government tiers with the local government hinders effective governance. While 
suggesting some reforms that might guarantee successful federalism, Wilson (2013) asserts 
that as a third tier of government. The local governments need to operate as independent 
authorities with explicitly defined functions and without interference from the state 
governments, such large scale interference being evident in present day Nigeria. Tonwe 
(2012) sees such interference as a major contributor to failed federalism and failed 
decentralisation in Nigeria, a view supported by Onor (2005) who states that such 
intervention remains more of a problem than a solution to the challenges confronting 
effective local government and governance. A key observation of this study is that such 
interference is not the only militating factor against the local governments in delivering good 
governance at the grassroots. There are other factors such as the problematic fiscal relations 
and   weak civic engagement, poor participation by citizens in governance. 
 
2.8 Fiscal Relations and the challenge of Nigerian Federalism 
The principle of fiscal relations in Nigeria is significantly based on structures that 
expropriate and distribute. However, such fiscal policy has legal and functional frameworks 
that enable each tier of government to generate revenues and a system of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers. Intergovernmental transfer is dominant in the Nigerian fiscal federalism, 
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when 80% to 90% percent of all sub-national revenues are derived from intergovernmental 
transfers. Fiscal federalism in Nigeria is essentially an intergovernmental fiscal relation as 
contained in the second and fourth schedules of the 1999 constitution of the federal republic 
These parts of the constitution provide the legal and functional framework for the tiers of 
government to generate and expend revenues.  
 
They also determine the jurisdiction and function of each tier of government in terms of 
powers of revenues collection and responsibilities for provision of goods and services to the 
citizens
9
 (Dunmoye, 2002: 49; Okunroumu 1997:157-162; Elaigwu 2007: 204). 
 
Table 2. Nigeria: Legislative List 
10
Assignments Tier of Government  
 
 
 
 
Expenditure Category  
Federal only  Defence; Shipping; Federal trunk roads; 
Aviation; Railways; Posts, telegraphs and 
telephones; Police and other security 
services; Regulation of labour, interstate 
commerce, telecommunications; Mines 
and minerals; Social Security; Insurance; 
National statistical system; National 
Parks; Guidelines for minimum education 
standards at all levels; Water resources 
                                                 
9
The current distribution of responsibilities is provided in the Second and Fourth Schedules of the 1999 
Constitution—Part I of the Second Schedule contains the exclusive legislative list on which only the federal 
government can act; Part II contains the concurrent legislative list on which both the federal and state 
governments can act; the Fourth Schedule provides the list of functions of the Local Government Councils. 
Hence, strictly speaking, the Constitution does not really provide the list of functions to be executed by the 
Federal Government of Nigeria and the states (as it does for the Local Government Councils), but only the 
subjects upon which they can legislate. However, these legislative lists form the guidelines for other legal 
decrees and sector policy reports that lay out the specific expenditure responsibilities of the different tiers of 
government. 
10
Source: 1999 Constitution and various sector policy reports 
  
63 
 
affecting more than one state;  
 
Federal-State (shared)  Antiquities and monuments; Electricity; 
Industrial, commercial and agricultural 
development; Scientific and technological 
research; Statistics and surveys; 
University, technological and post-
primary education; Health and social 
welfare;  
 
State-Local (shared)  Primary, adult and vocational education; 
Health services; Development of 
agriculture and non-mineral natural 
resources;  
 
Local government  Economic planning and development; 
Cemeteries, burial grounds; Homes for the 
destitute and infirm; Markets; Sewage and 
refuse disposal; Roads, streets, street 
lighting, drains, other public facilities. 
 
States and local government are financed through three sources of revenue; internally 
generated revenue; revenues shared with the federal government; but, mainly, by transfer 
from the federal account. States and local governments are highly dependent on revenue 
sharing arrangements from the federal level with oil revenue currently accounting for 75% of 
all consolidated government revenue in Nigeria and under the current formulae, oil revenues 
are divided according to a rule that first gives 13% to oil producing states (the derivation 
principle) and then splits remaining revenues between the Federal Government (53%), State 
Governments (27%), and Local Governments (20%). Revenues from customs, excise, and 
corporate income taxes are divided by the same formula but without the derivation principle. 
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Revenues from VAT are divided in the following ratio; 15% to the Federal Government, 50% 
to State Governments, and 35% to Local Governments. In each case, a small part of the 
federal share is divided among the special funds (The World Bank: Nigeria Economic Report 
2003). Federation revenue released to sub-national government rose from 7.4% of GDP in 
1999 to about 15.3% of GDP in 2001 (Ahmad and Mottu 2002:5). Oil revenues play a 
dominant role in intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria. Production is concentrated in 
eight states, mainly in the Niger River delta. The current revenue allocation formula is as 
follows: Federal Government (52%), States (26.72%), and Local Governments (20.60%). 
 
Fiscal laws in Nigeria tend to give more power to the federal government than the other sub-
federal units combined. There is an increased dependence of the sub-federal units on the 
federal government particularly for their finances. State and local governments are neither 
given any strong fiscal incentive nor encouraged to generate revenue internally. In view of 
this they are weak financially and a weak financial base of states cannot strengthen or 
guarantee true federalism. As a result, there is discontent, conflict and agitation by the two 
lowertiers against the federal government seeking the right to greater self-reliance. It is 
argued that for any federation to be sustained there must be fiscal decentralization and 
financial autonomy. However, in contrast, in Nigeria, there is fiscal centralization(Omotoso 
2010). 
 
The federal allocations in Nigeria are centrally administered by the National Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission. The make-up of the Commission is 
constitutionally defined, comprising the Federal Minister of Finance and representatives of 
the states, typically the State Finance Commissioners and State Accountants General. The 
commission meets in the national capital Abuja on a monthly basis to allocate the previous 
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month’s tax receipts among the recipient governments. However local governments are not 
directly represented in the Commission (Omotoso 2010). Nigeria's fiscal federalism evolves 
hand in hand with political federalism. Elaigwu (2008:23) argues that the history of revenue 
sharing in Nigeria has been one of interregional or inter-state conflicts; that it 
demonstratesgradual movement from the derivation to a mix of principles for distribution 
purposes.  
 
The overview of the Nigerian fiscal federalism shows that there is a persistent problem of 
revenue allocation between the central government and the sub units. Revenue allocation in 
this sense goes beyond economic imperatives; rather it aligns with the argument of Adeshina 
(1998) who statesthat Nigerian fiscal federalism is in the midst of thestruggle for political 
and economic control and domination among various classes and interest groups. In the 
same vein Elaigwu (2008) argues that the Nigerian fiscal federalism, heralding perhaps more 
conflict rather than the harmonious and equitable relationship that it set out to achieve.  
By his theory of Horizontal Inequality (HI) Stewart (2005) argues that when the socio-
economic difference between the people that make up a multi-ethnic country is pronounced 
and geographically represented, there is a higher tendency that violent conflicts, sooner or 
later, will emerge. With marked differences in the socio-economic existence, it becomes easy 
for unscrupulous politicians and ethnic ideologues to mobilize support across religious and 
ethnic lines. However, it is important to note that in HI theory, federalism has an in-built 
capacity to address horizontal inequality through revenue sharing formulas that is designed to 
take from better endowed states to cater for the poorer states. Writing on the factors that 
affect Nigerian federalism, Elaigwu (2008) suggests that the Nigerian federalism has been 
affected by a number of factors, predominant among them being; 
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“(1) the numerous changes in the federal structure, especially in the number 
of sub national units-states and local governments; (2) the nature of 
military rule; (3) the advent of oil revenue and the attendant politics of 
derivation (4) the problem of fiscal equalization, vertically and horizontally; 
(5) persistent review of the legislative list and expansion in the tax powers 
of sub-national units and (6) the imperatives of equity and national 
development”(Elaigwu 2008:252).  
 
2.9 Civic Culture and Participation in Governance.  
As earlier noted institutions and political network matters in how federalism works to bring 
about good governance and development (Obiinger et al 2005; Kemp and Gibson 2005; 
Leftwitch 2007; Law 2013). However, scholars, such as Almond and Verba (1963); 
Chambers and Kymlicka 2002) argue that the level of participation of the citizens is 
dependent on their political culture. Almond and Verba (1963) maintain that a democratic 
political culture requires that a substantial proportion of the public follows and is invested in 
national politics. Without being informed about the national political system, people are 
likely to remain apathetic to the system.  
To this extent political culture deals with citizens’ behaviour in relations to political 
development and governance in society, an issues that produces one of the most intellectually 
stimulating issues to study in the area of comparative politics. In some other instances, 
political culture can be conceptualized as the psychological study of the actions of citizens in 
relations to government and state policies. Political culture, and thus behaviour, affects state 
democratic development and processes to a larger extent, Baba (2015). Richard (2000) and 
Axelrod (1997) incline to the view that the political culture in any nation exemplifies how its 
history affects peoples’ thinking about politics and society as a whole. Richard (2000) asserts 
that politics, being the function of the immediate environment, displays the same key 
characteristics in any country. However political landscapes differ because of economic, 
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cultural, political and social dimensions so that generalisation might be modified according to 
the context.   
 
Political culture is influenced by ‘parochial’ and political ‘orientations’.  Almond and Verba 
(1963) argue that there are three types of political culture; this is based on their studies in five 
democratic countries, namely Germany, Mexico, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America. The first element of political culture identified is the ‘parochial political 
culture’. In this type there is no clear differentiation of specific political roles and citizens are 
mostly uniformed and unaware of their government, typically taking little interest in the 
political process. An example of this type of political culture is Mexico. The second is 
‘subject political culture’. This type represents a situation where citizens are to some degree 
informed and aware of their government occasionally participating in the political process; 
examples of countries like this include Germany and Italy. The third is the ’participant 
political culture’. In this type, the relationships between specialized institutions and citizen 
opinion and activity are interactive; examples of this political culture are the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom.  
 
Many scholars have categorized developing countries, such as Nigeria, as the first category of 
typology of political culture, the parochial political culture. Lerner (1958) and Pye and Verba 
(1965) argue that Almond and Coleman (1960) correctly describe the political culture of 
many Third World nations as one in which citizens are generally unaware and uninvolved in 
politics. Why they are so unaware and uninvolved cannot be stereotyped because political 
culture in itself is not monolithic. The question as to whether people are unaware and 
uninvolved may no longer be conclusive taking into account new orientations and 
opportunities which may provide a new culture. This view accords with that of Dalon and 
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Shin (2014) that citizens in established democracies now appear less allegiant and more 
willing to pursue contentious courses of political action to change the status quo. In addition, 
democracy has spread across the globe, even in nations where the civic culture theory might 
not expect democratization.  
 
Systematic empirical evidence on political attitudes in developing nations is now quite 
extensive with the result that such material is range of more people. This position is further 
advanced by technological advancements referred to by Norris and Inglehart (2009) who 
suggest that the expansion of a globalized economy and social system touches even rural 
areas that once might have fit the civic culture’s description of a parochial society. That 
position questions the typology of civic culture of Almond and Verba (ibid) whose views 
have been questioned for their selection of unrepresentative samples, asking invalid 
questions, overestimating the stability of attitudes and underestimating the impact of short-
term political events and drawing unwarranted connections between cultural patterns and 
regimes; in general, for reaching conclusions not justified by the evidence. The emerging 
question in the civic culture of Nigeria is what kind of orientation can be put in place to 
enhance civic society where individuals are oriented positively to the input structures and 
input processes (Almond and Verba).  This is done in two areas; (1) support of institutions, 
this is the attitude towards the political system are central in political culture (these may 
range from support for leading political actors to general support for the political system 
itself); and, (2) trust, focussing on the relationship in the polity.  
 
As noted above the political culture which prevails in contemporary African society has been 
observed by different scholars to be either the parochial, or subject political culture. With a 
spotlight on Nigeria the political process is characterised by aggressive manipulation of the 
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electorate by political actors, especially those in the seat of power.  Some commonly 
experienced manipulative techniques in the Nigerian electoral process include unjust 
disqualification of candidates, stealing of data capturing machines, supporting politically 
biased police, to mention but a few; such cynicism has, perhaps understandably, resulted in 
an increase in electoral apathy. Nuka (2015) identified the following as factors that engender 
such apathy in civic culture; 
1. The belief that a vote does not count in Nigeria: many people dislike voting in 
elections in Nigeria because of the negative belief that votes do not count in the 
country.  
2. A lack of trust in corrupt politicians: many people have lost trust and faith in 
government and the so-called elected politicians. Many believe that Nigerian 
politicians will say anything to get elected but once in office, they quickly turn their 
back on those who put them there.   
3. The absence of Security at voting centres: the use of thugs, cultists, criminals and 
militants to intimidate political opponents.  
4. Hypercritical negative media: negative political news coverage and political 
criticisms, which in most cases are not always constructive, create cynicism in many 
Nigerians. Thus, voters are at times over-fed with falsehood and a frightening image 
of the political environment. 
5. Illiteracy and poverty: illiteracy and poverty are two powerful forces that militate 
against political participation in Nigeria. Victims of these forces have little or no 
interest in political activities.  
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6. Failure of elected political office holders to honour electioneering promises and the 
imposition of candidates on voters by political parties 
 
Although coined by Almond & Verba (1963) the term ‘civic culture’ came to prominence 
from a survey conducted in five countries (England, Germany, Italy, Mexico and the United 
States) studying the attitudes of citizens in respect of their political society. This resulted in a 
paradigm shift from constitutional analysis to the study of comparative behaviour; a culture is 
a balance of ‘participant traits’, which incline citizens to take an interest in politics and 
participate in elections and generally those other activities that make democracy work. From 
the same source the term ‘subject traits’ are those which incline citizens to respect the law 
and the authority of the state and the government.  Almond & Verba (1963) classified ‘civil 
culture’ as a subset of political culture, which they defined as a substantial consensus on the 
legitimacy of political institutions and the direction and content of public policy. They 
defined ‘civic culture’ as “an allegiant participant culture. Individuals are not only oriented 
to political inputs; they are oriented positively to the input structures and input processes” 
(1963: 31).  
 
Dalton and Shin (2014) in evaluating the submissions of Almond and Verba argue that civic 
culture is mixture of a number of traits, such as a political culture that is based on an aware, 
participatory public, although participation is often a potential rather than a reality. 
Nevertheless, the democratic culture requires a supportive public that identified with the 
political community and trusted the institutions of government.  The submission of Dalton 
and Shin reinforces the interface of institutions and the actors, and in this instance the 
  
71 
 
citizenry.  Civic culture is seen as an integral element in the democratisation of a society or a 
community for its socio-political advancement as it engenders participation.  
 
2.10 Conclusion 
Through the review of relevant literature, this chapter establishes relationships between 
governance and development through a specific examination of some key concepts of 
governance and development to espouse the challenges of the practice of federalism in 
Nigeria, and the challenges of good governance. There is affirmation that the practice of 
federalism has not performed optimally because of the inherent structural defects. It is also 
noted that other factors such as weak civic engagement and poor participation by citizens in 
governance is an integral part of the challenges of Nigerian federalism. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out details of the methodology used to investigate the governance and 
development in Nigeria under federalism. It accounts for the choice of the research design 
methodology used, data collection and management and analysis. It also details the steps 
taken by the researcher to ensure that the research is conducted in an ethical manner. The 
purpose of this study is to determine why decentralization has failed to foster good 
governance and development in Nigeria. The major sections in this chapter are on research 
design, research method, target population, inclusion and exclusion criteria, sample size, 
study procedure, research instruments, method of data collection, data analysis, validity and 
reliability and the key ethical considerations.  
 
3.1  Research design  
The historical institutionalist approach was employed in the design of the research. In this 
context Sanders (2006: 43) adds a more institutional interest by raising questions as to who 
designs institutions, what makes institutions change or collapse and what are the exogenous 
social forces or internal group dynamics that are responsible. The foregoing normative 
questions serve two purposes in this research: firstly they subject the research to various 
investigations and secondly they point to the core aspects of historical institutionalism, 
namely, construction, maintenance and adaptation of institutions (Sanders (2006: 42).  
 
Interpreting the variable factors of institutions therefore requires reliable analytical tools. It is 
important to note from the outset that historical institutionalism employs more narrative in 
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setting out its causal chains (Sanders 2006). However, it does incorporate analysis of 
statistical data to further interpret variables. Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 3) highlight three 
important features that characterize historical scholarship in political science and its ability to 
be able to sufficiently interpret the variables. Firstly they note that historical institutionalists 
address substantive questions that are inherently of interest to a broad public as well as to 
fellow scholars. In other words, historical institutionalism develops explanatory arguments 
about important outcomes or conundrums. Secondly time is of the essence to historical 
institutionalism analysis in the sense that it specifies sequences and traces transformations 
and processes of varying scale and temporality. Thirdly they hold that historical 
intuitionalism analyses macro contexts and hypothesizes about the combined effects of 
institutions and processes rather than just examining only one institution or process at a time. 
This research revolves around substantive questions, the answers to which would be of 
interest to the broad public. It is period specific and it examines questions arising from 
similar institutions. 
 
Historical institutionalism analysis does not however follow a singular pattern. Pierson and 
Skocpol (2002:2) note that historical institutionalism strategies vary in important ways. Some 
are explicitly comparative whilst others analyse trends within just one macro context. In the 
same manner some offer suggestive interpretations while others offer explicit models framed 
in general terms. Some draw extensively from primary sources; others synthesize from 
secondary publications or adopt culturist modes of explanation. As Pierson and Skocpol 
(2002: 3) posit, taking together the three characteristics of historical intuitionalism, that is, “ . 
. . substantive agenda, temporal arguments and attention to contexts and configurations, add 
up to a recognisable historical institutional approach that makes a powerful contribution to 
an understanding of government, politics, and public policies”. In effect the historical 
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methodology is appropriate in answering the normative questions about the ‘goodness’ of 
particular institutions and the struggle to achieve a ‘good state’ (Sanders 2006). 
 
Additionally a case study approach was applied in this research. The qualitative case study 
explored the experiences of the participants in civil service regarding development and 
decentralization in Nigeria (Yin, 2014).  A case study was considered as the finest research 
design to address the primary research question as it sets boundaries for the entire study and 
delivers a perspective on the primary theories and models to see if Nigerian federalism foster 
or hinder development (Frost, 2012).  Yin (2014) defines a case study as a technique most 
researchers use while focusing on in-depth understanding of events or entities in a specified 
time. Case studies depend on diversity of evidence sources, observation, interviews, focus 
groups and videotaping (Neuman & Robson, 2012). In detail individuals, organizations, 
events, school institutions, standards and departments can be examined suitably using a case 
study. Creswell (2013) suggests that case studies are increasingly being used by multiple 
researchers to understand the participants’ experiences. By that method scholars understand 
primary characteristics of real life events, including managerial and organizational decisions 
and processes (Yin, 2014). 
 
A case study will examine specific situations and factors, such as infrastructure development, 
while providing explanations about the primary concerns that are untraveled within the 
population of decentralization and development. Moreover this case study method also 
allowed the researcher to develop a theory, evaluate major factors in Nigerian federalism and 
develop and propose an intervention that guarantees good governance and development 
(Suberu, 2009; Suberu, 2010). The case study method is the most appropriate for this 
research as it (a) deals with the subjective experience of decision makers in civil service; (b) 
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accentuates instances of success by referring to individual subjects experiences through 
listening and observation (so that the data can speak for itself, a powerful feature of 
qualitative research), and (c) allows for focusing on examples of successful good governance 
and development arrangements in three government tiers (Yin, 2014).  
 
The primary focus of the study was an analysis as to how federal structures in Nigeria 
influence governance and development. Rather than depending on the existing standardized 
measures on the development index, the researcher was more interested in (a) the 
participants’ perspectives as a practical subjective experience, (b) the competence of the 
participant and his or her experience in federal practices, and (c) the meaningful experience 
of the participants as interactive, inter-subjective construct extending far beyond the formal 
government tier projects and corresponding implementation mechanisms. To maximize on 
good governance and foster development, there is need to account for decision makers’ 
experiences (Suberu, 2010).  
 
3.2  Research Method 
 
This study comprises of qualitative data mainly derived from the publicly available data on 
governance and development from which the researcher compared governance and political 
and social economic development under federalism. The qualitative narrative is used as it 
enhances the argument in this research by providing in-depth insights into good governance 
and development in Nigeria using Ondo state as a case study.  
 
Through qualitative methods, the researcher collects primary data which is then used to 
corroborate or contest the existing theories, in turn allowing for clarification and 
understanding of distinct observations (Neuman & Robson, 2012; Creswell, 2013). In 
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qualitative research induction is a process through which data linked to particular study areas 
is collected then used to create different theories and concepts (Frost, 2012). In this research a 
qualitative technique was considered the most appropriate as it enables researchers to gain in-
depth meanings through experiences that individuals narrate (Maxwell, 2013) feelings and 
beliefs expressed about federal structure in Nigeria, governance, political culture and 
development, contrary to quantitative technique that is based on descriptions, numerical data, 
structured and cover broader scales (Neuman & Robson, 2012).  
 
This research combines two related methodological and analytical tools. The first is the case 
study approach; the second is the historical institutionalist approach which includes the 
critical juncture approach with some reference to path dependency. Critical juncture analysis 
is favoured here due to its use in comparative-historical analysis, since it provides the means 
of assessing the political origins and development of institutions that exert critical and long-
lasting influences on their social and political environments (Cappocia, 2016).Analysis by 
such means arises in the context of the development of institutions, broadly defined as 
organizations, formal rules, public policies, political regimes, and political economies. Path-
dependency institutions do not always develop as a rigid rational-choice solution to certain 
societal problems Pierson and Skocpol (2002). In this vein, Peters et al, (2005: 1276) argue 
that the path dependency approach models the policy process as ‘a discrete process 
characterised by extended time periods of considerable stability – referred to as path 
dependency – interrupted by turbulent formative moments.’ The path-dependency approach 
notes that decisions we are faced with depend on past knowledge trajectory and decisions 
made, and are thus limited by the current competence base. In other words, history matters 
for current decision-making situations and has a strong influence on strategic planning. It is 
within the scope of path-dependency approach that the history of Nigerian federal system is 
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examined.  For example, Acemoglu et al., (2001, 2012) argue that in the case of Nigeria, the 
nature of institutions promoted by the colonial administration was extractive.  Therefore, 
according to the path dependence theory, societies within Nigeria will become well versed in 
extractive behaviour (North, 1994; Pierson, 2000).Another fitting example relates to 
Nigeria’s mineral and petroleum legislation. A system fraught with rent seeking tends to be 
one with minimal checks on the executive, and hence results in a society that extends 
arbitrary executive powers (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Persson et al., 1997).  
 
Such approaches have generally been the object of critical juncture analysis with the caveat 
expressed by Capoccia, “As a matter of political science, within comparative-historical 
analysis, the concept of critical juncture applies only to the analysis of path-dependent 
institutions and not to all forms of institutional development.”The combined approach 
therefore of critical junctures and path dependence is considered best as the tools for 
identifying institutional development.  In this analytical context critical junctures are defined 
(per Cappocia: 2016: 147-179), “…as moments in which uncertainty as to the future of an 
institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal 
role in setting an institution on a certain path of development, a path that then persists over a 
long period of time.”The combination of these analytical methods is meant to ensure a proper 
interpretation of the variables in the historical and socio-economic events that have impacted 
on the institutional framework of the Nigerian state. Furthermore it becomes clear that all 
actions have corresponding consequences, confirming the potential of collective or individual 
agency. Based on research findings and existing research on successful attempts made by 
other countries using a decentralized system of government, comparisons can be made 
between the position of the United States, Australia and Indonesia against those of the 
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Nigerian experience, and identify reasons for failed attempts in decentralization efforts using 
a sample population from Ondo State 
 
The general literature on institutionalism treats the issues that are crucial to these research 
namely state institutions, actors and political networks asking what institutions are, how they 
structure political life, and how they determine political processes and their results. There are 
three main schools of thought in the ‘new institutionalism’ namely rational choice, 
sociological, and historical institutionalism. The first type of institutionalism focuses on the 
rational choices and individual preferences of different classes of actors towards the rules 
imposed by institutions. In the second type emphasis is placed on the cognitive and normative 
account of institutions, with the possibility that institutions are socially constructed by its 
members, their perceptions, and cognitions, rather than being objective entities (Scott 1987: 
Peters 2007: 117). Thirdly, historical institutionalism emphasizes that institutions, and the 
relations of actors within the rules of these institutions, have to be considered in their 
historical embedding, sequencing, and unfolding. 
 
Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) reinforce the theory that critical juncture analysis helps in 
identifying the disconnection between small contingent events and unsuitable institutional 
political and economic dynamics created though micro-decisions. They reveal that in the 
course of political and social fluidity, key actors make few decisions and choices which are 
effective in directing development in institutions. In this context, this study was able to 
capture the dynamics surrounding critical factors influencing institutional selection choices. It 
does this by the examination of choices and strategies adopted by the political decision 
makers as against the micro decisions of individuals. This provides a theoretical platform to 
place the analysis of critical juncture in this study as a suitable tool for the explanation of 
  
79 
 
strategies often adopted by the political decision makers which influence the outcome of any 
decision, which, in this study means good governance. 
 
Adoption of this approach is further reinforced by the submission of Mahoney (2007) who 
stressed the flexibility of critical juncture to accommodate influencing factors that underpin 
the strategy of any decision made by the political leaders. There are recent comparative 
studies illustrating the strength of the critical juncture approach. For instance, Mahoney (ibid) 
provides an account of change in political regimes using Central America as the sample for 
analysis. In Mahoney’s study, the era of open-minded oligarchic governments at the turn of 
the 20
th
 century includes the critical juncture in which political progresses shaped the 
disparity of regimes through Central America in the subsequent decades. The regimes 
included the old-fashioned dictatorships that developed in Nicaragua and Honduras, 
democracy in Costa Rica and the military dictatorship in El Salvador and Guatemala 
(Mahoney, 2007).  
 
Mahoney makes out that the amplified world demand for native Central American 
agricultural products and technological advances, which endorsed long-distance shipping of 
perishable goods, created new possibilities for the development of agricultural industries in 
those countries. Hence the selections the liberal presidents, alongside their political 
associates, made about agricultural development for the duration of the critical junctures were 
important in setting political institutions on dissimilar paths of development. Mahoney (2007) 
also revealed that the early choices, several of which failed to encourage agricultural 
development due to foreign intervention, in addition to others that thrived but differed based 
on whether the individual countries sought gradual or rapid development, led to the creation 
of institutions and policies that influenced class relations in the rural area. In turn, these 
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emerging class relations created social populations that reinforced the persistence of earlier 
institutional choices, organised the political dynamics in foreseeable ways and stimulated the 
development of states which sustained different agricultural development models. In the 
theory Mahoney offers, precursor conditions were vital frameworks during the critical 
juncture period, but never determined the decisions the political actors made. Mahoney 
(2007) stresses the “historical contingency” of choices made by the liberal presidents, 
positing that the immediate political authority to maintain or increase power decisions 
directly influenced their decisions as opposed to their desire to forge some social coalitions 
that would persist over the long term.  
 
Generally, comparative analyses in political science have different approaches and different 
methods of gathering and analysing data. Peters (1998: 11) highlights five types of study that 
are classified as being components of comparative politics. These include:  
(1)  single country descriptions of politics; 
(2)  analysis of similar processes and institutions in a limited number of countries; 
(3)  the study of developing typologies or other forms of classification schemes for 
countries or sub national units using these typologies to compare groups of 
countries and reveal the internal politics of each political system; 
(4)  statistical and descriptive analysis of data from a subset of the world’s 
countries, usually selected on geographical or development grounds, with the 
aim to test hypotheses about relationship and variables within that ‘sample’ of 
countries; and, 
(5)  statistical analyses of all countries of the world attempting to develop patterns 
and to test relationships across the entire range of political systems.  
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Out of the five types of study, this research study employs the first option, which is a single 
country description of politics. The approach was used to examine in detail the 
decentralization aspects of Nigeria based on the sample population from Ondo State.  This 
approach is considered suitable because of the numerous conceptual issues involved in the 
research and varied characteristics and multi-dimensional nature of institutional designs. The 
research study seeks to determine why the decentralization system of government in Nigeria 
has failed to bring good governance and development by an analysis of a possible 
relationship between decentralization form of government, good governance and 
development. This relationship is tested through the historical institutionalism approach. The 
suitability of this approach comes within the normative interrogation of all the variables that 
constitute and influence governmental institutions.  
 
According to Pierson and Skocpol (2002:4), historical institutionalism interrogates 
historically situated outcomes of broad interests. It asks questions such as:  
 Why something important happened or did not happen?  
 Why certain structures or patterns take shape at some times and places, but not 
others? 
 Why have welfare states emerged and developed along various paths?  
 Why have some countries become stable democracies, whilst others have not?  
 Under what circumstances do ethnic identities become more prominent in 
national or international politics? 
 
 Sanders (2006: 43) adds a more institutional interest to this and raises questions as to who 
designs institutions, what makes institutions change or collapse and what are the exogenous 
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social forces or internal group dynamics that are responsible for such events. The foregoing 
normative questions serve two purposes in this research. Firstly, they subject the research to 
various investigations and, secondly, they point to the core aspects of historical 
institutionalism which are construction, maintenance and adaptation of institutions (Sanders 
2006: 42).  
 
Interpreting the variables of institutions therefore requires reliable analytical tools. It is 
important to note from the outset that historical institutionalism employs more narratives in 
setting out its causal chains (Sanders 2006). However, it does incorporate analysis of 
statistical data to further interpret variables. Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 3) highlight three 
important features that characterize historical scholarship in political science and its ability to 
be able to sufficiently interpret the variables. Firstly, they note that historical institutionalisms 
address large, substantive questions that are inherently of interest to a broad public as well as 
to fellow scholars. In other words, historical institutionalism develops explanatory arguments 
about important outcomes or conundrums. Secondly, time is of the essence to historical 
institutionalism analysis in the sense that it specifies sequences and traces transformations 
and processes of varying scale and temporality. Thirdly, they hold that historical 
intuitionalism analyses macro contexts and hypothesizes about the combined effects of 
institutions and processes rather than just examining only one institution or process at a time. 
This research revolves around substantive questions, the answers to which would be of 
interest to the broad public. It is period specific and it examines questions arising from 
similar institutions. 
 
Historical institutionalism analysis, nonetheless, does not follow a singular pattern. As 
submitted by Pierson and Skocpol (2002:2), historical-institutionalism strategies vary in 
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important ways. Some are explicitly comparative, whilst others analyse trends within just one 
macro context. In the same manner some offer suggestive interpretations, while others offer 
explicit models framed in general terms. Some draw extensively from primary sources; some 
synthesize from secondary publications; others adopt culturist modes of explanation. 
 
This research is descriptive, providing in-depth details of a single country and its politics. 
Since empirical data and data from the existing literature are included, the inferences are 
drawn from primary and secondary sources.  
 
3.3  Target Population of the Study 
There were two samples of the interviews. The first sample consisted of questions for the 
politicians and the policymakers, the civil servants and the academics in the society. The 
second one consisted of the questions for the community leaders, and local members of the 
community.  
 
3.4 Study Procedure 
Interviews were carried out using face-to-face meetings. Interview questions were carefully 
designed to answer the study research question formulated in the first chapter (Kumar, 2005). 
Using the literature reviewed and the research question formulated, an interview protocol 
with open-ended questions was created. As the participants provided information, the 
researcher (interviewer), being the study representative, and provided directions on major 
issues to be addressed. As such, the participants expanded their responses without limiting 
the information.  
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Qualitative interviews are useful in revealing how other people think or feel about their 
experiences (Frost, 2012). Through interviews, participants elaborate their experiences, 
providing more wide and flexible details (Kumar, 2005). The research, therefore, elicits more 
details and information (Creswell, 2013). The researcher, therefore, can comprehend 
experiences and use them to re-construct events he or she never engaged in (Neuman & 
Robson, 2012). Qualitative interviews highlight the significance of understanding and 
relaying meanings to the interviewees, allowing participants to put forward their experiences.  
Data was collected in between October 2016 to February 2017. Each interview was recorded 
then transcribed. The participants were contacted through emails, by telephone and through 
formal and informal connections. The researcher provided research details, particulars and 
the importance of participants’ roles in the research process. The participants opted for 
carrying out the interview in suitable places, where they felt comfortable sharing information 
on governance and development. For a smooth interview process, the researcher prepared an 
interview schedule. Similar question sets linked to general experience in Nigerian governance 
and development were presented to each participant. Most questions were open-ended. Some 
questions, such as those about length of employment, gender and age were close-ended. An 
example of the open-ended question was, ‘how do you feel about Nigerian federalism?’; ‘do 
you think there is improvement in governance in local government from 1999-2016?’; ‘is 
there any platform for interaction between the officials of the local government and the 
community?’ This kind of questions permits the interviewee to express more feelings and 
thoughts freely, particularly in relation to sensitive topics like governance and development 
(Frost, 2012).  
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According to Creswell (2013), qualitative interviewers that follow suitable procedures 
successfully collect data for comprehensive analysis. Creswell proposes the following 
process which the researcher followed: 
 using purposeful sample process to identify the participants; 
 the choice of semi-structured interviews as suitable for the study; 
 record all interviews to transcribe them later; 
 design an interview protocol form for use; 
 conduct a pilot test to test the interview questions and prepare the last script after 
making necessary adjustments;  
 identify the location for interviews; and, 
 obtain the consent from each participant. 
 
Prior to actual data collection the researcher carried out a pilot interview which allowed the 
interviewee to express feelings and thoughts about questions asked. The researcher used 
feedback provided from that interview to resolve challenges in question structuring and 
wording, while pinpointing and eliminating questions likely to upset the participants (those 
issue about which they feel uncomfortable in sharing in an interview). Data from the pilot 
interview was not however used during analysis.  
 
3.5 Research Measurement 
The data collections method in this study consisted of semi-structured interviews. The 
researcher was the instrument in this study and collected the primary data.  The one-on-one 
interview technique can produce a large number of ideas in a short period (Creswell, 2013).  
The researcher conducted interviews with participants by asking pre-formulated questions 
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related to the research topic to promote ideas from participants and collect relevant data.  The 
protocol for the interviews was similar to Maxwell (2013) and Creswell and P (2007) 
discussion on interview techniques.   
 
3.6 Data Collection 
Semi-structured interview questions were found to be useful in stimulating open discussions 
with the participants. The findings from these questions also provide data needed to formulate 
conclusions relevant to the research questions on decentralization in Nigeria. The researcher 
worked in partnership with all participants throughout the whole research process. The 
interviews were classified into five principal categories; political, legal, economic, socio-
economic factors and development. Those five classes relate to issues on good governance 
within the framework of Nigerian political structure. These classifications, though distinct, 
they are strongly interwoven. Consideration of each research category is set out below. 
Political Research 
This involved principally interviewing the political class (the policy makers). This interview 
was an exploration into the historical evaluation of the Nigerian State, the political intrigues 
that are involved in the structural arrangement of Nigeria federalism, the politics of 
distribution (fiscal federalism) and the role of political parties in the political multi-ethnic 
nation and development    
Legal Research 
 This involved interviews with the constitutional lawyers. This aspect of the interview sought 
an in-depth examination of constitutional framework of Nigerian federalism, dealing 
concisely with the constitution of the Federal Republic, distribution and separation of power 
within the framework of Federalism Constitutional Power of the Constituent Federating 
Units, Local Government and Federal Constitutional Power. 
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Economic Research 
 This aspect of research dealt with the technical issues of economy of Nigeria. This involved 
collection of data and documentaries on Nigeria economy, from Agro based economy to oil 
economy. 
Socio-economic research 
This heading included questioning about the perceived benefits accrued to the general 
population by a distribution of wealth through federalism. In part this crossed over with the 
development aspect of the research, post 
Development Research 
This part of the interviews had three dimensions. Firstly it explored the concept of 
development among the local people, and their understanding of the term development and its 
measurement and their assessment of successive governments on development. Specifically, 
the researcher asked questions concerning the available infrastructure i.e. road; primary 
education; and primary health care. Secondly, the study explored how citizens understand 
development and in determining their understanding, the interviewer sought to discover 
whether the local people understood their role in the quest for good governance. Thirdly, an 
aspect of research was conducted among some civil servants.  The main reason for 
interviewing the civil servants was to access the bureaucratic complexities in the federal 
structure, the sub units (States) structure and the issues militating against governance in 
Nigeria. 
 
This research was also conducted with some civil society groups. The researcher chose to 
work with the Action Aid Nigeria on this particular research because the non-governmental 
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organization (NGO) works in the six geo-political regions of Nigeria, and their five thematic 
areas of intervention is hinged on development and good governance. 
 
3.7 Study Setting 
The location used to collect the data was Ondo State which is comprised of eighteen local 
government areas. The local government areas are grouped into three senatorial districts (six 
local governments were visited, two per senatorial district). The respondents targeted in this 
research were civil servants, members of the civil society, politicians and associated policy 
makers, academics, community leaders, local members of the community (persons living in 
vulnerable situations, poverty included). This populace composition gives a balanced 
representation. It is important to note that some of the data are collected, especially from 
policy makers, academics are obtained outside of Ondo State. 
 
This research extensively examined the practice of federalism in Nigeria, while using one 
state as a case study. The choice of using only one state out of the thirty states and the federal 
capital territory of the federation may appear inadequate considering the diversities in Nigeria 
state. However, there are some very fundamental factors that made Ondo State suitable and 
adequate in assessing and analysing federal system in Nigeria. A number of the features 
inherent in the administration of Ondo State are identifiable in and common to all other 
states.  They include; (1) the administrative structure of both state and local governments. 
There exist uniformed administrative systems of state and local governments. The 
administrative systems are enshrined in the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria.  
The institutional lapses exploited by the politicians in Ondo State are also exploited by 
politicians in other states. For example, non election into the local government, but using 
caretaker committees to run the affairs of the local government has been one of the 
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challenges of local governance in Nigeria. (2) Vertical and inter-governmental relationship; 
like many other states in Southwest of Nigeria, Ondo state has been in opposition to the 
federal government. There is a consistent contention between the powers of the federal 
government and state. Ondo State offers a more profound example of this relationship.  Being 
a state in opposition to the federal government for many years  has attendant consequences, 
which  will be further examined in this research; and (3) the Location; Ondo is one of the Oil 
producing states in Nigeria, and it is located near one of the recent hotspots of violence, the 
Niger-Delta. This factor offers a dual advantage for this research. First, it gives opportunity 
of examining the contentious issue of allocation and utilisation of resources accruing to the 
state government.  Secondly, two local governments in Ondo South Senatorial District, 
namely Ilaje and Ese Ondo Local Governments experienced the restiveness of Niger Delta 
Militancy to such extent that   these two local government became part of the Federal 
Government Amnesty Program for ex-militants. It is important to note that being an oil 
producing state, Ondo State receives   13% derivation revenue outside of the statutory 
allocation. This is a significant derivation payment. The struggle for, and the utilisation of the 
funds from the 13% derivation revenue among the Ilajes and Apois, offer an insight to how 
revenue funds can lead to ethnic mobilisation.  This research will therefore draw on 
interviews from officials of Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OSOPADEC). (4) Ethnic and cultural diversity: although Ondo State is predominantly a 
Yoruba speaking State, it does include some non-Yoruba groups. Within the  Yoruba groups 
there are further diversities which sometimes impact on the politics of the state, and quest for 
a political space for the purpose of development.  
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3.8 Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis began with identifying the emergence of principal patterns and 
themes and occurred concurrently with the raw data collected. Data analysis for interviews 
consisted of examining, categorizing and tabulating the patterns of information to address the 
research questions. During the coding process, the researcher identified, named and grouped 
the conceptual groups. The theoretical and conceptual analyses were carried out using 
primary and secondary data. The primary data consisted of interview responses provided by 
the participants. Secondary data, on the other hand, constituted constitutions and legislative 
documents, books, journal articles and newspapers.  
 
This approach enables extensive assessment of historical events, conceptual issues on 
decentralization, governance and development in Nigeria. Furthermore, the research makes 
extensive use of global aggregated indices of relevant international development 
organisations to further analyse the causal relationship between institutions, good governance 
and development. After interviewing all participants, the questions and responses were 
transcribed. The researcher developed a description of the information collected to create a 
combined textual and structural description justifying the essence of the participants’ 
experiences. This process allowed the researcher to recognize similarities and developing 
patterns as well as themes. 
 
3.9 Trustworthiness 
The face to face interviews withthe participants helped the researcher toestablish trust 
between him and the respondent interviewees. It also permitted him the opportunity to assess 
the trustworthiness of the interviewee in providing opinions and expressing views.This active 
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engagement by the researcher ensured the quality of the findings and minimized ethical 
issues. 
 
3.10 Ethical Considerations 
Scholars tend to place emphasis on the originality and veracity of documentation and 
interpretation of the procedures leading to the conclusion of the research project. Swazey et al 
(1993) highlight fundamental categories of ethical problems in academic research, including 
(i) fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism, in proposing or reporting research; (ii) 
questionable research practices, such as keeping poor research records or permitting honorary 
authorship; (iii) behaviour such as sexual harassment and violation of government 
regulations, which may take place in a research context. To this end, ethical issues are crucial 
in all the processes involved in academic research. In this research, the main ethical 
considerations adhered to were informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity and 
scientific integrity. 
Informed Consent 
In order to inform and assure the participants of their role in the research, permissions and 
informed consents from all participants in the research study were obtained. To gain access to 
the participants and collect data through interviews, the researcher sent a consent form. 
Ethical concerns related to participants’ recruitment include deception and unequal treatment. 
The researcher explained the benefits and risks of the study to avoid deceiving the 
participants. All were treated equally and both genders were included.  
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
To ensure confidentiality of the participants, the data collected and relevant information will 
be stored in a locked computer; the recording gadget and protected by a password and 
secured in a secured locked coded safe inside. 
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The researcher believes therefore that all practices employed throughout the fieldwork aspect 
of this study accorded with accepted good practice. 
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Chapter Four 
Political Culture and Governance in Nigeria 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the nature and character of governance in Nigerian politics. In doing 
so the author examines and explains the relationship between institutions and political 
networks, politics and governance, political parties, and civic engagement in the Nigerian 
context. It lays a foundation for an understanding of the dynamics underlying Nigerian 
politics with its ethnic rivalries and political clientelism that keep defining the character and 
nature of Nigerian federalism. For illustrative and comparative purposes, in part 4.1.It 
references the political system in Indonesia where a version of decentralization was 
successfully implemented in place of the exiting political structure following three hundred 
years of colonial rule and thirty years of military rule. 
 
It is widely considered that ethnic rivalries in Nigeria dictate the direction of its politics and 
governance. As a result keen attention is paid to competing class interests, the interests of the 
political elites and the religious dichotomy as well as the other varied sub- agendas that drive 
the political landscape. These other interests spread across the ethnic frontiers; hence an 
understanding of Nigeria federalism requires an understanding of the dynamics of Nigerian 
politics with its various political actors and competing interest groups. These actors 
sometimes form alliances where and when it is convenient and beneficial but unfortunately 
such alliances are rarely permanent and provide little medium or long term stability in 
Nigeria’s political equation. This factor on its own affects the stability and implementation of 
Nigeria’s federalism.  
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Decentralising powers and responsibilities will often depend on the nature of relationship 
between the centre and the federating units, a relationship usually determined by the political 
parties controlling each tier. Where the same political party controls both the centre and a unit 
it is expected that there should be a cordial relationship but unfortunately in Nigerian context, 
opposition interest groups within the same party remains the ultimate decider of the nature 
and character of this relationship. In effect, the political elites who control the apparatus of 
governance seldom consider the interest of the larger society over their own interests. In 
essence, the ultimate driving force of the Nigerian federalism may not necessarily be the 
ethnic rivalry as many had averred but the political actors that constantly instigate such 
rivalry to achieve their group ambitions. This view appears to be in consonance with the view 
of Bayart (1989), who argues that the patron-client relationship generally defines politics in 
Africa. Bayart uses the term ‘politics of the belly’ to describe this kind of relationship. 
Politics of the belly further highlights the relationship between clientelism, corruption and 
power.  This type of politics points to the propensity of politicians to hoard and greedily 
consume resources, Thomas (2003: 3).This relationship is established and sustained by the 
patrons (politicians) through distributing goods or outright buying loyalty and votes during 
election, as observed in Nigerian electoral processes (Bratton 2008). This phenomenon is 
what Bayart refers to as the filling of the bellies of client in return for political loyalty, 
obviating the need for democracy and instituting alternative and sometimes moral forms of 
accountability. This view can explain why politicians indicted for corruption or larceny 
always seeks their clients’ protection, principally from their ethnic or religious clients.  
 
It is imperative that both observers and participants in the political process of federalism in 
Nigeria should recognise the critical contributory factors in the apparent failure of equitable 
and effective implementation. One of the respondents referred to good governance of the 
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process of federalism as a mirage and this is very revealing of a widely held view of the 
political culture and process. The history of Nigeria is set out in Table 2 below. 
Table 3: Timeline of Historical Events 
Year Event 
12.000B.C Stone Age evidence indicates the antiquity of various indigenous people. 
500 B.C An iron civilization emerged, with one major center at Nok. Technology 
was altered, with great consequences on farming, urbanization, and 
settlements. 
200 A.D Evidence of a metal age became abundant, indication the spread of cities 
and villages. 
1000-1500 A.D Foundation of many kingdoms such as Benin, Oyo, Hausa States and 
Kanem Borno. 
1450-1850 A.D. Contacts with Europe and the New World, dominated by the slave trade 
which had profound consequences on the people. 
1804 An Islamic revolution took place in northern Nigeria. It created a huge 
caliphate and led to the spread of Islam. 
1842 The beginning of success in the spread of Christianity. A new elite emerged 
and Christianity and Islam became the two dominant religions in the 
country. 
1861 Establishment of a British consulate in Lagos, the beginning of a process 
that led to the conquest of Nigeria. 
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1886 Formation of the Royal Niger Company with a charter to trade and enter 
into treaties in the Niger basin and its environs. In the same year ended a 
prolonged war among the Yoruba in the Southwest. 
1892 British attack on the Ijebu. 
1893 Establishment by the British of a protectorate over Yoruba. 
1897 Name “Nigeria” officially adopted. 
1900 Establishment by the British of a protectorate in northern Nigeria. 
1914 Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates. 
1929 Aba riot, a major protest by women against colonial taxation and other 
forms of injustice. 
1936 Establishment of the Nigerian Youth Movement, a leading political 
association that demanded for major reforms.  
1946 Richards Constitution, with a central legislature and three Regional Houses 
of Assembly. This marks the beginning of constitutional reforms that led to 
the independence. 
1954 Federal system of government introduced 
1957 Regional Self-government proclaimed in the East and West, a major 
transfer of power from the British to Nigerians. 
1959 Regional self-government in the North. 
1960 Independence from Britain, October 1. 
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1963 Republic proclaimed. A Nigerian replaced the Queen as the symbolic head. 
1966, Jan.,-July The first military coup ended the First Republic, but created further political 
instability soon after. 
1966-1975 Administration of General Yakubu Gowon presided over the civil war and 
later economic boom. 
1966 Beginning of Nigeria Civil war July 3. 
1967 Creation of twelve states to replace the existing four regions, but demands 
for more states continue as various groups see this as an opportunity to 
attain rapid development and benefit from federally distributed revenues. 
1970 End of civil war, January 13. Nigeria embarked on a program of 
reconciliation and reconstruction, partly financed by oil revenues. While the 
East was reintegrated, secession demands by various groups have yet to 
end, while some outstanding issues of injustice during the war are yet to be 
resolved. 
1973 OPEC oil price increase and led to an economic boom and prosperity for 
Nigeria. Development project became grandiose. 
1975-1975 Military regimes of Brigadiers Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo 
introduced far reaching reforms in political institutions and became the first 
to transfer power to civilians. 
1979-1983 The Second Republic, with Alhaji Shehu Shagari was president, was unable 
to create discipline among the ranks of politicians and was ended by a 
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military coup. 
1983-1985 The military rule of Genera Muhammadu Buhari was noted for firmness, 
investigation of political figures for corruption and poor economic 
performance. 
1985-1992 Nigeria under General Ibrahim Babangida, with both failed economic and 
political programs. 
1991 A census put the country’s population at 88.5 million, and this has since 
formed the basis or subsequent projections of population increase. 
1993 Presidential election, won by Chief M.K.O Abiola, was annulled by 
General Babangida. The country was thrown a prolonged crisis thereafter.  
1994 Short-lived interim National Government, led by Chief E. Shonekan, 
characterized by chaos and public distrust. 
1994-1998 Dictatorship of General Sanni Abacha, died June 8,1998. He was replaced 
by General Abdusalami Abubakar. 
1998 General Abdusalami Abubakar conducted a general elections and handed 
over power to civilians headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. 
2007 Alhaji Umaru Yar Adua was elected the President. He died in 2010 and was 
replaced by the Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan 
2011 Dr. Goodluck Jonathan was elected the President. 
2015 General Muhammadu Buhari was elected the President 
Source: Falola (1999)  
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4.1 Foundational Factors: paths to Nationalism and Federalism  
The introduction of a new political system to a country used only to colonial or perhaps post- 
colonial rule involving military authority will generally be seismic in its effect on the 
incumbent government, the political actors involved in the process and most of all the 
national population. However such process is generally has its roots in history so some 
background to the present position of Nigeria is critical in understanding how Nigeria has 
reached this stage in its evolution and development. A review of the pre-independence 
Nigeria shows that one of the key factors in political change is the agitation by the educated 
elites to participate in government. Consequently the successive constitutions became the 
cornerstone of the emerging nation and the independent Federal Republic of Nigeria. These 
constitutions built on each other so that in theory the successive constitutions picked up the 
baton for the previous one and moved on. There are four pre-independent constitutions, the 
Clifford Constitution (1922), the Richards Constitution (1946), the Macpherson Constitution 
(1951) and the Littleton Constitution (1954). 
 
4.1.1 The Clifford Constitution 1922 
This was the first constitution and its hallmark was the introduction of party politics and the 
first opportunity for a democratic election in Nigeria. It provided for the election of four 
persons into the legislative council; three from Lagos and one from Calabar. It was the first 
opportunity therefore for Nigerians to elect their own representatives. Although voting was 
by direct election, the election was based on a very limited franchise. Those who could vote 
or be voted for were only British citizens residing in the cities and British protected persons 
with a minimum gross income of one hundred pounds a year. Many if not most Nigerians 
were thus disenfranchised. This constitution is said to be the bedrock of formation of political 
parties in the country (Afigbo: 2003:23). 
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4.1.2  The Richards Constitution 1946 
This was a direct response to the agitation of some sections of the country, particularly the 
more educated south, for either self-government or more participation in the present 
government (Coleman: 1986; 271). It moved on from the previous constitution by creating a 
regional House of Assembly with a majority of unofficial members, (though all elected) in 
each part of the country, along with a House of Chiefs for the North (Kirk-Greene 1997: 
315). For the period of 1946 to 1954, the country moved therefore from Unitarianism to 
quasi-federalism (Elaigwu 2007). 
There were three main objections to the Richards Constitution by Nigerian nationalists: (1) 
the imposition of the constitution from above without due consultation with the Nigerian 
people; (2) the ambiguous role of chiefs in politics (nationalists were suspicious of chiefs 
whom they regarded as colonial government officials and anti-nationalists groups); and (3) 
the number of political units created in Nigeria (Elaigwu: 2007). The third objection 
expressed the sentiments that the three regions did not capture the reality of the 
heterogeneous nature of Nigeria state, taking into consideration the numerous minorities 
groups within the three regions and the fear of domination and marginalization from the 
majority ethnic groups. Elaigwu (2007:34) observed that; 
“. . . by 1956, the three major leaders had become grafted in their 
respective region, which has increasingly become centres of power. Nnamdi 
Azikwe had returned to the Eastern Region as Premier; Awolowo was the 
Premier of the Western Region; Ahmadu Bello took the title of Chief 
Minister of Northern Nigeria. Secured in the regions, the leaders jealously 
guarded any erosion of regional powers; even Nnamdi Azikwe, who had 
supported a strong centre, equivocated”.  
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4.1.3  The Macpherson Constitution 1951 
The Macpherson Constitution was more inclusive of the indigenous people and in fact laid a 
foundation for an inclusive federal government and the first general elections into the 
regional and federal assemblies (Kirk Green 1997). 
4.1.4 The Lyttleton Constitution 1954 
This constitutional reform provided the regional governments with broader legislative and 
fiscal powers. Each was controlled by their leading political party with a seat or seats in the 
national legislature. Three major parties consolidated their regional bases of control and their 
leaders attained both local and national prominence; Nnamdi Azikiwe- head of the Igbo 
dominated National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) - later renamed the 
National Convention of Nigerian Citizens) became premier of the Eastern Region. Obafemi 
Awolowo of the Yoruba-based Action Group (AG) won the Western Region premiership, 
while Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, who held the traditional title of Sarduana of Sokoto, led the 
Northern People’s Congress (NPC) chiefly based among the Hausa-Fulani.  
 
The constitution brought into existence a federal system within the colonial framework. 
Elaigwu (2007:31) explains that the regions were given more autonomy in decision-making; 
not only had the regional assemblies sprung up, regional bureaucracies had also become 
established. The regions maximized their autonomy at the expense of the centre, which was 
still under colonial control (Elaigwu 2007:31).The transfer of power from colonial 
administrators to indigenous rule yielded northern dominance of the first post-independence 
government. The 1957 constitutional settlement which the British negotiated with the 
Nigerian nationalists allotted representation in the federal legislature on the basis of regional 
population. The 1952 census indicated that Northern Region included 53 percent of the total 
population. The NPC’s decisive hold on the Northern Region ensured a polarity in the 
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National Assembly and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa deputy leader of the NPC became 
prime minister in the new national administration. In 1959, the British invited Tafawa Balewa 
to form the government. With control of the Federal executive and a secure regional base, the 
leading northern party was in a uniquely advantageous position in Federal politics. 
4.1.5 Transition to civilian rule: July 1975- October 1979  
The government of General Gowon was overthrown by General Murtala Muhammed, 
promised to return the country to civilian rule (Falola 1994:51). The hallmark of his regime 
was the centralisation of power back to the central government and the creation of seven 
additional states, making nineteen in total.  
4.1.6  The Second Republic: October 1979 – December 1983. 
In October 1979the Military returned power to the civilians and a democratic government 
headed by a new President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari (a Muslim from Sokoto in the northern 
Nigeria) of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was sworn-in. The Second Republic was 
based on the 1979 constitution which provided for a three tier government, the federal, the 
state and the local governments, there being a unicameral legislature at both state federal 
levels. It was aimed at national integration and equitable representation of all the ethnic 
groups. There were representatives of other Political parties at the state and Federal levels. 
However public office was again treated as route to personal and ethnic gratification, and 
contending political factions employed fraud, patronage, and violence to gain advantage 
(Falola, 1994: 76). 
4.1.7 The third military intervention and successive military Governments: 
1983-1999 
The new military government was marred with records of human rights abuse, although 
dramatic steps were taken to curtail political corruption and impose accountability on the 
civilian political class; attempts were made to restore a measure of social order and civility to 
an unruly public arena. The government was overthrown in August 1985 by General Ibrahim 
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Babangaida whose military regime lasted eight years during which the military regime 
controlled and manipulated the political, social and economic life of the entire country. In the 
historic June 12 1993 presidential elections, which most observers deemed to be Nigeria’s 
fairest, because for the first time the barriers of ethnicity, religion and other cleavages were 
broken, early returns indicated that the wealthy Yoruba businessman Moshood Kasimawo 
Abiola (a Moslem from Abeokuta, South West) had won a decisive victory.
11
 
 
The annulment of this election by the military triggered off another round of ethnic tension in 
Nigeria; the Yoruba ethnic group perceived the annulment as fulfilment of the north’s agenda 
to rule Nigeria perpetually and the situation nearly degenerated to a state of civil war. General 
Abacha’s rule was adjudged to be the most notorious dictatorship in Nigeria. “Public reaction 
to this development in the transition programme was apathy and a new-complete boycott of 
the elections.”;Maja-Pearse, A. (1999).12Eventually a credible transition programme to 
civilian rule was put in place.  
4.1.8 A new democratic Dispensation May 1999-date: The Fourth Republic 
The emergence of the fourth republic was regarded as a consensus to keep the unity of 
Nigeria as a direct consequence of the annulment of the 1993 election and was a ‘power shift’ 
from the north to south in response to the accusation of political marginalisation of the South 
by the North. The constitution of 1999 provided a new framework for liberal democracy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 The recent book of Prof. Humphrey Nwosu on the June 12 election published on the 15
th
 anniversary of June 
12 Laying the Foundation for Nigeria’s Democracy, confirm that M.K.O. Abiole won by 8,323,305 votes to 
beat Alhaji Bashir Tofa who got 6,073,612 votes 
12
Maja-Pearse, A. From Khaki to Agbada: a Handbook for the February 1999 Elections in Nigeria, Lagos: CLO, 
1999. pg. 17 
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4.2  Consideration of a similar political situation: Indonesia  
It is informative to compare the position of Nigerian federalism, which is largely considered 
to be a failed attempt, against the process in Indonesia which is regarded as a highly 
successful example of post-colonial government being succeeded by a civil government 
based on the principles of federalism and decentralisation.  
 
In assessing the political conditions and the institutional structures as a fulcrum for economic 
growth and development, most of the literature comparing Nigeria with Indonesia seems to 
agree that the structural and institutional factors that are embedded within the social and 
political histories of the two countries are vital in the understanding of the process of 
governance development in both (Lewis 2007; Tirtosudarmo 2008; Akinyoade 2008). This 
includes the history of colonialism and nationalism, ethnicity and religion, the role of the 
military, the role of the elites (the elites herein consist of the politicians, the technocrats and 
the political parties) and international factors (foreign loans, aids and investment).  
 
These factors significantly shape the process of nation building, the formation of the political 
structure and the economy of the country. For example, the different decolonisation processes 
and establishment of state sovereignty were critical factors that influenced the perceptions of 
the political leaders on the concept of the country as a national project (Lewis 2007). To this 
end, Tirtosudarmo (2008) argues that a state’s format and the structure of the government are 
outcomes of the long process of political development, mostly before independence. Equally, 
the format and structure of the state are also an institutional manifestation of the country’s 
state ideology.  
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As did nearly every other newly independent colony, Indonesia had its own share of post-
independence conflicts and crises, especially the self-determination struggles of the various 
ethnic groups. As expressed by Vickers (2013) Indonesia had to cope with the effects of 300 
years of colonisation on the one hand and the effects of the militarised struggle for 
independence from the Japanese and the Dutch on the other. Vickers (2013:117) explained 
that: 
“. . . colonial rule had created institutional structures that could be 
converted to Indonesian needs, but had also created massive inequalities 
and an economic system that drained resources and sent these overseas.” 
 
He went on to consider the legacy that the emerging nation state had to contend with, equally 
applicable to the position of Nigeria; 
 
“. . .  the Revolution left legacies of dislocation, division and death, and it would take 
a huge effort to rebuild broken lives and industries lost in the scorched earth 
campaigns. Coming out of the revolution, some Indonesians . . . expressed deep 
bitterness about the effects of the tumult, but others felt a great optimism that, free at 
last, they could form their own destinies.” (Vickers, 2013: 117).  
 
The establishment of independence was set against two contrasting phenomena vis-à-vis 
Indonesia and Nigeria. Whilst the Indonesian freedom fighters were optimistic about 
developing an Indonesian nation from the multi-ethnic groups, diverse ethnic groups in 
Nigeria were concerned that the loss of their own identities would lead to being subsumed 
into some version of a national identity by a dominant ethnic group. Additionally, in post-
independent Nigeria, residual religious and ideological identities became prominent factors in 
political affiliations.  
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For any nation-building project to succeed Vickers (2013: 119) submits that its architects 
must be able to convince other social forces of its virtue.  One such force in Indonesia was 
the army that had been torn by divided loyalties arising from allegiance to various social 
groups. As did Tafawa Balewa in Nigeria (1960-1966), Sukarno, who ruled Indonesia from 
1949 to 1966, inherited a fragmented Indonesian state from the colonial authority. He then 
introduced an ideological tone with his policy of ‘Guided Democracy’, designed to unify the 
various social groups in the interest of the nation. He took the view that the Indonesian way 
of resolving important questions was by prolonged deliberation (musyawarah) designed to 
achieve a consensus (mufakat); this was the procedure at village level and was intended to be 
the model for the country. In this way he used the ‘bottom up’ approach which complemented 
the ‘top down’ method where the same political theory originated at each end of the 
spectrum.  
 
The principle of Guided Democracy received the consent of the four main parties and the 
National Council representing all the social groups such as the urban workers, rural farmers, 
intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, religious organizations, the armed services, youth 
organizations, women’s organizations, etc. Decision making for governance henceforth 
included the inputs of all these social groups and the political parties under presidential 
guidance for a national consensus to be expressed. In addition, a middle-way strategy of 
introducing the military into the process of Guided Democracy was also developed by 
Sukarno. This arrangement weakened the strength of the opposition parties and saw a rise in 
the military profile and the powers of the President.  
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Sukarno also infused the principle of Guided Democracy with an indigenous national 
ideology christened Pancasila. This was based on five principles declared by Sukarno and his 
nationalist group in 1945. They were meant to serve as the guiding philosophy of the, then, 
anticipated independent state. These principles included structuring a free Indonesia in 
faithfulness to God Almighty, consensus or democracy, internationalism or humanitarianism, 
social prosperity and nationalism or national unity (Vickers 2013).  All political parties were 
made to subscribe to these principles that crystallised into a national ideology for the 
Indonesian state. By contrast there was no such attempt by any Nigerian government to create 
that national identity and to establish a recognisable set of shared values on which to build a 
sense of nationalism.  In fact the decolonisation process in Nigeria was established against a 
background of indirect and deliberate fragmentation of the state which did not create any sort 
of ideal platform for a national ideology. In this context Lewis (2007) and Tirtosudarmo 
(2008) argue that the travails of development as responses to challenges and opportunities 
brought about by political independence, more often than not reflect particular circumstances 
that the country and its leaders have had to confront.  
 
It can be seen therefore that there are distinct differences between the comparative 
experiences of Indonesia and Nigeria in their arrangements for power devolution. While 
Nigeria distributes powers among a three-tier arrangement of federal-state-local government 
structure, Indonesia’s political arrangement allows the distribution of powers in a five-tier 
arrangement of central-province-local-municipality-villages. In addition, social groups are 
also infused into each tier to allow broader participation and contributions from every 
segment of Indonesian society. The diffusion of power through this arrangement greatly 
improves the level of political consciousness of the Indonesians, shapes the characters of their 
civil societies groups and gives some legitimacy to Indonesian governments irrespective of 
  
108 
 
their ideological bents. Though Suharto’s autocratic regime only used this arrangement to 
keep the people busy, rather than really involving them in governance, it nevertheless 
recognized the sovereignty of the people beyond multi-party elections and remained 
fundamental to the survival of the government.  
 
While Nigeria’s federalism is fraught with controversy and suspicion among the major ethnic 
groups, Indonesian centralised, but all-inclusive system, of government reduces suspicion and 
is less controversial. In the context of Indonesian decentralization Aspinall and Fealy (2003) 
argue that the shifting of authority to the sub-provincial level would promote democratisation 
because communities had a far greater awareness and sense of engagement with local politics 
than they did with either provincial or national affairs. District based autonomy was found to 
bring decision-making to a level where communities were more inclined to participate, and 
where they could hold politicians accountable for their actions. Further such district level 
autonomy was seen as the best way to ensure that decentralization did not encourage 
separatism and the break-up of the country. Such differences of approach between the 
Nigerian federalism and Indonesian decentralization experiences are relevant in this study 
and support the view that the experience of federalism is context and country specific. 
 
4.3 From Agriculture to Oil: a shift of the economic paradigm in Nigeria 
Before oil was discovered in the late 1950s, agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy. At this time,  
“Nigeria is the world’s largest exporter of groundnuts, with about 36% of 
the world trade, she also ranks as the second largest exporter of cocoa in 
the world supplying about 20% of the world trade. Her export of cotton 
seeds represents about 18% if the world supply and the country’s share for 
vegetable oil was 11%.”Ekundare (1971) 
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Agriculture accounted for 70% of the Nigerian labour force and from agricultural export 
Nigerian earned between 65% to 70% of its foreign exchange (Lewis 1998). However, by the 
late 1960s, oil had replaced these agricultural products as the country's largest foreign 
exchange earner. These agricultural commodities transcended the geopolitical regions of the 
country; the north had the groundnuts while the south produced cocoa and rubber. The 
revenues accrued facilitated economic growth and concerted efforts were made in 
establishing industries and human development within the context of the political 
arrangement at that time (Nnoli 2008) 
 
The 1970s was a period of volatile expansion (Birdsall 2006:86). The revenue from oil rose 
to 58.01% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)(Nnoli 2008; Omeje 2006; Birdsall 
2006). At this point there was a leap from agro-based economy to oil economy. There was a 
downturn in agricultural sector (Aiyede: 2009: 254). Oil revenues fluctuated with the 
vagaries of world prices, and state expenditures were supplemented by extensive international 
borrowing. The oil boom and its downturn have altered fiscal federalism, political structure 
and development (Aiyede 2009).The transition from agro-based economy to oil economy had 
a fundamental effect on the economic growth and human development. Nnt only did it 
cripple agriculture, over and above all, oil revenue accruing to the Nigeria state only served 
to transform the Nigerian economy into a mono-mineral economy, the state into rentier state 
and the population into consumers (for the most part), rather than producers (Aiyede: 254).  
The ‘Rentier state’ is a concept used to describe a political economy of a state that is largely 
dependent on extractive resources rents, taxes and royalties paid by transnational companies 
and on profits from its equity stakes in such investments. They are incomes that are not 
derived from the productive sectors but thrive by courtesy of international capital (Omeje 
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2008:5). In other words, in rentier economy and state, resources from rents predominate the 
sources of income and it is externally derived. However, one of the greatest features of rentier 
economy is that it is only a few groups that are involved in generating rents, while the 
majority distributes and utilize the wealth created (Beblawi and Luciani 1987). In effect, this 
few are the governing elites who Omeje (2008) argues mainly expend the resources for their 
own benefit rather than the welfare of the society at large. To this extent, the nature of 
resource acquisition and distribution appears to be problematic in the sense that the rentier 
economy has, 
“. . . the tendency to develop a self-propelling energy capable of 
reconfiguring the structures of the political economy of a state, 
peripheralizing and displacing non-rentier productive forces, and 
generating a convoluted culture of accumulation and politics that confronts 
to the imperatives of ‘rents speak’” (Omeje 2008:5-6).  
 
There are three critical issues/debates that are associated with rentier states: 
(i) the extent to which rent economy makes governments less democratic; 
(ii) the extent to which rent economy causes government to do a poorer job of promoting 
economic development. 
(iii) the impact of rentier economy on the citizens, i.e. ‘rentier behaviour’ or ‘rentier 
mentality’.  
 
In 2003 Nigeria ranked second in the index of oil dependent states. There are however 
attendant consequences of being highly dependent on rent economy which includesthe 
centralization of the governance in Nigeria. The 1999 constitution of Nigeria, section 44(3) 
prescribes that, 
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“Notwithstanding the foregoing provision of this section, the entire 
property in the control of all mineral oil and natural gas in, under or upon 
any land in Nigeria, under or upon the territorial waters and the exclusive 
economic zones of Nigeria shall be vested in the government of the 
federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by 
the national assembly.” 
 
Omeje (2008:63) indicates the four key distribution mechanisms which include the federal 
account; (1) rents appropriated directly by the federal state, a state derivation principle; (2) the 
right of each state to a proportion of the taxes that its inhabitants are assumed to have 
contributed to the federal exchequer; (3) the federation account (or state joint account) which 
allocates revenue to the states on the basis of need, population and other criteria; and (4) a 
special grant account, designated for other considered special needs, for example the Niger 
Delta development. The sharing of the revenue from oil became the dominant issue in the 
political struggles throughout successive regimes and they gave rise to negative and bitter 
competition between ethnic and regional groups for power and access to the country's oil 
wealth. This is very fundamental in the politics of federalism and the consequences of 
fragility and underdevelopment. To this extent the history of the post-colonial Nigeria is in a 
sense the history of the reconfiguration of revenue allocation (Omeje 2008).  
 
Some characteristics have been associated with rentier states. Scholars such as (Karl 2005; 
Omeje 2008; Collier and Hoefller, 2000; Collier 2009; Shultz 2005) explain the merits and 
demerits of the rentier state and show that a rentier economy imparts more on negative side 
than the positive side. The issues range from the effects of overdependence, stagnation of 
economic growth, crisis of development, elite capture and corruption. Karl, (2005) argues 
that over dependence on oil revenues results to poor governance and a slow rate in economic 
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growth and development. He contends that the overdependence on oil exports is accompanied 
by weak public institutions with no competence in handling the challenges of oil-led 
development (Karl, 2005:25). In the rentier state there is no separation between political 
power and economic influence, public and private, as they all centre on the rulers, and rent 
seeking becomes their strategy for wealth creation rather than productive use of the revenues 
(Karl, 2005). Corroborating this view, Collier (2009:15- 17) argues that there is a 
fundamental relationship and interplay between natural resources and politics. Collier 
identifies three ways in which there is interplay between natural resources and politics. The 
first relationship is a situation where the economic development opportunities created by the 
abundance of natural resources cannot be exploited due to a weak political system. The 
second is the situation whereby the presence of huge resource revenues leads to the 
deterioration of governments and its institutions. The third is a political system that has 
already developed before the inflow of huge resource revenues becomes a major foreign 
exchange earner.  
 
Accountability, which is a fundamental element in the process of good governance, appears 
to be compromised or ignored in a rent economy. Peter et al (1998) argue that the easy 
availability of oil revenue relieves the state of the need of taxation and enables a small group 
of leaders to undertake public spending and make public policy without accountability. 
Shultz (2005) identifies corruption as one the greatest challenges associated with a rentier 
economy and refers to two factors. The first is that multinational corporations themselves 
encourage non-transparent relationships. They would rather deal with a few high-level 
government officials than with parliamentary committees. The second is that because oil 
rents make the government the ‘biggest spender’ political clients gather around it, influencing 
government officials to embezzle and spend recklessly irrespective of how and where the 
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money is spent. They do this by diverting public funds to their private accounts at home and 
abroad, through subsidies, protection policies, and the creation of public employment even in 
government agencies where there are no the vacancies (Karl, 2005:25).  
 
In the case of Nigeria, Peter et al (1998) argue many Nigeria leaders have become rich 
through politically inspired partnership in oil ventures, misuse or misallocation of funds, and 
diversion of funds and diversion of revenues, such that corruption has undermined much of 
Nigeria institutional framework most especially the federal structure. Corroborating the 
argument of Peter et al, and explaining further the negative impact of rent economy in 
Nigeria, Omeje (2008:62) notes that: 
 
“. . . what is on offer in the name of petro-development is the terrifying and 
catastrophic failure of secular nationalist development...from the vantage 
point of Niger-Delta-but to no less from vast slum worlds of Kano or Lagos- 
development and oil wealth is a cruel joke”. 
 
He continued by considering the misappropriation and the value of oil revenues thus; 
 
“In effect, as it is noted, it is neither the case that development is uneven, 
but basically, the oil wealth has not really transformed any part of the 
country. It is important examine the performance of Nigeria oil wealth, ’85 
per cent of oil revenues accrue to 1 per cent of the population; perhaps 
$100 billion of the $400 billion in revenues since 1970 have simply gone 
‘missing’ (the anti-corruption chief, Nuhu Ribadu, claimed that in 2003, 70 
per cent of oil wealth was stolen or wasted; by 2005 it was ‘only’ 40 per 
cent of the country’s wealth). Over the period of 1965-2004, the per capital 
income fell from $250 to $212; income distribution deteriorated markedly 
over the same period. Between 1970 and 2000 in Nigeria, the number of 
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people subsisting in less than one dollar day grew to more than 70 per cent 
from 19 million to a staggering 90 million”  
 
From the data and analysis of the contribution of oil wealth to national development, it seems 
that oil wealth did not add value to human capital development. Omeje (2008:14-15) 
identifies eight areas in which the rentier economy contributes to the fragility of the national 
condition. These are: 
(i) the struggle over ownership and control of specific natural resources or ‘extractive 
spaces’ by various stakeholders (the state inclusive) and groups within a state, often 
compounded by external intervention of support for one of the conflict parties; 
(ii) the struggle over distribution and use of public revenues derived from natural 
resources by various local stakeholders and groups; 
(iii) the inability of weak state institutions to cope with large rents from natural resources 
coupled with prebendal looting, misappropriation and exclusion of the society, 
leading to violent protest and resistance; 
(iv) the use of official and unofficial revenues from natural resources by the state and its 
governing elites to build up and finance strong repressive security machinery as a 
means to keep the hegemonic elites against opposition from counter-hegemonic 
forces; 
(v) the use of legal and illegal rent from natural resources by splinter groups, disgruntled 
factions of the governing elites and opposition forces to sponsor anti-government 
insurgencies, secession movements and insurrection. 
(vi) the organised extortion of big business (extraction and mining companies),creating 
aggrieved militia groups protesting against issues of resource related misgoverning; 
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(vii) the blatant politicization and mismanagement of conflict-issues and legitimate 
grievances related to natural resources and the rentier economy. 
(viii) Interests and intervention of external parties and stakeholders, forces of imperial 
governance, predatory networks and militarists regimes on extractive economy of a 
relatively vulnerable state. 
 
4.4 Civic engagement in Nigerian politics 
Independence was the critical factor in the development of Nigeria as a sovereign state but 
post-independence actions of the political elites 
13
 have undoubtedly left Nigeria a more 
divided and alienated nation compared to when it was subject to the benevolent despotism of 
unitary colonial rule (Lewis 2003). One of the models for Nigerian federalism was the US 
federal system so that its establishment is comprised of lower and upper houses of the 
bicameral legislature system in which the president serves as the head of government, the 
state and the multi-party system. Central government therefore exercises executive authority 
over the Nigerian people. It will be made out therefore that rampant corruption within the 
state originates from that executive authority (Lewis 2003). 
 
Nigeria is a well-known oil and mineral rich country with many ethnic and religious 
disparities which, in the view of Lewis (2003), present serious challenge to the Nigerian 
political system. These differences sometimes reinforce each other mutually, and also 
generate peculiar voting behaviour, political, social and economic inequalities. Ethnic 
disparity is not a sufficiently dominating feature however for it to be considered as the sole 
                                                 
13Within this section the term ‘the elites’ is used to describe certain political groupings. For the avoidance of 
doubt it defined as ‘a select group that is superior in terms of ability or qualities to the rest of a group or 
society’. Furtherit includes persons who finds himself/herself in a position of superiority by reason of greater 
power that his or her contemporaries.  
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parameter to account for the dysfunctional federalism in Nigeria. There are other social 
groups and organisations in addition to religious groups that also play vital role in the 
faltering federalism, to include labour unions, civil liberty associations, student movements, 
women’s movements, the press, political parties and professional associations (Toyo and 
Aremu, 2003). There is an increased participation by such groups all of whom have a voice, 
some of them strident, while the somewhat politically disengaged, such as those from the 
rural areas in particular, or the unemployed, have less of a voice. 
 
Such groups are to a greater or lesser extent all key actors in Nigerian politics with their 
varying degrees of engagements in the political processes and governance of the process of 
federalisation. Of all these groups however, it may be said that the political parties and the 
political elites are perhaps the most influential because, above all others, it is they who 
dominate space in Nigerian politics. In the view of Agbaje (1997) the involvement of these 
peripheral groups is largely influenced by the terms dictated by the elites and their political 
parties. It is generally the elites who control the affairs of state and direction of the political 
processes simply because the ownership of these parties, as asserted by Musa (2014), solely 
lies within their grasp. Agbaje (1997) reinforced by Toyo and Aremu (2003) nourished the 
total control argument of Musa (ibid) with an explanation that these elites principally fund 
and control the activities of the parties, so that there is no place for the voice of the masses. 
The aftermath effect of this control is the disconnection between the politicians and the 
electorate. 
 
Current literature suggests that three largest ethnic groups, which include Yoruba, Hausa-
Fulani and Igbo lack a common historical, social or political unifying factor. Such disparate 
groups also live unconnectedly, some in ethnic reserves within ethnically mixed cities or 
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traditional regions. Religion also plays a significant role in the Nigerian mass political culture 
(Lewis 2003). While religion in the southern parts may have less impact than ethnicity on the 
political culture, it has a profound influence in the north. For instance, the identification of 
the Hausa-Fulani is Islam and traditional religious and political leaders have successfully 
resisted any efforts to introduce westernization.  
 
The patrilineal system that has existed for several decades in the country is also reflected in 
the political culture where women are marginalised especially in the North where the male 
dominated regime, based on fundamentalist religious beliefs, segregate women and limit their 
access to political power almost completely. In fact it is difficult for women to even vote in 
northern Nigeria (Toyo and Aremu, 2003) where officials aspire to use a distinct legal system 
built on Islamic laws, a key factor in constitutions drafted for the three regions during 
federalization efforts.  Religion, on the social scale, largely shapes Nigerian political 
behaviours. For example twelve out of the thirty-six states in the northern part of Nigeria 
instituted Sharia as the main body of civil and criminal laws. The introduction of Sharia in 
these states heightened the religious tension particularly between the Christians and the 
Muslims.   
 
Scholars such as Elaigwu and Galadima (2002); Suberu (2009) have argued that the 
introduction of Sharia violates the constitution. However, as Elaigwu and Galadima (2002) 
pointed out, the main debate in this instance is the extension of Sharia from civil matter to 
criminal matters.  Nigeria’s various constitutions, that is pre and post-independence, allowed 
practice of Sharia in personal and civil matters. For example Section 275 of the 
1999 Constitution allows for the creation of state Sharia Courts of Appeals so that the 
Constitution has implicitly reserved discretion to the states to create their own Sharia 
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courts to act as courts of first instance.  Sharia criminal code prescribes punishment such as 
decapitation, amputation, and stoning to death, threatening the well-being of non-Muslims, 
endangering fundamental rights protected by Nigeria's federal Constitution, and posing 
significant challenges to elected officials and federal courts.  
 
The extension of Sharia Law to criminal law in twelve northern states also has increased 
inter-communal and intergovernmental conflict, threatening the fabric of Nigerian federalism. 
The apprehension expressed by Elaigwu and Galadima (2002) and Suberu (2009) are 
justifiable when the situation is compared to failed federal practices in Africa for example, 
the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, or African countries that have convulsed into  civil war; such 
as  Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  It is very instructive to note 
that this dangerous trend has been curtailed through what Suberu (2009) described as the 
Nigerian federation's judicious combination of centrist and autonomy mechanisms this has 
been effective in managing religious conflict and cauterising potentially disintegrative 
centrifugal challenges to national stability. However, despite the significance of regional, 
ethnic and religious considerations Nigeria seems to have cultivated a political culture of 
sorts.  
 
Underpinning the deliberate polarization of the population, as posited by Olowu (2003); 
Ndibe (1999) Toyo and Aremu (2003) is the struggle for the distribution of political power 
and economic resources. Elaigwu (1994) argues that the imbalance in the distribution of 
power has exacerbated politics of ethnicity, and heightened the struggle for political power 
and economic resources using ethnic and religious affiliations in achieving this purpose by 
the politicians. One can therefore deduce from this situation three implications; firstly that the 
situation creates a political culture amongst the general population; secondly that the situation 
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diminishes the collective bargaining power of the general population; and thirdly, that good 
governance and development is not the main goal of the struggles for political power and 
economic resources among the political elites. These three deductions perhaps informed the 
position Suberu and Osaghae (2005:69) when they argued that economic concerns might 
have been centric in defining the political assumptions and values in Nigeria. Based on the 
resources accruing to Nigeria state and the Human Development Index of the World Bank, 
the position of Suberu and Osaghae (2005),that  Nigeria has not developed to its full potential 
because the politicians do not focus on economic development is entirely plausible.  
 
As mentioned above, the approach and mechanisms of politicians in attaining political power 
and economic resources has produced a specific type of political culture. The analysis of this 
culture is complex because it has two dimensions due to the dichotomy between urban and 
rural areas which are also disparate in nature. Two thirds of citizens in Nigeria live in the 
rural areas which have strong customary value systems and structures. Rural leaders have 
found it comparatively easy to transform the British administrative system into influential 
patron-client relationships, equivalents to Indian Jatis or Japanese Oyabun-kobun (Lewis 
2003). A study by Miles (1988) on rural Nigerian politics revealed that customary differences 
between the commoners and the nobles had been passed into modern Nigerian politics. 
Further, most Nigerians seem instinctively to reject movements that push for equality or 
opposition for authority (Lewis 2003). In most rural areas therefore, democracy is practiced 
at low levels due to high illiteracy and poor education. It is not surprising to find authority for 
the proposition that the majority of the residents from the rural areas have no knowledge of 
the political processes at national levels or national political concerns. Kehinde (2007) further 
notes that with isolation, it is clear that countryside residents barely get involved in issues of 
the national politics. Instead most residents follow initiatives or programmes that local 
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leaders propose or are easily persuaded by the politicians who they see only during election 
campaigns.  
 
The behavioural pattern of the politicians and political elites is examined against the 
backdrop of their attitude towards the general population. Kehinde (2007) indicates that it is 
neither uncommon nor surprising that the elites think and act distinctively from the general 
public. In the Nigerian experience such distinctiveness is considered to be very significant 
creating a gulf between the top of the pile of political actors and those whose engagement in 
the political process is very limited. Momoh and Adejumobi (1999); Okotoni (2001) argue 
that the behavioural pattern of the political elite is equivalent to Marx’s bourgeois class in 
that their wealth comes from their control over the national purse. As such, the resulting class 
of bureaucratic political leaders popularly called ‘lootocrats’(mis)use their political positions 
for personal gains and use military as well as civilian rule to protect their power and wealth. 
The elites, as a whole, have therefore become united in subverting democracy in Nigeria by 
taking advantage of religious, ethnic and regional divisions to mobilize their resources and 
amass wealth (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007).  
 
In any discussion on Nigerian political mass culture and elite culture, it is clear that there are 
three main challenges affecting decentralization and federalism in the Nigerian political 
system. Firstly, Nigeria’s lack national integration or identity; to most citizens, the important 
thing is to define politics in terms of one’s status, concerning the overlapping, polarizing and 
sub-national cleavages. Secondly, public acceptance and validation of the government is an 
important element of a stable government but in a very large measure this is missing. In fact 
Nigerian citizens have no high regard for the elites, an attitude reciprocated by the elites 
towards the masses. Thirdly, Adejumobi and Kehinde (2007) illustrates that the federal 
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government does not entrust other government tiers with resources to foster development 
because of existing regional boundaries, ethnic groups and religious definitions.  
 
Adejumobi and Kehinde (2007) argue that a nation with such linguistic and cultural 
assortment presents analytical challenges while examining political and cultural aspects. In 
the recent years, most scholars and authors such as (Lewis 2003) have attempted to overcome 
the analytical challenges by advancing various perspectives and methods, including ethnic 
pluralism, structural, institutional and economic political method, stressing more on class, 
underdevelopments, clientelistic patronage, materialism and prebendalism politics, where 
elected officials, and government workers feel they have a right to a share of government 
revenues, and use them to benefit their supporters, co-religionists and members of their ethnic 
group. 
 
Generally, Osaghae (2011) argues that there has been political instability over many years, 
immensely influencing political behaviour in the Nigerian society. Momoh and Adejumobi 
(1999) point to the manifestations of such instability in frequent regime turnover of 
institutions, personnel and structure motivated by the military coups, alterations in public 
policy which often result in poverty, inconclusive as well as disputed electoral outcomes, 
legitimacy crises and political violence, for instance, six military coups occurred from 1960 
to 1999, some successful others unsuccessful. Similarly Osaghae (2011) cites three civilian 
governments in Nigeria, led by Shonekan, Tafawa Balewa and Shagari as a proof of a poor 
and inconsistent political culture.  Osaghae (2011) develops this theme by identifying three 
principal factors which account for such volatile conditions to prevail; 
(1)  political instability: as manifested in the high turnover of government (regimes, 
structures and personnel) occasioned by military coups, inconclusive and contested 
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electoral outcomes, frequent changes in policy, political violence and crisis of 
legitimacy; 
(2)  national cohesion; a low level of national cohesion is evident in frequent and disputed 
struggles for political power and resources. Such disputes revolve around regional, 
ethnic and religious interests, within this context being the recurrent issue of minority 
rights, resource distribution and power sharing. 
(3)  economic factors; the indices of economic crisis is reflected in the high rate of 
poverty. 
 
Whilst the third republic, comparatively, seems stable in the sense of its continuity, many of 
the historic malpractice continues, all of which factors,, according to Osaghae (2011:15), are 
mutually reinforcing.  
 
Economic decline in Nigeria is attributed to mismanagement of the national economy, itself 
attributable to regime instability, the dis-enablement of rational planning and deployment of 
resources by centrifugal politics, primitive accumulationist inclinations of state officials and 
pervasive corruption and the absence or ineffectiveness of institutions of oversight. That 
characterisation of the state is another factor that contributes to the Nigerian political culture 
in that there is a dichotomy between the absence of relative independence and the nature of 
the federal government system with its backdrop of British colonial rule(Lewis 2003).  
 
Whist successive regimes have made efforts to eradicate legacy attitudes and perceptions the 
reality is that such attitudes are endemic in the political system. The post-colonial state is still 
based on law and order, a key seal of the colonial heritage. Moreover, the colonial regime 
employed an authoritarian administration to coerce the population and sustain power. The 
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military regimes also relied on the same style of government (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999). 
The post-colonial, post military Nigerian state has attempted through the 1999 constitution, to 
encourage extractive and regulatory roles which found the systems by which natural 
resources are produced and distributed within the system of state capitalism. However the 
reality is that the state still accumulates resource wealth, relying on patron-client ties that 
dominate political relations between central government and the general populace.  
 
In the colonial period, the Nigerian citizens had negative perceptions and attitudes toward the 
British government as well as the political beneficiaries of the system, such as the local 
chiefs. By its very nature colonial rule imported key European practices, so that the Nigerian 
people were effectively serving European interests. Consequently they did not develop an 
interest in the sustenance and wellbeing of their own country, which would have largely 
contributed to political notions of responsiveness, accountability and transparency. That 
legacy is evident in contemporary Nigeria where people lack interest in government 
businesses (Lewis 2003). Consequently, leaders can, and do, steal government funds with 
impunity in the pretence that they are acting in the interest of society at large.  
 
It must be acknowledged that previous regimes have made efforts to address the political 
culture which creates such a negative view of central government. The creation of the 1999 
constitution itself is an indicator that while prevailing practice is corrupt the standards of 
probity and fairness in government were recognised and are the good standard for which 
honest politicians strive to attain. Other examples include the creation of the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). In 1987, the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida 
inaugurated a federal directorate of mass mobilisation, Mobilization for Self-Reliance, Social 
Justice and Economic Recovery, best known by its acronym MAMSER.  MAMSER is a 
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government machinery for a new political order, meant to “inculcate new values, politically 
educate the adult, socialise the young and mobilise the masses for participation in the new 
order” Agbese (2012: 269). According to General Ibrahim Babangida in Agbese  (2012: 22) 
the thrust of MAMSER to Nigerians involves; 
“...a radical review of our external dependency, building our production process 
more on our own natural and human resources, switching our own growth engine 
from trading to production, avoiding waste and vanity, shedding all pretences about 
affluence, reversing our past life-styles. We must create social justice aimed at 
promoting equality of opportunity in all spheres of our national life.... We are 
convince that self-reliance is the strategy for building a new society, where our people 
can develop the consciousness of being the matters of their own destiny” 
 
Another agency was inaugurated by the same regime, Directorate of Food Roads and Rural 
infrastructure also best known by its acronym DFRRI to complement MAMSER. Decree No. 
4 of 6 February, 1986, supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 19, Vol. 74, 10 
April, 1987, Part A outline the objectives and objectives of DFRRI, the main objective is to 
identify, involve and support viable local community organizations in the effective 
mobilization of the rural population for sustained rural development activities, bearing in 
mind the need for promoting greater community participation and economic self-reliance of 
the rural community. These programmes were abandoned by successive regimes so that there 
was no continuity in these programmes.  
 
The distributive role of the government is a significant element of the Nigerian political 
behaviour (Lewis 2003). At a fundamental level central government is responsible for the 
distribution of national resources throughout the state in a fair and equitable manner, having 
regard the principles of the constitution and natural justice. The tendency not to achieve that 
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duty has however hampered and obscured political and social developments related to public 
finance and according to the perception of most citizens, the government reserves free money 
for itself. According to Osaghae (1988) the Nigerian state cannot change such societal 
perceptions and achieve legitimacy without change. According to Graf (1988), Nigeria can 
only continue operating as one state if it changes and promotes and maintain the federalism 
system of governance. In 1954 Nigeria adopted federalism as a the most expedient principle 
of government but it has declined due to the establishment of additional states and the 
difficulty of governing a more disparate country. Adding to such difficulties comes the call 
for the creation of even more states so as ensure a more equitable from of authority, resource 
sharing and local political independence. 
 
Regard must be had also to the Nigerian political culture of ‘live and let live’ and the 
apparent tolerance of the culture of competition for a share in resource and wealth 
development regardless of merit and need (cf ‘laissez faire’, the equivalent European 
principle leading to the free market culture of capitalist society). This however in practice 
leads to political competition being regulated through a dominant state authority (Lewis 
2003) so that the elites dominate political life resulting in the real completion being between 
them and a disgruntled populace. Even so there is a degree of philosophic acceptance of that 
situation by which the masses acknowledge perhaps unequal competition as normal 
behaviour in the political climate of the country.  
 
4.5 Political engagement in Nigerian 
 
Commonly the generic term ‘politics’ has to do with power relations (Richard, 2000). 
Osaghae (2011:13) explains that politics involves, and has to do with, how individuals and 
groups organise themselves so as to pursue their divergent and often conflicting interests, 
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why the state is crucial to this process, how and why domestic and external economic, social, 
cultural and other forces shape or influence this process, what major issues ensue from power 
relations and how conflicts are managed and resolved. That position simplified in an 
alternative view of the definition of the term as in ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Musa, 
2014).  
 
Richard (2000) and Axelrod (1997) suggest that political culture in any nation exemplifies 
how its history affects peoples’ taking politics and society as a whole. Richard (2000) asserts 
that politics is the function of the immediate environment and are largely the same in any 
country, basing his view that general principles and theories apply across the political 
spectrum on the facts. Pieterse (2001) and Jhingan (2007) however offer an insight as to the 
unique nature of every state, this quality manifesting through different dimensions, namely, 
those in the political, cultural and social realms. Elaigwu (2007) further elaborates on the 
scope of those differences when he argues that the disparity in these dimensions makes 
political practices in different states disparate.  
 
Pieterse (2001)and Jhingan (2007) consider however that Nigeria’s political environment has 
a number of characteristics which distinguish it, for instance from the United Kingdom, so 
that is difficult to generalize about the prevailing political culture. Those obvious differences 
are based on the diversity of linguistics, cultures, regional boundaries, ethnicity and religion 
(Elaigwu, 2007). 
4.6 Specific factors which erode trust in the Nigerian political system 
 Authoritarianism and human rights  
Nigeria theoretically functions, in accordance with the constitution, as a federal government 
that fosters national development, yet when assessed on the specific criteria against which a 
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democratic system is evaluated, it is categorized as an ‘authoritarian’ state; the 2008 
Democracy Index (Musa, 2014). While the situation concerning human rights has improved 
since the era of the military regimes, violations have since been reported (Lawal, 2004). This 
prompts the question as to how far human rights violations promote or hinder political 
engagement and good governance in Nigeria. 
Corruption 
Corruption contributes to dysfunctional federalism in Nigeria and the elite strangulation of 
Nigerian politics and state, Susan (2004) and Victor (2002). An examination of how big a 
problem corruption is in Nigeria, and how significantly it contributes towards economic 
crises, poor governance and socio-political problems is critical. Kofele-Kale (2006) defines 
corruption as, 
“ . . . ‘requesting, offering, giving or accepting directly or indirectly a bribe or 
any other undue advantage or the prospect thereof, which distorts the proper 
performance of any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the 
undue advantage of the prospect thereof”. 
 
One of the central flaws of the Nigerian political system is prebendalism (Osaghae 2011) 
described by (Agbaje 1997) as practice of elected officials, government workers, and 
members of the ethnic and religious groups misappropriating government revenues believing  
that they have the right to do so. While the country earns trillions of Nigerian Naira (in 
$USD) from its oil exports, corruption sullies the process with the result that revenue doesn’t 
find its way into much needed development projects for the communities at large.. This 
corruption can therefore be closely associated with dysfunctional federalism as many officials 
convert the state and federal resources to personal use; 
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In an article entitled, “Oil giant that runs on grease of politics,” in the San Francisco 
Chronicle (March 11, 2007) Nigeria was described as a rich nation floating on oil wealth with 
“. . . almost none of it flowing to the people.” Nigeria has been described asa ‘Kleptocracy’, a 
nation ruled by an administration of thieves, a ruling body or order of thieves that hampers 
the societal progress (Susan 2004). According to Hali (2003) it will thus take a committed 
leadership for Nigeria to solve the corruption menace, and create a productive environment to 
move the nation forward (Hali 2003). 
 
The Transparency International Index shows that Nigeria was at that time the most corrupt 
country in Africa (Susan 2004). Most administrations have made promises to eradicate 
corruption during pre-election manifestos but either have never taken sufficient action to 
honour such pledges or have been unable to do so in face of endemic and corrupt practices, 
(Daron 2003). The incumbent government’s commitment to the maintenance of the rule of 
law and the ‘war on corruption’, its oft repeated mantra, would however seem to be 
extremely questionable as the increasingly high profile of corruption cases weakens the 
integrity of the existing federal and state institutions and the associated leadership; this has 
damaging effects on people’s trust and interest in administration (Susan 2004).  
Deprivation 
The larger population lives in poverty because of widespread corruption and economic 
mismanagement (Adejumobi 2000). Violent insurgencies and community clashes in several 
Nigerian regions in protest against corruption (inter alia) threaten economic and political 
stability (Musa, 2014; Lawal, 2004). That society at large lacks the basic necessities of life is 
evident from even the simplest incursion into rural areas.  Health care services are poor 
because hospitals in Nigeria are ill equipped and in general there is a shortage of medically 
qualified staff. People are reported to have died from minor ailments and it is has been 
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proven that poor health affects people’s productivity and the overall health of the economy 
(Victor, 2002). 
The political culture 
Although discussed extensively elsewhere in this study the scholarly evidence suggests that 
the Nigerian party administrative systems have not yet done enough to overcome the 
intricacies of party politics and made the more accessible to the population at large (Sklar 
2004; Osaghae 2011; Agbaje 1997: 379). In fact the political parties have become a self-
serving venture, unable to create and sustain a credible backdrop for good governance, 
imperative for socio-economic development (Kampen et al 2006; Adejumobi 2000).  
 
4.7 The effects of social and cultural disparities on Politics in Nigeria 
Nigerian political culture directly exemplifies religious, social and economic fragmentation 
as well as the polarization evident in the large populace. For instance the population of the 
northern states are quite distinct from those in the southern states, creating a culture of 
national differences. Such serious social separations between the prominent ethnic groups and 
religious separations between Christians and Muslims have caused enormous political 
conflicts within the regime since the groups are also divided along social, political and 
economic lines. As a consequence voting behaviour and political culture lead to inequalities 
which are rampant.  
 
As with other third world countries, scholars have conducted studies investigating the 
political culture and for most it is evident that mass political culture is the major cause of 
unstable and fluid politics in the country Lewis (2003). Whilst the majority of Nigerians may 
think in national terms, and most consider Nigeria as a progressive country in terms of 
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development, there are very diverse and competing groups who think differently. Boko 
Haran, for instance, militates for Muslim separatism and national cohesion is difficult to 
maintain in such circumstances. Such optimism for a fully developed Nigeria, so evident in 
the early years, has however failed to translate into sustained support of the successive 
Nigerian regimes. Consequently there has developed a climate of disappointment, mistrust 
and disillusion. Lewis (2003) describes Nigeria’s political system as an unstable and 
overburdened system.  
 
The key question for Nigeria as a whole is whether thee still exists the national will to take 
Nigeria forward and achieve federalism as provided for in its constitution. In this context the 
author’s observations, perceptions and experience of the respondents in Ondo go some way 
towards an answer in the affirmative but only if action is taken to remedy perceived faults in 
the political culture and differences between disparate groups. In this regard it is worth 
referring to the bedrock of the system, the constitution, and quoting its guiding principles set 
out in the preamble as follows, 
We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
Having firmly and solemnly resolve, to live in unity and harmony as one 
indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God, dedicated to the 
promotion of inter-African solidarity, world peace, international co-
operation and understanding 
And to provide for a Constitution for the purpose of promoting the good 
government and welfare of all persons in our country, on the principles of 
freedom, equality and justice, and for the purpose of consolidating the unity 
of our people 
Do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following Constitution;- 
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When asked, the respondents unanimously replied that achievement of those principles 
remain the national ambition and are still worth striving for, despite, or perhaps because of, 
the increasingly disparate nature of their country. 
 
4.8 Governance: the effect of the politicians  
Nigerian political parties have eroded the goals of good governance (Osaghae, 1988). High 
levels of corruption have created a culture of competitive business politics (Adejumobi and 
Kehinde 2007). From 1999 to 2007, Nigerian citizens suffered from governance crisis as they 
experienced human rights violations, widespread corruption, insecurity, increased democratic 
crisis, disillusionment, macro-economic instability, thereby losing confidence in the regime 
(Musa, 2014). It is apparent therefore that political parties contribute very significantly to the 
success or failure of good governance. Consequently, organization of the political parties in 
ensuring effective governance becomes important (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007).  
 
In 1999, Nigeria transformed into a nation with democratic governance (Agbaje and 
Adejumobi, 2006). The civil rights groups, labour unions and civil societies warmly 
welcomed the reoccurrence of democracy following persistent dictatorship for fifteen years 
(Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). The political parties, accordingly, were expected to realize 
democracy and good governance since they act as platforms for political leaders to champion 
peoples’ voices (Musa, 2014). Nonetheless, the programs and activities of most political 
parties have failed to foster good governance, a possible explanation for failed 
decentralization efforts (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006).  
 
Based on the state of political culture in Nigeria, researchers reveal that individuals must 
affiliate themselves with blocks to succeed (Musa, 2014; Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006; 
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Agbaje, 2004). In shaping the Nigerian social, economic and political dimensions, 
associations and blocks are powerful influencers. The associations help individuals ready to 
associate with them (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). The ethno block groups, for instance, 
influence voting behaviour in Nigeria. The children have the tendency to vote based on the 
beliefs parents provide in affiliated associations.  
 
The state dominant trends are equally significant in shaping the Nigerian political behaviour. 
The state guarantees accumulation of resources (Suberu 2010). So, majority of the business 
people join political parties in power to control their interests and amass wealth. Business 
people can therefore control resource distribution, promote their own interests and 
misappropriate public resources (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007; Suberu 2011; Suberu 2010). 
Dependence on patronage rhetoric aimed at retaining legitimacy and political power, thus, is 
important as any political party which loses grip with local, state or federal tier loses its 
power to other parties, and there is no guarantee to win elections (Adejumobi and Kehinde 
2007). The National advanced Party (NAP) case in 1979 is a good case example for the 
context. Several Nigerian segments and institutions, including social organizations, religious 
groups, politicians, academics, military and government bureaucracies, struggle for power 
(Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999; Okotoni (2001). 
 
It is the view of Lewis (2003) that the limited participation of the citizenry in the process of 
governance is attributed to the serious and multitudinous development challenges in the 
country. This view is corroborated by Elaigwu (2005); and Suberu (2005) who went further 
in arguing that poor participation, of itself, has produced corruption which in turn creates a 
very weak economy, inflation, high unemployment, poverty coupled with diminishing 
educational standards and an increasing crime rate. All of the evidence points to the fact that 
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limited engagement in the political process does not foster sustainable socio-economic 
development and the governance envisaged by the adoption of the constitution. In this regard 
Dike (2006) noted that.'. . . the political landscape of Nigeria is besieged by myriad of 
unreasoned policies-those that are hastily put together and poorly implemented.’ There is 
growing evidence to support the widely held belief that crises affecting the nation's political 
economy is partially attributed to the authoritarian tendencies of the leadership at all levels 
and which discourages participation in the process of governance, Bolaji Akinyemi (2004).  
For instance, almost every facet of the economy is being controlled by the President who by 
virtue of Section 5. 1. (a) of the Constitution has virtually complete executive authority 
vested in him. This is strongly suggestive of a lack of good governance, which by ordinary 
and accepted standards includes those factors referred to Chapter 2.4 of this study, and 
repeated for emphasis in figure 1 below; 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Indicators of good governance 
The Nigerian states need transparency, efficiency and accountability, which are so lacking in 
its public sector (Darma and Ali 2014; Oni, Oni and Gberevbie 2015; Besley and Ghatak 
2007). Agbu (2004; 35) is of the opinion that there is too much control of the government by 
the executive to enable governance to be delivered. For instance, the President controls the 
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on-going privatization process as well as the decisions in petroleum industry, including the 
pricing of the petroleum products, a function that stakeholders in the petroleum industry are 
supposed to address. To support the notion of the domineering role of the president, Suberu 
and Osaghae (2005:69), Bolaji Akinyemi (2004:4) and Wunch and Olowu (2010:3) note that 
the president also controls the elections process, determining which individuals take part in 
the process and who is corrupt and who is not. Moreover, makes decisions about the national 
budget, often allocating public fund without seeking approval from the National Assembly. 
Suberu and Osaghae (2005) find that the Nigerian system lacks transparency and the checks 
and balances generally found in a mature system of government, while at the same time, the 
people lack the freedom to challenge the autocratic leadership style that prohibit people 
participation and effective governance.  
 
The discussions of Suberu and Osaghae (2005:69), Bolaji Akinyemi (2004:4) and Wunch and 
Olowu (2010:3) lead to the inescapable conclusion that the extent to which most of the 
institutional organs that carry out national functions, such the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC), more often than not appear not to be independent, so that they lack 
accountability and transparency, both critical features of governance. Inherent in the notion of 
governance is that it flourishes only if sufficient opportunities and guarantees for political 
expression by all the people exist, people expressing themselves as individuals or in 
associations (Lawal 2004; Kehinde 2007). That implies the existence of all the characteristics 
comprising good governance as described in detail herein. 
 
4.9 Infrastructure: provision and enhancement by the distribution of resources 
Consumer and market participation in the economy necessitates durable supply networks 
frequently supplied by enhancements to the existing physical infrastructure, such as all-
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weather roads, clean water, railroads, ports and plentiful electricity, Bolaji Akinyemi (2004). 
The means by which the distribution of national wealth is achieved is by its percolation 
downwards from central government into the states and hence to local government for local 
projects, is through the political and physical infrastructure designed to achieve full 
federalism.  
 
Empirical evidence about the way decentralization programs work in practice is scanty 
(Kampen et al 2006). More recent studies provide new evidence on the way locally elected 
government’s function in delivering essential services to the Nigerian citizens, (Agba, 
Akwara and Idu 2013). Such evidence suggests limited accountability at the local levels, 
reflected in poor payment of workers, corruption among other challenges, a tendency that 
cannot be justified by appealing to the lack of resources the local governments have as 
provided by governments in higher tier levels (Agba 2006). Faced with the evidence of lack 
of accountability at all levels of government, there is need to explore some solutions taking 
into account the on-going policy discussions on high-level fiscal relations in Nigeria 
(Anazodo, Okoye and Chukwuemeka 2012; Bardhan 2002). 
 
According to Agba, Akwara and Idu (2013), the goal of governments is to offer services 
likely to make life better for the citizens. Ogunrotifa (2012) also supports the same argument. 
Gani Fawehinmi as quoted in Anagwonye (2009:184), while analysing the Nigerian 
economy, point out that unsatisfactory government fails to address poverty in terms of food, 
health, education, energy and infrastructure. Based on this argument, local governments, as 
the third tier of government, are established to transform peoples’ lives at the grassroots or 
rural levels (Bardhan 2002; Anazodo, Okoye and Chukwuemeka 2012). Local governments 
are therefore constitutionally obliged to manage four fundamental functions (Okoli 2000): 
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1. equipment for local needs and corresponding services inside the capability and 
competence of local areas; 
2. the provision of equipment for the implementation of federal or regional government 
policy at the local level; 
3. the provision of a mechanism for the resolution of the conflicts of interest at the local 
level; and, 
4. the provision of training grounds for political involvement and vocalization. 
 
Delivering satisfactory, effective, sufficient and timely services to people at grassroots is one 
of the means to bring the government closer to the people (Anazodo, Okoye and 
Chukwuemeka 2012; Ogunrotifa 2012). Agba, Akwara and Idu (2013) examined social 
service delivery by the local governments in Nigeria, and found that the primary 
constitutional obligations given to the local governments have not yet, in general, been 
practically realized.  
 
In fact the performance by most public organizations in providing effective service to the 
general public has lagged behind for decades despite investments made by previous 
government reforms (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007, Anazodo, Okoye and Chukwuemeka 
(2012). Efforts geared towards transformation of public service and other administrative 
institutions for efficient and effective enactment have undoubtedly become pressing anxieties 
of the government as evident in the continuing social, economic and administrative reforms 
by the Obasanjo regime (Agba, Akwara and Idu 2013; Oni, Oni and Gberevbie 2015). The 
study by Agba (2006) provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of human resource 
management in effectively delivering under the decentralized regime in Nigeria. He 
advocates that the refurbishing and alteration of the Nigerian Civil Service to provide 
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effective service to the general public does not depend on the continuous formulation of the 
reforms parameters that are dishonestly applied but rather in the effective human resource 
management system, complete transformation of citizens’ attitudes, change in the value 
system and the reawakening of a fresh political order considered as foresighted leadership, 
(Agba 2006). 
 
In any nation, whether developed, or developing, the provision of effective public services is 
a major factor for determining stability and development (Agba, Akwara and Idu 2013). The 
reason for this argument is that the public service is the route by which government 
responsibilities for the implementation of public policies, projects and the provision of 
indispensable services to the people are conducted (Darma and Ali 2014; Agba 2006). 
Numerous governmental regimes in Nigeria have endeavoured to reposition the public sector 
so as to deliver effective and efficient services using several reforms (Oni, Oni and Gberevbie 
2015). In spite of all efforts, the Nigerian Public Service still remains inefficient and 
incompetent in delivering its constitutional responsibilities (Suberu 2010; Suberu 2009; 
Suberu 2011).  
 
Recent research by Oni, Oni and Gberevbie (2015) adopts descriptive and analytical 
approach in Nigeria to evaluate the exponential development, usage and the acceptance of 
Information Communication Technology, arguing for a methodical shift from the outdated 
approach to electronic administration, which enhances the delivery of public goods and 
services, The essential role of the public service institutions in Nigeria’s development 
accounts for the several reforms aimed at reviving the state to efficiently and effectively 
deliver its constructional responsibility (Darma and Ali: 2014). Similar to other African 
governments, Nigeria has attempted to improve the performance of its public service through 
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changes aimed at increasing the capacity for quality public service delivery as well as 
effective performance of the major governmental functions regarded as fundamental in 
sustainable socioeconomic development (ECA, 2010; Ayodele and Bolaji 2007).  
 
While improved productivity in the public service has been and is still the main aim, and a 
decisive factor for the existence and success of any nation, the move to attain improved 
productivity in the Nigerian Public Service has largely been wishful thinking because 
bureaucratic disorganisation continues to create obstacles (Okotoni 2001). Bureaucracies 
destroy the smooth operation of the whole civil service (Oni, Oni and Gberevbie 2015; 
Okotoni 2001). Consequently, it has adversely affected the delivery of public goods and 
services (Darma and Ali 2014; Besley and Ghatak 2007). In this context, the question that 
must be answered is what are the new strategies that could enhance efficiency, productivity 
and service delivery by the Nigerian Public Service? 
 
Obaro (2005) suggests that poor service delivery in Nigeria reemphasises the significance of 
quality public services as key determinant of the health of any economy. He posited that the 
valuation of the strengths and weaknesses of the public service delivery system is important 
for formulating policies, and designing strategies and plans that foster good governance. For 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez and Prado-Lorenzo (2013) the, essence of public 
service includes the regime taking action to provide the citizens with definite assistance 
funded by taxation, and possibly by private and public joint ventures. Whereas the private 
sector is responsible for efficiently providing private goods and services, the public sector is 
responsible for the provision of public goods and services (Darma and Ali 2014; Ayodele and 
Bolaji 2007). The public sector, as a matter of fact, came into being as an instrument to battle 
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lack of interest by private initiatives in establishing businesses that offer universal services at 
affordable prices, as proposed by Besley and Ghatak (2007).  
 
According to Anwar (2005), treating all persons equally and allocating the resources based on 
the needs are the primary guiding principles delivering services to the public. OECD (1996) 
consider a more inclusive and broad aspect, and identifies the core components of quality 
public service delivery, including consultation, transparency, openness, information, 
satisfying user requirements, participation, accessibility, availability, accountability, 
timeliness and convenience (cf. the figure on governance in part 4. 5 of this Chapter 4). In 
examining the reasons for failed decentralization, one particular question that may be posed is 
whether the Nigerian political system does de facto ensure transparency, openness, 
information, satisfying user requirements, participation, accessibility, availability, 
accountability, timeliness and convenience while delivering services to the public. The author 
will conclude (post) that based on the evidence and the literature that the answer is likely to 
be in the negative. 
 
A point already made in a different context is that of Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez 
and Prado-Lorenzo (2013) who demonstrates that all regimes have had to address the 
problem of providing effective public services notwithstanding their financial means, and at a 
reasonably priced cost. Besley and Ghatak (2007) subscribe to the same position by noting 
that one of the main challenges universally, is how to improve public service delivery 
proportionately and most efficiently. Omotosho (2014:119) and Oduwobi (2011) observed 
that this situation is exacerbated in Africa generally, given the low quality of services 
provided and the needs of the poorest of people. Globally one of the main challenges is not 
only how to ensure functional, efficient, flexible and effective public service delivery, but 
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also how to make the service providers accountable and ensure that the services are 
accessible to the citizens, Clarke and Clegg (1999); Omotosho (2014); and Barkan and 
Gboyega (2001). Therefore for majority of the African countries, Khemani Gauri and Gupta 
(2004), Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez and Prado-Lorenzo (2013) and Suberu (2010) 
agree the inequitable distribution of resource, weak governance and poor quality of public 
services remain unresolved. That this is equally so in Nigeria is overwhelmingly made out by 
the literature.  
 
The old-fashioned focus of the theoretical government has classically paid either little or no 
attention to the public service delivery approaches, making effectiveness and efficiency in big 
bureaucracy progressively sub-standard (Ayodele and Bolaji 2007; Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 
García-Sánchez and Prado-Lorenzo 2013; Clarke and Clegg 1999; Okotoni 2001). Among 
the developing nations, (Barkan and Gboyega (2001) regard Nigeria among those that have 
decentralized services delivered, particularly education and basic health. The research by 
Khemani Gauri and Gupta provides evidence on how decentralization in Nigeria functions in 
relation to service delivery institutions in efforts to promote public accountability and good 
governance. Several scholars (Oni, Oni and Gberevbie 2015) have observed the following 
defects in contemporary Nigerian service delivery: 
a. nepotism where individuals in with influence and power favour their friends and 
relatives by providing them job opportunities. 
b. corruption where individuals in power engage in fraudulent and dishonest activities; it 
is reported that they both give and receive bribes.  
c. delay in decision making and implementation where local leaders cannot take 
immediate actions to address problems raised by the citizens because of the weight of  
bureaucracy; 
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d. absenteeism is prevalent, particularly in government offices; 
e. unresponsiveness to the general public needs and concerns  
f. inappropriate supervision and resistance to change; 
g. wastage of government resources due to corruption and inefficiency;  
h. the violation of codes of ethics.  
 
Musa (2014) posits that there have been numerous attempts by various Nigerian regimes to 
address such challenges. Such interventions have, however, achieved minimal economic 
growth that does not significantly improve human development Osaghae (2011). There is 
generally a lack of continuity in the programs. For example, at the inception of a new 
government, the programs of development of successive government are frequently 
abandoned. Rahman and Achi, (2005:113) citing poor coordination by government officials 
points out that none of the programmes of each political regime aiming at reducing poverty 
have been able to significantly reduce poverty as well as engender development. For 
example, the late General Sani Abacha regime's (1993 to 1998) Family Economic 
Advancement Programme, instituted an anti-poverty strategy aimed at lifting rural families 
from poverty and spent an estimated NI0 billion of oil revenues without any major positive 
impact on reducing poverty incidence in the country (Osaghae, 2011). 
 
The 2013 USAID report affirms that Nigeria has enjoyed relatively strong economic growth 
over the past seven years, but that poverty is still a major concern. In the same vein, the 
World Bank Economic Report of Nigeria states that the size of the Nigerian economy is 
170% times larger today than at the beginning of the decade. Reported growth in the non-oil 
economy has been even higher, implying that the Nigerian non-oil economy is now 240% 
times higher than a decade ago. However, the same report notes that economic and human 
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capital development are still constrained by inadequate infrastructure, electricity, incentives, 
and policies that promote private sector development, and poor access to quality education 
(World Bank, 2013). See figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Nigerian economic report of 2013 
Source: Nigeria Bureau of Statics. 
Figure 2shows that in the first quarter of 2014, Nigeria’s Nominal Gross Domestic Product, 
GDP (at basic prices) was estimated at N20, 169,778.04 million. In the corresponding quarter 
of 2013, nominal GDP was estimated N18, 295, 631.91. As a result, the growth rate of real 
GDP was recorded at 6.21% in Q1 2014, higher than 4.45% recorded in the corresponding 
quarter of 2013, but lower than 6.77% recorded in the fourth quarter of 2013. 
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Table 4: Nigerian poverty rates 
 2013-2014 2009-210 
Per Capita 
Poverty Rate 64.2 62.6 
Urban Poverty 52.2 51.2 
Rural Poverty 73.4 69 
Adult equivalence   
Poverty rate 48.3 46.1 
Urban Poverty 36.8 34.3 
Rural Poverty 57.4 52.9 
 
Source: The World Bank Data on Nigeria Economy Report. 
Table 1 show that poverty rates remain high in Nigeria, particularly in rural areas. These rates 
declined between 2003-2004 and 2009- 2010, although not nearly as fast as would be 
expected were it to match the pace of economic growth in the country.  
 
4.10 The creation of States 
Political instability is still evident in the local and state levels. For instance, there were three 
regions at the inception of federal system in Nigeria, however the number has increased and 
currently, there are now thirty-six. The local governments and federal territories have also 
increased from three hundred and six and seven hundred and seventy four respectively as at 
2014. Changes in the Nigerian government translate into new formations and policy changes; 
most alterations usually destroy old political cultures. Enormous institutional, policy and 
structural changes come from government changes at state, local and federal tiers. 
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Government departments, parastatal agencies and ministries have continuously been 
restructured by consecutive regimes.  
 
The changes have also been reflected in financial regulations, taxation and revenue allocation 
systems. The contest for political power and resources for development in Nigeria has 
continuously increased the agitation for the creation of more states to ensure a more inclusive 
distribution of resource. Based on the earlier analysis of the interactions of ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, it is apparent that there is consistent political and economic rivalry. State creation is 
a means of accessing power and resources and it therefore an important aspect of national 
debate. Since Nigeria attained independence, fragmentation of the federation has occurred six 
times; 1963; 1966; 1976; 1987; 1991 and 1996. As a result the creation of states and local 
governments has thrown up issues that impact on political structures and development. 
 
State creation constitutes major conflict among the three major ethnic groups on the one 
hand, and the conflicts between the major and minority ethnic groups on the other. For 
example, the minority ethnic groups agitate for separate states to protect themselves against 
the domination and subjugation by the larger ethnic groups. It appears that the agitation is 
widespread as the states are the major means of control of power and resources. In response 
to this notion Suberu (2009) and Suberu (2010) argues that the states, as they are configured, 
function as the structural and administrative conduits for the devolution of centrally collected 
revenues, which are allocated to the states mainly on the basis of the dual principles of inter-
unit equality and relative population. The military government fragmented the federation of 
the four regions to twelve states in 1966, with the goal of curbing the violent ethnic 
separatism tendencies that had developed around the old regional system. The move, 
subsequently, provoked civil war over the attempted secession of the Eastern Region as an 
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independent Republic of Biafra (Moreno and Colino 2010: 233). In effect, the decision to 
create twelve states in 1966 was informed by the desire to safeguard Nigeria as a nation. 
Moreover, Alapiki argues that the creation of the twelve state structure of the federation was 
a conscious effort to ‘balance’ the south and north, giving each region six states (Alapiki: 
2005).  
 
Campaigning for state creation has been a significant political issue even though some 
development concerns underlie the campaigns (Suberu 2009). The motivation behind the 
creation of states has been to bring the government nearer the people while, encouraging 
participation of the local people, so ensuring equal development within a federal structure of 
the government (Suberu 2010). Additionally, the demand for more states has been fuelled by 
rapid economic development (Alapiki: 2005). Essentially, scholars have put forth reasons for 
creation of more states in Nigeria (Suberu 2010; Alapiki: 2005; Suberu 2009; Suberu 2011). 
Based on the push for the creation of states two questions emerge. The first is the extent to 
which the creation of states has enhanced peace, cohesion, equity and justice. In other words, 
has the creation of states solved the problems of disunity, violence, agitation and secessionist 
tendencies. The second is the extent to which the creation of states engendered development. 
Informed opinion answers both of those questions in the negative, (Suberu 2009). 
 
Nonetheless it is important to examine the positive effect of state creation and contrast it with 
the negative effects. Some scholars have argued that fragmentation of Nigeria over the years 
has significantly reduced the tendency of secession and disintegration. For instance, Suberu 
(2010) argues that the present fragmentation has created a situation that no single constituent 
unit of the federation is large enough to challenge the authority of the federal government, 
threaten secession, or dominate other states. To this extent, Suberu (2011) argues that the 
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initial reason given for state creation has been substantially achieved. Conversely, this 
attainment does not stop threats of secession and violent ethnic and religious uprisings, 
Momoh and Adejumobi (1999). In fact the creation of states appears to exacerbate ethnic 
tension and restiveness amongst the different Nigerian ethnic groups and interests, Musa 
(2014). Importantly, it appears that as more states are created, the states are becoming weaker 
and the federal government is correspondingly becoming stronger, Moreno and Colino 
(2010).  
 
The implications are that the greater the number of states, the weaker and less viable 
individual states will become. Consequently, the centre regime would actually gather more 
power and initiative (Diamond, 1987). Further, the condition implies that the creation of more 
states will make the states so small and will not have the capacity to check the excess of the 
overbearing centre. This has been playing out in the intergovernmental relationship of 
Federal-state relationship (Alapiki: 2005). Some suggest that in the Nigerian state creation 
efforts, winners and losers have emerged. For instance, Alapiki (2005) notes: 
 
“ . . . each state creation exercise in Nigeria, significantly, was accompanied 
by attendant effects that actually exacerbated pre-existing interethnic and 
intergroup conflicts rather than relieving them. The August 27, 1991, events 
are particularly interesting in this regard.”  
 
He went on to break such events down into three constituent features as follows; 
“First, they demonstrate clearly the low level of political integration among 
the various peoples and communities that make up Nigeria. Second, the 
exercise was greeted with violence, rampages, and public demonstrations 
unsurpassed in the history of state creation in Nigeria. Third, the displacement 
of "non-state indigenous persons" and the subsequent "asset sharing" 
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controversies among affected state governments were unprecedented. 
Instructive, too, is the fact that the violence and public demonstrations took 
place in all the geopolitical zones of Nigeria.” 
 
Ojo and Adebayo (2008) similarly support the argument put by Alapiki (2005). They explain 
that there is a considerable merit in the demands for an equitable spatial spread of economic 
development (a) through the creation of more states and local government areas; and (b) 
through effective engagement in physical (spatial) planning which is sometimes referred to as 
Urban and Regional Planning. Conversely, from an economic viewpoint, academics argue 
that there appears to be no justification for the creation of more states in Nigerian in the 
foreseeable future as virtually all the existing thirty six states are not economically viable 
(Ojo and Adebayo 2008).  
 
The current fiscal arrangement made states rely on the Federal Government for subvention 
and allocations to fulfil their constitutional roles. As a consequence most of the states are 
insolvent so that few states in the federation appear viable on the strength of their secondary 
and tertiary industries alone (Suberu 2010; Suberu 2011; Suberu 2009). In general, the 
evaluation on the rationale and actual creation of states reveals that it has further compounded 
the fear of the minority groups, thereby promoting more agitation, and throwing up new 
interest groups (Alapiki 2005; Suberu 2010; Ojo and Adebayo 2008; Suberu 2011; Suberu 
2009). On the issue of development, Ojo and Adebayo argue that apart from the expansion of 
bureaucratic and physical infrastructure in the newly established administrative headquarters, 
the developmental (as distinct from distributive) value of new financial devolution which 
accrues to the new constituent units from the revenue sharing system is immediately 
consumed by administrative overheads and new patronage positions, which leaves little 
resources for real development (Ojo and Adebayo 2008). 
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Nigerian nationalism originates from three primary sources. First is the settlement of the 
slaves in West African coast which group established its own political culture. The second 
are, the soldiers from the Second World War, following failure to be recognized by the 
British government, who also formed their own culture and identity. The last element of 
nationalism originated from Nigerian students who studied overseas. It was these three 
nationalistic associations that brought forth ethnic groups during struggle for independence.  
The current state structure of Nigeria is set out below in Table 2. 
Table 5: Nigerian states 
State Date Created Preceding Entity 
Abia State 27 August 1991 Imo State  
Adamawa State  27 August 1991 Gongola State  
Akwa Ibom State  
23 September 
1987 
Cross River State 
Anambra State  27 August 1991 (old) Anambra State 
Bauchi State  3 February 1976 North-Eastern State 
Bayelsa State  1 October 1996 Rivers State 
Benue State  3 February 1976 Benue-Plateau State  
Borno State  3 February 1976 North-Eastern State 
Cross River State 27 May 1967 
Eastern Region; known as South-Eastern State 
from 1967 to 1976. 
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Delta State  27 August 1991 Bendel State  
Ebonyi State  1 October 1996 Enugu State and Abia State 
Edo State 27 August 1991 Bendel State  
Ekiti State 1 October 1996 Ondo State 
Enugu State  27 August 1991 (old) Anambra State 
Gombe State 1 October 1996 Bauchi State  
Imo State  3 February 1976 East Central State  
Jigawa State  27 August 1991 Kano State  
Kaduna State  27 May 1967 
Northern Region; known as North-Central State 
from 1967 to 1976. 
Kano State  27 May 1967 Northern Region  
Katsina State 
23 September 
1987 
Kaduna State  
Kebbi State 27 August 1991 Sokoto State 
Kogi State  27 August 1991 Kwara State; Benue State 
Kwara State 27 May 1967 
Northern Region; known as West Central State 
from 1967 to 1976. 
Lagos State  27 May 1967 Federal Territory of Lagos and Colony Province 
Nasarawa State  1 October 1996 Plateau State 
Niger State  3 February 1976 North-Western State  
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Ogun State  3 February 1976 Western State 
Ondo State 3 February 1976 Western State 
Osun State 27 August 1991 Oyo State  
Oyo State  3 February 1976 Western State 
Plateau State 3 February 1976 Benue-Plateau State  
Rivers State 27 May 1967 Eastern Region  
Sokoto State 3 February 1976 North-Western State  
Taraba State  27 August 1991 Gongola State  
Yobe State  27 August 1991 Borno State  
Zamfara State  1 October 1996 Sokoto State 
Abuja Federal Capital 
Territory 
3 February 1976 
Benue-Plateau, North-Central, and North-
Western States 
 
4.11  Politics and Socio-economic Development 
The relationship between politics and socio-economic development, and the consequences 
thereof, has been a persistent issue in the debate and analysis of Nigerian federalism 
(Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). The debate has several components and perspectives and by 
reference to a number of opinions Osaghae (2011) categorizes them into five distinct areas, 
each with differing sub-sets; 
(1)  ethnicity, ethnic pluralism and ethno-politics; Nnoli (1978); Diamond (1988); 
Osaghae (1986); and Otitie (1990); 
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(2)  institutional, process, governance and democratisation: (Awa, 1964; Oyediran, 
(1979); Mahwood (1980); Oyovbaire (1985); Jinadu (1985); Ayeni and 
Soremekun(1988); Diamond (1988); Dent (1989); Ekeh and Osaghae (1989); and 
Bach (1989); 
(3)  the political economic approach, with emphasis on class and materialist forces, the 
role of oil in the economy as well as dependency-underdevelopment perspectives: 
Panter-Brick (1978); Nnoli (1981 and 1993); Ake, (1985);and Onimode, (1982 and, 
1983); 
(4)  the civil military perspectives: Adekanye (1981; Dudley (1973 and 1982; Miners, 
(1971); Luckman (1971); Odetola (1978 and 1980); and Agbese (1991);  
(5)  statist and state-society perspectives, including political culture perspectives such as 
client/patronage politics, prebendalism and the system of values; Okpaku (1972; 
Oyobaire (1987); Williams (1980; Ekeh(1975 and 1989); Dudley (1973 and 1982; 
Ajayi and Ikara (1985); Joseph (1987 and 1996); and Lewis(1996). 
Each of those perspectives can be discussed in isolation however an assessment of their 
interaction as a series of inert-related factors is preferred for the purpose of this study.  
 
To this end, the analysis of the politics and development in Nigeria in this section takes a 
historical approach which provides a general understanding of the issues of the Nigerian 
politics and development (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007).The quest for development and oil 
revenue play significant roles in the structure of the Nigerian federalism and based on this 
notion Elaigwu (2007:25) indicates that the prospect of decolonization led to competition for 
power among the different groups in order to control the dispensation of resources. 
Development presupposes mechanisms and processes for its actualisation, Adejumobi and 
Kehinde (2007). A sound economic base and effective political processes are therefore 
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fundamental mechanisms that drive development and the intersection of politics and 
development is situate within the conceptual framework of development as a 
multidimensional process involving reorganization and reorientation of the entire economic 
and social systems, Rostov (1960: Leys (1996): Pieterse (2001): and Jhingan (2007). 
Development, therefore, involves the creation and maintenance of institutional, social and 
administrative structures.  
 
The politics of Nigeria are expressively dictated by the struggle for political and economic 
control of the available resources of the country, Elaigwu (2008; Nnoli (2008); Wunsch & 
Olowu (1990); and Osaghae (2011). Consequently competition has arisen between the 
players within ethnic and factional politics, Nnoli (2008). The effect of this situation has been 
and remains a persistent and real threat to the stability of Nigeria as a nation and the many 
incidences of underdevelopment, Musa (2014). Hence, the observable failure of Nigeria as a 
cohesive nation capable of building a workable system of government and an economy that is 
sustainable and effective in the provision of the legitimate and credible process of governance 
essential for public good is evident Adejumobi and Kehinde (2007; Lewis (2006: 54-85). 
 
Among other things, the USAID (2003) economic report on Nigeria entitled: Nigeria 
Economic Growth Activities Assessment, states that despite the fact that Nigeria has the 
advantage of manpower (the largest black population in the world)and enormous natural 
resources, principally oil (it is the sixth largest oil producing country in the world) there is no 
corresponding human and social development, rather what obtains is a poorly functioning 
economy (despite historical increases in GDP referred to in 4.6 of this chapter) and a dearth 
of development. Osaghae (2011) attributes this overall condition to failed economic policies, 
manifest in the level of poverty and the poor state of the national infrastructure. The USAID 
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report notes that half of the adult population is illiterate; there are apparent gender disparities 
in education; and high maternal mortality rates. Public utility services are among the worst in 
the world, with at least two-thirds of households not connected to electricity, with access to 
water being extremely limited; unreliable urban transportation; and an average of fifty 
households for each telephone land line. It has disturbing ethnic rivalries that regularly flare 
into communal violence and Nigeria is rated as the world’s most corrupt country.  
 
The key features of democratic governance include rule of law, freedom to choose the 
leadership, accountability, freedom of expression and elective representation amongst other 
factors (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). Miles (1988) argues that being a government system, 
democracy seeks to attain overall common good via collective discussion of the policy 
questions about the public affairs, and the power is given to agents who implement decisions 
made through the majority vote. Thus, democracy in the modern era involves expressing 
popular will using elected representatives (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007; Musa, 2014).  
 
Compared to other nations, the Nigerian democratic government seems disparate (Agbaje and 
Adejumobi, 2006). From 1999 to 2007 Nigerian citizens never fully experienced the rule of 
law and respect for the human rights, one of the key attributes of good governance. In 
Nigeria, election violence and rigging have been prevalent, and barely separating autocracy 
from democratic governance (Agbaje, 2004). Foreign policy in Nigeria has been based on 
leadership perception, stressing the significance of responsibility toward development and the 
liberation in Africa as a continent. Among the educated classes living in urban centres in 
Nigeria, this perception has been driving political behaviour. 
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Current politics in Nigeria are viewed in terms of standards of a civilised nation (Pereira, 
2006). In civilized political emancipation, society is ready to leave regimes or political parties 
that under-perform (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). Order transformation, expediency by the 
government in power and performance puritanism is current in the priorities of government. 
Nonetheless, backwardness in policy development is still apparent (Lawal, 2004). 
Historically, policy development in Nigeria is frequently disarticulated from implementation 
(Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). The National Executive Council and National Conventions 
are the examples of available party structures being responsible for formulating polices, but 
still policies which are implemented only reflect the desires of political leaders rather than 
those of the organs of state and the majority. Political party life lacks public participation and 
debate on policy alternatives (Toyo and Aremu, 2003); Party reforms are so challenging 
because of complex methods used, which lack democracy so political parties must prioritize 
on policy development to foster good governance and economic development (Miles, 1988).  
 
To a very large number of Nigerian citizens, education is absolutely vital (Adejumobi and 
Kehinde 2007). They consider attaining degree level education as a prerequisite for social and 
economic personal progress (Pereira, 2006). While a number of them demand universal 
education, others do not support the idea, giving rise to conflicts and disagreements in policy. 
The number of men and women enrolled in educational institutions varies significantly 
pointing to inequality of opportunity (Toyo and Aremu, 2003). While English is the official 
language, the majority of the Nigerians consider it as second language, reverting to their own 
traditional languages and dialects. Pereira (2006) is of the very firm view that to enable 
individuals to play a significant role in the Nigerian politics, they need education and a good 
command of English. By contrast, state officials and politicians generally have more access 
to education and use their elevated status to dominate the less well-educated majority. For 
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instance individuals with a formal education can far more easily access government contracts 
than those without (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007).  
 
Education has other benefits and according to Pereira (2006) few educated individuals trust 
the government as they seek to reap the benefits of booming oil economy. In general most 
citizens still remain cynical about the underlying motives and agendas of politicians while 
formulating national development policies given that the media portray political life as full of 
corruption (Pereira, 2006).  
 
4.12 Service delivery Institutions  
Under the civilian regimes the Nigerian federation has experimented with two types of 
federal structure since independence, the Westminster-style parliamentary system (1960 to 
1966) and the U.S.-presidential system (1979-1983 and 1999-date). In between there were the 
years of military rule, with its unitary hierarchical structure and intrinsic arbitrariness and 
authoritarianism (Adamolekun 1991: 5), the process being described as ‘military federalism’. 
 
The immediate post-independence Nigeria operated under a parliamentary system. 
Adamolekun (2005) has highlighted three main features of this era. Firstly, that each regional 
government was free to determine its own economic and social development policies. 
Secondly a strong incentive was built into revenue-allocation formulae, with 50% assigned 
according to the derivation principle; this meant that each region had to mobilize resources 
that would be used to implement its development plan (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). 
Thirdly, there was an increasing desire to provide ‘life more abundant’ for the citizens in 
their respective regions, leading to the emergence of informal competition (Adamolekun 
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2005; 386). For example, the Northern government was determined to match the Western 
government achievements in terms of education and commerce. 
 
Institutional development was therefore required hence the establishment of tertiary 
organizations in the regions. An example was the system of Regional Development Boards 
administering the newly created marketing boards (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). Such 
marketing boards were created to facilitate exports of the principal crops of the country on a 
world economy competitive basis and their function was to stabilize local cash crop prices to 
provide some stability for producers. In addition they were given the responsibility of fixing 
of carrying out price support and stabilization of policies, and the financing of research 
(Nnoli 2008: 234). Since the principal crops are cocoa, palm oil, groundnut and Cotton, there 
was a Cocoa Marketing Board in the West, the Palm Oil Marketing Board in the East, and the 
Groundnut Marketing Board and Cotton Marketing Board in the North. These became some 
of the institutions designed to standardize and improve production practices and ensure that 
producers received value for their crops.  
 
4.13  Political parties, Politicians and elections  
Recent history 
The Military and the political parties are the two central institutions that have influenced and 
continue to shape the dynamics of the Nigerian federal state (Musa, 2014; Osaghae, 2011). 
Both institutions have produced political leadership over a number of years, even though the 
method through which leadership emerges is essentially different (Musa, 2014; Adejumobi 
and Kehinde 2007). While the military used coup d’états to seize to power, access to 
leadership in the political arena is premised on an electoral process (Momoh and Adejumobi, 
1999; Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006; Agbaje, 2004).  
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According to Osaghae (2011) the role and the impact of the Military on the Nigerian 
federalism cannot be overstated. It is however, instructive to note that the long years of 
military incursion into governance has also affected the development of party system in 
Nigeria (Amuwo, Agbaje, Suberu and Herault 1998). As Agbaje, (1997) argues, all of these 
has contributed significantly in robbing the party system the opportunity to develop capacities 
and appetite for its traditional role of deepening democracy and civil activities through 
political parties. Previous arguments in such research provide analysis of the extent to which 
the military governments have impacted on the nature, structure and character of Nigeria 
federalism (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006). It is common ground therefore that the centralized 
and unitary character of Nigerian federalism is essentially of a military heritage. On the other 
hand, the role of political parties and politicians remain fundamental in analysing the success 
or failure of federalism in Nigeria (Osaghae 2011). Since military involvement in the 
Nigerian political scene has now ended, this analysis centres on the Nigerian political parties 
(Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). 
 
In this context, Nigeria has had some regimes that permit popular participation but equally 
others that fail or refuse to allow for such participation. The first and second republics, for 
instance, introduced provisions for emergency rule, so denying their opponents voting rights 
or opportunities for political expressions (Kehinde 2007). In other regimes (Babangida and 
Abacha), Momoh and Adejumobi (1999) noted that the opponents were randomly arrested for 
criticising the politics of the ruling party who operated akin to a dictatorship. Unlike other 
third developing country dictatorships, such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the media has 
largely remained free to comment on the political landscape without undue suppression, this 
has resulted to some extent in a participatory role in the institution of government by the 
  
158 
 
press. Furthermore, Suberu and Osaghae (2005) state that successive regimes have allowed 
interest groups to criticize them politically and publically.  
The democratic process 
The essence of liberal democracy is competition for political authority judged by a free 
electorate exercising free choice from amongst the available platforms offered through 
political parties whether they be single issue of multi faceted (Amuwo, Agbaje, Suberu and 
Herault, 1998).  It is that competition for power by which representation and participation in 
the process of democratic governance occurs (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). While some 
people presume that the alignment of political parties is largely directed by the voters the 
opposing view is that it is the political parties themselves who are responsible for creating 
visions to mobilize voters by way of their election manifestos (Musa, 2014). 
 
Democracy is the process by which an electorate freely expresses itself against the backdrop 
of the choices on offer by competing political parties. Inherent in that is that there is more 
than once choice on offer otherwise the resulting system is likely to be an autocracy, 
benevolent or otherwise.  Democracy produces and results in government likely to represent 
the wishes of the majority of voters (Agbaje, 2004). Miles (1988), Agbaje and Adejumobi 
(2006) and Musa (2014) provides the following as the manner by which democracy is 
expressed through the function of the political parties: (a) generating government policies and 
programs; (b) encouraging candidates to stand for public office; (c) effective control of 
government agencies; and (4) societal integration through effective function of government.  
 
In general, political parties are crucial in good governance- centre of democratic governance 
(Musa, 2014). Political parties provide platforms for collective action, legitimacy, 
inclusiveness, accountability and popular participation through amalgamated ideologies, 
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goals and competing principles (Weingrod, 1977; Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). So, they 
mediate agency and personnel affairs with the peoples’ affairs (Lawal, 2004).  
The party (ies) politic 
Political parties hold a special place in any discussion about democracy (Weingrod, 1977). 
Their very existence forms an essential part of what defines liberal democracy and how they 
operate in no small measure determines whether or not democracy will endure. According to 
Sklar (2004), the basic foundation of political parties in Nigeria is predicated on a multitude 
of associations devoted to community improvement, political reform and racial liberation. 
Such diverse interests remain contentious and highly volatile issues within the Nigeria 
political parties (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). According to Amuwo, et al (1998) the 
majority of Nigerian political parties develop the national system that shares “the national 
cake” equitably amongst the citizenry. 
 
Political parties are authentic instruments for championing democracy; Nigeria has twenty-
five registered parties. Apart from being used to capture political power, political parties are 
instruments used to satisfy the interests of people through government control. In addition 
they help sustain democratic governance.  Amuwo, et al (1998), further emphasise that the 
accountability level in public life is determined by; the extent political parties freely represent 
and articulate citizen’ concerns. Coalitions develop between parties of a similar outlook 
creating a complex system of politics. 
 
From the earlier discussion, it is apparent that there were some highly active political parties 
before Nigeria achieved independence, increasing number during the first and second 
republics (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). In addition the military government created two 
new political parties as part of the planned transformation to the third republic that ended 
  
160 
 
with the doomed presidential election in 1993 (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999). The Abacha 
regime that followed disqualified virtually all opposition and that ban remained effective the 
constitution was put in place. The death of Abacha in 1998 permitted the creation of new 
political parties (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). They were different from the previous 
parties established during the second republic and scholarly opinion is generally that they had 
little in common with the earlier institutions.  Some of those differences grew out of the fact 
that they were permitted to be structurally (if not philosophically) autonomous from the 
departing military government (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999).  
 
In total, nine political parties were legally recognized but of them only three recorded good 
performance in the state and local elections of 1999 for both the presidential and the 
legislative elections (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). Out of those three however certainly 
two had close associations with the military (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999). The People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) was founded by those opposed the Abacha administration in the 
mid-1990s and though most of them had been imprisoned by the regime they emerged to 
form this new party. There had been rumours that the PDP also had close ties with the 
military, particularly to former President Babangida supporters, who is believed to have 
contributed about $18 million to the party’s reserves (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). Others 
were the All People’s Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) which claimed to 
have had serious democratic credentials. 
 
According to Sklar (2004) political parties represent the social forces that shape and 
transform the structure of the society, formed to represent diverse interests. These are 
constituent parts of the political landscape (Musa, 2014). Political parties are the platforms 
for like-minded people to organize and inaugurate their interests as guidance for government 
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action (Amuwo, et al 1998). They set and execute the societal agenda, (Musa, 2014) but 
according to Schumpeter (1961:279), the primary aim of each political party is to prevail over 
other parties, win elections in order to acquire political power or mandate to rule. 
The electoral process 
Musa (2014) views an election, in the broad sense, as the process by which individuals are 
selected to occupy organizational, government or institutions positions. Democratically, it is 
normally expected that candidates chosen via the electoral process exemplify specific policy 
platforms commanding electorate support (Agbaje, 2004). In this context, Agbaje and 
Adejumobi (2006: 26) suggest that elections express the sovereign will of the citizenry it 
being the job of the political parties to provide the platforms for candidates seeking office 
(Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007; Weingrod, 1977).  
 
The 2015 general election represented a significant shift in attitude in that after losing his re-
election bid, President Goodnight Jonathan phoned his rival to concede defeat. Will Ross, of 
the BBC, report that, "The fact that Goodluck Jonathan phoned the opposition's Muhammadu 
Buhari to congratulate him is a massive moment for Nigeria.” It was widely recognized that 
that call signaled the country's first peaceful democratic transition of power, ensuring that 
the tensions of the campaign wouldn't spill over into post-election unrest. Observers 
commented that Jonathan's gesture also went a long way toward healing Nigeria after 
an election that took place against a backdrop of violence in which the President was 
criticized for not responding sooner to the threat of Boko Haram. 
14
 
 
                                                 
14
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-03-31/goodnight-goodluck-nigerias-president-concedes-election-defeat 
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Ethnicity 
Ethnic interests continue to play a major role in political parties, in terms of power 
negotiations and ascent to political offices (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006). Conversely the 
appearance of ethnic conflict in the Nigerian national politics actually masks a more complex 
struggle between interests that were non-ethnic in nature (Lawal, 2004). Yet another view is 
that of Musa (2014) who considers that there are still elements of ethnic loyalty and identities 
attached to the parties, although, such trend appears to be minimal.  
Female participation 
Women too have come to assume a varied role in Nigerian politics (Toyo and Aremu, 2003). 
This however is more apparent in the south as the north, which has Muslim influence, 
exercised restrictions on the role of women generally (Adejumobi and Kehinde 2007). By 
contrast in the central east, women still have some rights and if nothing else this illustrates 
the disparity in culture across the country, a factor which figures greatly in the absence of 
political unity. Women are enfranchised but overall representation in local politics is 
extremely low by comparison with their place in federal government (Toyo and Aremu: 
2003).  
Malpractice 
Adejumobi (2000) notes that vote rigging and other means of coercion have been customarily 
practiced by all major parties since independence in order to retain power.  According to 
Joseph 1987; Sklar (2004) and Osaghae (2011) the electoral process in Nigeria has always 
been fraught with challenges, before, during and after the elections, a demonstration of poor 
participation by the citizens. The challenges range from the use of violence, monetary 
inducements, outright rigging of election process and results, and ‘the elite behaviour that not 
only used government resources to reward loyalists and punish opposition but show disdain 
for the voting power of the civil society’, (Sklar 2004). There is also the mentality of 
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‘Whether you vote for us or not we would remain in power’ (Agabje 1997:374). This has 
increased the sense of fear, a lack of confidence in the process and, consequently, the level of 
participation and apathy on the part of the electorate during elections (Adejumobi 2000). 
There seems to have been an improvement in the general elections of 2011, although the level 
of scepticism on the part of the electorate remained high, as the number of challenges to the 
process after the election underscored the quality of the electoral process (Osaghae 2011).  As 
referred to above (in this section 4.4) the circumstances surrounding the 2015 election might 
have marked a new milestone in the development of democracy in Nigeria although it is too 
soon to draw supportable conclusions. 
 
Corruption has dramatically increased because of the oil boom (Adejumobi and Kehinde 
2007). Government officials and the politicians use money generated from oil reserves to 
sustain their extravagant lifestyle (Toyo and Aremu, 2003). The behaviour has made most 
citizens develop mistrust in the government officials. Some commissions constituted to 
eradicate crime, for instance, The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, have 
ultimately favoured the corrupt officials (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999).  
 
Overall, it can be argued that the general electorate in Nigeria are excluded from the process 
of leadership recruitment (Agbaje 1997; Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006; Agbaje 204). This 
situation impacts on accountability and transparency, translating to poor governance 
(Osaghae 2011). Despite the positive result of the 2015 election the view of Musa (2014), 
that there were limited opportunities for participation by the Nigerian people in the decision-
making processes under the Jonathan regime, remains the general view of the political 
situation.  
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4.14  Conclusion  
Taking into account structure of Nigeria federalism, the study provides primary data in efforts 
to examine the structural conflict amongst the three tiers of government, the issue of 
bordering on the exclusive and concurrent lists, the nervous (of losing control) and 
overbearing central government, the cost of governance, the politics of proliferation of states 
and local government, the corruption and culture of impunity within the structure and the 
principle of derivation as discussed by (Osaghae 2011; Elaigwu 2007; Osayimwese and Iyare 
1991: 95; Suberu 2009). 
 
Running through this chapter is a discussion of the essence of the political culture and 
systems of governance in Nigeria, identifying flaws while acknowledging the positive aspects 
of the political system, as it impacts on the principles and practice of federalism, where they 
exist. Political culture encompasses deep-rooted, engrained political and cultural traits that 
characterize a society. It takes into account the values, beliefs and attitudes that people in a 
society have about the prevailing political system. The ‘quality’ of that political culture is 
relevant, in the sense that it constitutes the growing bed for the seeds of democracy and 
socio-economic development intended to and actually achieving improvements for the 
populace of Nigeria.  
 
The chapter demonstrate that the defective design of the contemporary federal structure 
coupled with the poor ‘quality’ of the prevailing political culture, are responsible for poor 
governance and limited socio-economic development. It is clear from the literature that the 
actions of politicians, and the party system, has produced a culture of leadership in both 
political and civil society that ensures the persistence of dominant norms, attitudes, practices 
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and procedures conducive to behavioural and institutional tendencies that are exploitative, 
and self-seeking (Suberu 2010; Musa 2014; Kaplan 2001; Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999).  
 
It is widely recognised that Nigeria lacks an appropriate ‘quality’ of political culture for 
successful decentralization. This research further illustrates that although the constitution and 
the structure of government provide a legitimate foundation for good governance and socio-
economic development, evolutionary changes are required if true federalism is to be achieved 
in Nigeria in the foreseeable future. The author concludes therefore that non-violent political 
activism is a prerequisite for such change.  
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Chapter 5 
Report on the Field Experiment in Ondo State, Nigeria 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the report of the fieldwork undertaken for the purpose of this research. It 
can be seen from the preceding chapters that the bulk of the literature on the Nigerian federal 
system unambiguously holds that it is dysfunctional and ineffective as a form of government. 
The fieldwork examines such findings by means of a practical examination of the structure of 
Nigerian federalism which results poor governance, largely by the performance (whether 
deliberate or in advertent) of the principal political actors in the process of governance.  The 
issues discussed in this report on the fieldwork are varied; however, they are directly linked 
to the architecture of Nigerian federalism and the extent of the success or failure of 
decentralisation in terms of service delivery and participation of the citizenry in governance. 
This study follows up and augments the previous fieldwork carried out in 2013.  
 
5.1  Ondo State; a general description 
Ondo state is one of the six states that constitute South West Nigeria. It was created on 
February 3rd 1976 and then on October 1st 1996 it was split into two, so carving out the 
present Ekiti state.  The diagram below (Figure 3, map of Nigeria) illustrates that Ondo State  
is bounded in the northwest by Ekiti state, Osun State to the west central area; to the 
southwest there is  Ogun State, and the Edo and Delta states lay in the southeast while the 
Atlantic Ocean forms the natural southern boundary. Ondo State is about 296.6 kilometres 
from the Lagos Airport and 437 kilometres from Abuja Airport. It has a landmass of 
15,500km
2
 (6,000 sq mi).  
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 Figure 3:   Map of Nigeria; Map of Ondo State. 
 
Table 6: Ondo Population Statistics 
 
Name  
Status  
Population 
Census 
1991-11-26 
Population 
Census 
2006-03-21 
Population 
Projection 
2015-03-21 
Ondo State 2,249,548 3,460,877 4,525,600 
Akoko North East  Local Government Area ... 179,092 234,200 
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Name  
Status  
Population 
Census 
1991-11-26 
Population 
Census 
2006-03-21 
Population 
Projection 
2015-03-21 
Akoko North West  Local Government Area 119,278 211,867 277,000 
Akoko South East  Local Government Area ... 82,443 107,800 
Akoko South West Local Government Area ... 228,383 298,600 
Akure North  Local Government Area ... 130,765 171,000 
Akure South Local Government Area ... 360,268 471,100 
Ese-Odo  Local Government Area ... 158,256 206,900 
Idanre  Local Government Area 85,776 129,795 169,700 
Ifedore  Local Government Area 102,617 176,372 230,600 
Ilaje  Local Government Area ... 289,838 379,000 
Ile-Oluji-Okeigbo  Local Government Area 116,094 171,876 224,800 
Irele  Local Government Area 100,127 144,136 188,500 
Odigbo  Local Government Area 154,320 232,287 303,800 
Okitipupa Local Government Area 176,615 234,138 306,200 
Ondo East Local Government Area ... 76,092 99,500 
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Name  
Status  
Population 
Census 
1991-11-26 
Population 
Census 
2006-03-21 
Population 
Projection 
2015-03-21 
Ondo West  Local Government Area ... 288,868 377,700 
Ose  Local Government Area 93,033 144,139 188,500 
Owo Local Government Area 157,191 222,262 290,600 
State Population All Areas  3,460,887  
Nigeria Federal Republic 88,992,220 140,431,790 186,939,800 
 
Source: National Population Commission of Nigeria (web), National Bureau of Statistics 
(web). 
 
The state population as illustrated in Table 5 is about 3,460,887 with a concentration in the 
state capital located at Akure and urban areas. It is made up of eighteen local government 
areas within which are two hundred and three councillorship wards, twenty state electoral 
constituencies, nine federal constituencies and three federal senatorial constituencies each of 
which is composed of six local government areas. The senatorial districts are (1) Ondo North, 
the component Local Governments are: (i) Akoko North East (ii) Akoko North West (iii) 
Akoko South East (iv) Akoko South West (v) Ose (vi) Owo: (2) Ondo Central, is made of the 
following Local Governments (i) Akure North (ii) Akure South (iii) Idanre (iv) Ifedore (v) 
Ondo East (vi) Ondo West: (3)   Ondo South , the component Local Governments are  Ese-
Odo (ii) Ilaje (iii) Ile-Oluji / Oke-Igbo (iv) Irele (v) Odigbo (vi) Okitipupa.  
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Because the number of federal constituency representatives from a state is determined by the 
population of the state Ondo state only has nine federal constituencies and twenty six state 
constituencies. The indigenous people are predominantly Yoruba, though they speak other 
local dialects such as Ikale, Ilaje and  Ondo Akoko. There is however, a minority group who 
are the Ijaws in the coastal area of the state. Its people are predominantly farmers, fishermen 
and traders. There are also civil servants and some private sector employees. All these 
features contribute to the cosmopolitan nature of the state especially in Akure. 
 
Table 7: Local government areas in Ondo state and their headquarters 
S/N LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
AREA 
YEAR 
CREATED 
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
HEADQUARTER 
DISTANCE OF 
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
HEADQUATERS TO 
AKURE, STATE 
CAPITAL (KM 
1 AKOKO NORTH EAST 1991 IKARE 96 
2 AKOKO NORTH 
WEST 
1991 OKEAGBE 121 
3 AKOKO SOUTH EAST 1996 ISUAAKOKO 102 
4 AKOKO SOUTH 
WEST 
1996 OKA 88 
5 AKURE NORTH  1997 IJU/ITAOGBOLU 18 
6 AKURE SOUTH 1976 AKURE STATE  
 
STATE CAPITAL 
7 ESE ODO 1997 IGBEKEBO 168 
8 IDANRE 1996 OWENA 16 
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9 IFEDORE 1991 IGBARA-OKE 20 
10 ILAJE 1991 IGBOKODA 152 
11 ILE-OLUJI/OKE IGBO 1991 ILE-OLUJI 54 
12 IRELE 1991 IRELE 134 
13 ODIGBO 1991 ORE 83 
14 OKITIPUPA 1991 OKITIPUPA 126 
15  ONDO EAST 1996 BOLORUNDURO 46 
16 ONDO WEST 1996 ONDO  
17 OSE 1996 IFON 92 
18 OWO 1989 OWO 48 
 
 
5.2  The Field Survey: subject type, demographics and range 
The scope of the field survey ranged across two communities in each of two local 
governments areas in each senatorial district of the state. That made a total of twelve 
communities within six local governments spreading across the three senatorial districts of 
the state visited for the purpose of the survey. Selection of these local governments and their 
communities was done randomly; because they all share cultural and occupational affinities 
within their senatorial zones such random sampling was a safe method to employ. The 
selected local government areas fully represent the different blocs in the state while the three 
senatorial districts are structured to accommodate the various indigenous ethnic groupings.  
Further, the bulk of the population is found in the rural areas. 
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The local government areas include Ile – Oluji/Oke Igbo, Ese Odo, Akure North, Akoko 
South West, Ose and Ifedore. Ile – Oluji/Oke.  Igbo local government is located in Ondo 
Central senatorial district with an estimated population of 171,876 persons. The major 
occupation is farming and the crop grown mostly is cocoa with the state’s main cocoa 
processing plant located within this area.  Other crops grown include vegetables, plantains, 
rice, yam and cassava. Ese-Odo local government is located in the riverside area of the state 
with a mixed population of Ijaw and Yoruba. Due to its location, the main occupation of the 
people is fishing but with some small-scale farming as above. Akure is divided into north and 
south areas and the southern part houses the seat of local government. Akoko southwest local 
government area is located in the northern part of the state. Its topography is rocky and this 
makes the supply of water challenging for the local people. With the state university located 
in this local government area with a very busy route to Abuja, the federal capital territory, 
there is an increased business activity. The Ose local government area has its headquarters at 
Ifon which is located in the eastern part of the state sharing a boundary with Edo state and has 
a mixed population of both Yoruba and Edo whose main occupations include civil service 
jobs, lumbering and small scale trading. Ifedore local government has its headquarters in 
Igbara Oke; its main districts are Ilara, Ipogun and Ijare and the main occupations of its 
population are in Ifedore local government but include farming and small scale trading. 
Finally the Ondo North Senatorial zone is significantly made up of the Akoko and Owo. 
Apart from two towns, Owo and Ikare Akoko, most of the towns and villages are 
predominantly rural settlements and far removed from the state capital.  
 
From the generalised descriptions set out above the reader will gain a picture of the 
demographics of Ondo State as being predominantly rural with pockets of more densely 
occupied areas housing government and commerce while the generality of trade outside those 
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centres is small scale and local.  Its inhabitants are diverse and comprised of a number of 
groups with distinct ethnic and racial identities. For instance the Ondo South Senatorial zone 
includes with its population peoples of Ikale, Ilaje and Ijaws origins.  
 
5.3 Selection of the study Respondents and conduct of interviews 
To ensure a robust and unbiased information gathering process, the study respondents were 
selected from both urban and rural areas. The compositions of the first category included 
those who lived in urban centres and were generally more likely to have had more access to 
formal education. They included policy makers, civil servants, academics, and self-employed 
private practitioners, response from many of the respondents in this category was obtained 
during the first phase of the interview.   
 
The second group included respondents who reside in the rural area who were in general less 
literate having had less exposure to formal education. In general they comprised community 
leaders, local politicians, tribal or traditional leaders, traders, farmers, local government 
workers, artisans and the youth leaders of the communities. Each respondent was selected 
from within six local government areas in the state and in the view of the researcher formed a 
fair and sufficient sample taken across the widest possible range.  A minimum of twenty-five 
interviews were conducted in each of the six local government areas by a mixture of informal 
and semi structured interviews. Taken together with the range of respondents the volume of 
enquiries is reasonably considered to be adequate and representative. The general factors 
considered in selecting the respondents for the interviews were that they (a) had lived in the 
local community for a period not less ten years; (b) were active participants in the 
community; and (c) were aware of the local development initiatives in the communities.  
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5.4  Findings 
 5.4.1   The Constitutional Issues  
Of the issues considered in the literature review of the Nigerian federal system it is 
appropriate to reiterate (not least for the purpose of establishing the context of the findings of 
this research) the postulations of Obiinger et al (2005) and Law (2013) (see Chapter 2) that 
there are five key characteristics of a federal system. They all relationship based and are, in 
summary; (1) decision-making exists at central governmental level with power of veto; (2) 
the allocation of policy responsibilities between levels of government; (3) the presence and 
inter-play of territorially-based actors; (4) inter-governmental fiscal transfer arrangements; 
and, (5) informal agreements, both at the vertical and horizontal levels, between governments  
and other actors. There is therefore a compelling reason to examine these differing and 
competing relationships in this context. 
 
A federal system is fundamentally based on the constitution, which creates and sustains the 
state institutions and the relationships within the federal system.   The highlights of the 
Nigerian federal system investigated in this fieldwork are; (i) that the present constitution 
does not deviate from military federalism but, rather, it is a structural arrangement that 
confers superiority of the central government over the sub-units;  (ii) that the constitution is 
not a consensus document; (iii) that the power and fiscal relations  are asymmetrical; (iv) that 
there are ambiguities in the critical area of the listing of the legislative functions; and (v) that 
the Local Government’s position in the  constitution is shrouded in ambiguity, creating more 
problems than solutions in terms of bringing government closer to the people for the purpose 
of development. It must be noted however that there is minority opinion that suggests that the 
problem with Nigerian federalism and the apparent incidence of under development may not 
be entirely linked to the constitution.  
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Notwithstanding that minority view, an assessment of the understanding of the constitutional 
issues through stratified sampling interviews shows that there seems to be a general opinion 
that the Nigerian federal structure is dysfunctional and, furthermore, is not adequately 
responding to the challenges of critical development. For many of those interviewed there 
was no ambiguity or dispute about the importance of the federal system in a multi-ethnic 
country like Nigeria and the requirement for an effective constitution which permits its 
implementation. Indeed it is seen by some as a prerequisite for future development and there 
seems to be a consensus that the lack of capacity of successive Nigerian governments (at 
federal, state and local level) to translate the enormous resources in their control into 
economic growth and development is a consequence of that defective constitution.  It follows 
that state institutions are weak and require to be strengthened legislatively by means of 
constitutional reform. 
 
5.4.2    Informal and formal characteristics of a federal System. 
The Nigerian federal constitution has been denounced as lacking the basic prerequisite that 
puts in place structures and mechanisms that would engender development.  As stated above, 
prevailing opinion is that the constitution must be amended to reflect basic principles of 
federalism. The constitutional reforms are also meant to set right the wrong notions and 
understanding of federalism which have influenced the practice of federalism to date.  A 
particular civil activist and development expert agreed in interview with the popular notion 
that the Nigerian federal system is faulty and noted that: 
“The constitution is definitely the problem. The constitution is the centre of 
everything and if we have to reform our federal system, then it means we 
must work on the constitution.”(SS1/Civil Activist/Development Expert 1/ 
Abuja/2013) 
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All but one of those interviewed about the meaning of federalism as practised in Nigeria 
agreed that Nigerian federalism is fraught with errors and blamed the constitution.  One 
leading politician who was at the time of the interview a leader of the opposition party in 
Nigeria but is now part of the leadership of the ruling party agreed with the assertion of the 
civil activist set out above. Further, in his opinion the problem is that the Nigerian federal 
system is over centralised and could best be described as a de facto unitary government. He 
attributed this defect in the system to the many years of military rule in Nigeria. Hence 
among the first category of interviewees, the term ‘military federalism’ is used to describe the 
type of Nigerian federalism in practice today. That politician interviewee was of the view that 
the basis of federalism has been crafted by and for the military rather than by and for the 
people. In fact he put it in these terms, “ . . . a constitution that has been created by the 
military, no Nigerian state other than the old Mid West, was created by the 
people.”(SSI/Politician 1 / London/Lagos/2013). 
  
His position seems to represent the position of a section of Nigerian politicians who 
clamoured vigorously for the restructure of the Nigerian federal system based on 
constitutional reform. This perhaps explains the agitation for what is commonly referred to as 
‘true federalism’ as it is called in Nigerian political parlance. During this interview the term 
‘true federalism’ was a recurrent theme.  The clamour for ‘true federalism’ sounded across 
the board, from citizens in both urban and rural areas who agreed on the need to attain that 
state. However the term may have differing meanings to western educated people in urban 
areas as opposed to those from rural areas so caution must be exercised by the general use of 
the term. In general the urban elites, politicians and academics articulate the meaning of ‘true 
federalism’ as a restructuring of the Nigerian federal arrangement in terms of devolution of 
political and fiscal powers to the lower tiers of government. However the people in the rural 
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areas in general were found to have a far more simplistic meaning. For them it is more about 
infrastructural developments (i.e. schools, primary health facilities, water, electricity and 
roads) and economic empowerment, (i.e. job opportunities for youths, industries and financial 
empowerment in terms of soft loans to start small scale businesses). It may be however that 
each opinion as to what ‘true federalism’ means is not so different when translated into the 
basic population requirements for essential support systems, proper and fair governance and a 
sufficiency and equality of resource distribution.  
 
The major issues emanating from the responses of the interviewees are; (i) the over 
centralised government that follows the pattern of military command hierarchy which by 
definition may be overbearing; and (ii) the constitution does not take into full cognisance the 
diversities that exist amongst the federating units. It is proposed by the author that this state 
of affairs accrues from the exclusion of people in the process of the drafting of the 
constitution. This observations corresponds with Riker’s (1964) ‘Political theory of federal 
formation’ (Chapter Two) that the federal structure arrangement is essentially a bargain 
between politicians, and between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent 
governments for the purpose of, aggregating territory, rights to lay taxes and raise armies. It 
is postulated that Riker is correct to the extent that the process of formation of the Nigerian 
federal structure, the drafting of constitution, and the implementation of the federal system 
was not all-inclusive. Rather it was exclusive and focused on the interests of the key 
participants rather than the generality of the population and its needs, the respondents’ view 
in general was that the Nigerian federal system as a system of government should have been 
constructed for the benefit of the people, and its constitution drafted for them. In terms of the 
position of Stepan’s (2005) and his typologies of federal states as ‘coming together’, ‘holding 
together’ and ‘putting together’ Nigeria is seen by a majority of the respondents as falling 
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into the ‘putting together’ category, with its roots in the historic colonial government.  
 
The majority of the interviewees do believe that the present constitution either can enhances 
effective management or is capable of providing good governance. The response of one 
interviewee, a civil servant, broadly expresses the view of the majority of the interviewees, 
that the constitution remains; 
“ . . . an elite document meant for the elites; if you look at the trend of 
national events and how leaders are produced, you will realize that the 
constitution is carefully scripted to protect the interests of the elites who 
would always have their way through to the political offices and help 
themselves with the national wealth.” (SSI/Civil Servant1/Akure/2016) 
 
This demonstrates the lack of confidence in the constitution and the bylaws of the Nigerian 
federation. The majority of the respondents were cynical about the position but also recognise 
the apathy of the majority to defects in the system even though they agreed that many 
political actors have incapacitated them in terms of good governance for the benefit of the 
majority.  A very common opinion was that the constitution in itself is a fraud so much so 
that the phrase ‘Nigerian Constitution lied against itself’ is a popular view and prevalent 
among the interviewees. This opinion stems from the interpretation of the first line of the 
Nigerian constitution which states “We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria...” This 
is considered to be a false statement and it is the common view that that there was never a 
time when Nigerians converged in any sort of ‘coming together’ to agree on the terms of how 
they wished their country to be governed. At best, therefore, and in summary of this finding, 
the constitution is seen largely as the contraption of the military and political elites and 
questions arise as to the legitimacy of the constitution itself. The consensus view even of the 
academic, and civil servant interviewees is that the constitution disproportionately favours the 
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politicians, public office holders and those with vested interests, a situation which, they say, 
has very severely undermined good governance and development.  
 
Further consideration of the very forthright views of the politician respondent referred to 
earlier suggest a considerable degree of consensus about the over-centralisation of the 
Nigerian federal arrangement.  In the classical notion of federalism, a good federal structure 
allows for a high degree of autonomy, as noted by the federalists such as Wheare (1964), 
Riker (1964),  Adedeji (1971), Eleazar (1976),  Stepan (2005) Elaigwu (2007), Obinger et al 
2005, Suberu and Osaghae (2005) (Chapter 2),.  Observations from the fieldwork indicate 
that this is far from the reality in Nigeria. Category one respondents commonly referred to the 
legislative lists of the constitution and are of the opinion that the federal government have too 
many functions reserved to its own domain, function that ought to be devolved or at least 
assigned as part of the federal process. One the interviewees, a retired civil servant in one of 
the urban centres captured this view succinctly and offered the following as one of the 
consequences of the over centralisation:  
“Everything is centralized; a central railway, a central electricity, central water. The 
system suppresses the development of the units since all people are forced to rely on 
the federal government in the headquarters in Abuja to give out pee-nuts to the states. 
(SSI/Retired Civil Servant 1/ Akure/2016/2017) 
Common to both categories of respondent was the view that over centralised governance is 
naturally antithetical to the development of Nigeria as a self-contained and effective 
sovereign state. As it is, said the above interviewee, the regions and states rely on the federal 
government for their own survival as economic units because the only means of revenue for 
infrastructure development and service delivery is the allocation from the federal 
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government. Most of the respondents show little interest in the internally generated revenue 
of the states and the local governments because the focus is on the federal allocation 
especially in relation to the distribution of oil revenues.   
 
The researcher produced to the interviewees the IGR and the tax income of Ondo State as 
published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) from 2012 to 2016
15
. While the first 
category of respondents were already aware of this, but perhaps not fully familiar with the 
figures, the second category of respondents were generally unaware and showed little or no 
interest in the income coming from within the state but were more interested to observe that 
the states were obviously not getting their fair share by way of the federal budget allocation. 
By contrast, to a degree, the second category of the respondents also expressed an interest in 
having a federal presence in their communities, suggesting approval of federal government 
intervention in education, health and road infrastructure. The author observed that the many 
of the respondents in the local communities apparently have more trust and confidence in the 
central government than the state and local government. 
In making another important observation that is contrary to the common view of 
                                                 
15
 
2012 10,153,042,597.01 
2013 10,498.697,469.99 
2014 11, 718, 741,502.49 
2015 10, 098,000.000.00 
Taxes   7, 348, 474, 927.10 
MDAs Collections   2,277,317, 560.72 
2016   8,884,756,040.35 
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centralisation, a very well informed senior lecturer at the University of Ibadan suggested that 
centralisation is not essentially a problem of Nigerian federalism but, rather it is the values 
that drive the authors of Nigerian federalism, such as greed and self-interest. He bases his 
position on a comparative review of different federal systems and argues that there are so 
many more centralised countries in terms of tax powers than Nigeria and that good 
governance and the development index of these countries are higher than that of Nigeria. He 
cited Malaysia as an example thus; 
“ In Malaysia they have oil and the federal government controls 95% of the 
resources from the oil; whilst only about 5% goes to the state, the level of 
corruption and the level of dysfunction of the system is not as bad as in 
Nigeria.”(SSI/ Academic 1/ Ibadan/2013) 
 
For this particular respondent, the values that drives the Nigerian federal system include what 
he openly refers to as; the ‘illegal behaviour’ of the federal government in the federal-state 
relations; illegal behaviour of states in state-local government relations; absence of the rule  
of  law; and, more importantly the values that drives the federal government process, which 
he termed as behavioural pattern  of  primitive accumulation. He argued that what the 
politicians do is to manipulate public opinion by drawing the attention of the people always 
to the constitution, and to the federal structure as a diversionary tactic. To quote this 
respondent, the irresponsible behaviour of the politicians is the main problem of Nigerian 
federal system, “it is difficult to defend that popular view that the problem is over 
centralisation.” 
 
That position was referred to other interviewees, about 98% of whom agreed that there is 
fundamental problem with the values that drive the process of governance and that sometimes 
there is flagrant disregard for the constitution by those who operate under its auspices. An 
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example of the case between the federal government and Lagos state was referred to; this 
refers to the disobedience of the federal government of an order of the Supreme Court by 
withholding the statutory revenue allocation to Lagos State. Informed respondents commonly 
cited this as an example of the constitution being unable to bring the federal government to 
account. 
5.4.3   Imperatives of creation states and Local Government as means of good 
governance and development 
The principle of having a consensus document as the constitution is integral to the federal 
arrangement. There are strong negative sentiments expressed by the interviewees that not 
being part of the process of constitutional agreement seem to be affecting the workings of the 
Nigerian federalism. In other words, there is no sense of ownership or sense of being part of 
the process of governance. The common sentiment of the respondents about the constitution 
is that it is skewed to subjugate the composite units and, by extension, the citizens there into 
the federal government, a government already in the control of the political elites.  This 
sentiment is captured in the interview with a lecturer of political studies at the University of 
Ibadan:  
“If all the composite units came by consensus to form a federation then 
there must be a federal constitution that means each unit will be coming 
with a different background and with a different interest and all of those 
interests must be represented in the constitution. Since 1967 to this present 
system, we had a unitary constitution, but because they are military 
constitutions that is one of the bane of Nigeria federalism. Because we 
cannot have a kind of centralized constitution, dictated from the top this 
renders the composite units useless and then say you are practicing 
federalism.” (SSI/Academic 2/ Ibadan/2013). 
 
This idea seems, to a degree, to cut across the answers obtained from the other respondents. 
For example, a high ranking politician, who at different times, was a deputy governor, a 
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governor and later an official of the main opposition party, gives an insight into how states 
were created in Nigeria.  He noted that there is no standard formula or definable parameter 
for creating a state or local government.  He reveals that most of the states and the local 
government were created by the military, and the process is often fraught with bribery and 
corruption, He gave an example of a friend who bribed some military officers with 250.000 
Naira to site a local government headquarters in his own town. Incidents such as this have 
had a very significant impact on Nigerian federalism and development. 
 
A lecturer interviewed at the University of Ibadan noted that as they are presently constituted 
states are not reflective of political communities, but that state government has more 
characteristic of the larger political community than local government. His position aligns 
with earlier noted assertions of the former governor that the creation of sub units have not 
followed any standard formula, or set of parameters, he argues that local government was 
created for the purpose of diverting resources from the central government for the purpose of 
bringing development to the grassroots. He stated that,  
 
“They are not organised according to certain basic existing accountability   
structures or mechanisms. They are just demarcated as local government 
arbitrarily in order to be able to channel money into some areas. As people 
look for access to governmental power, they are looking for more political 
offices, so they agitate for more local government and they get 
it.”(SSI/Politician 2 / Ila Orangun/2013) 
 
From the foregoing it appears that the reasons given for creation of local governments as the 
means of the equitable distribution of national wealth (Olowu and Wunsch (2004) doesn’t 
reflect the reality. To this effect the creation of more states and local governments simply 
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breeds more corruption and does not in any way translate into infrastructural development or 
economic growth. Consequently the present structure, particularly by reference to the 
functions of the state and local government as development centres, cannot be sufficiently 
achieved. A development expert stated in interview:  
“When you create a state, you create more politicians and then you create 
more contractors, you create more corruption the more you have those 
people, more resources go to overhead
16
 than actually go to capital projects. 
I don’t think it has contributed in any way to the physical structural 
development.” (SS1/Development Expert 2/ Akure/2016) 
 
This assumption may be something of a sweeping statement but from my observations 
citizens are generally content with the notion of local government because it is a constituent 
element of successful federalism. They are generally of the opinion that all the development 
they have seen and are enjoying would not have come to them without the creation of such 
local government, which, in theory, attracts development. It must be acknowledged however 
that despite the challenges of the process and operations of these tiers of government, it has 
served a purpose. There is evidence that the aim of taking government and development 
closer to the people has been partly fulfilled but the question is whether the local 
governments and the states have maximized their institutional capacities to bring about higher 
degree of good governance and development. The respondents seem to agree that via local 
government, local people seem to have at least some access to development potential. For 
instance, a former head of service delivery in Ekiti notes that: 
                                                 
16
The growth and magnitude of public spending, in recent years, have tended towards the recurrent side and 
outstripped the growth of spending on capital projects. Following from the observed trend in aggregate 
spending, the share of capital expenditure hardly exceeded 30% of aggregate expenditure due to the growing 
magnitude of recurrent expenditure which reduces the fiscal space available for spending on developmental 
projects. Over the 2005-2012 periods, recurrent expenditure almost tripled from N1.2 trillion in 2005 to N3.4 
trillion projected for 2012. It is noteworthy that 52% of the increase from N2.1trillion to N3.2trillion occurred 
between 2009 and 2010 alone due largely, to a rise in the wage bill. (source; Federal Ministry of Finance) 
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“No doubt, the creation of states has brought tremendous development in 
our State (Ekiti State). Not just to our State, but many other states that would 
not have known development, because the government was far from them. 
What happens is that the government focuses more on the state capitals and 
the major towns while neglecting the interiors, but now with the creation of 
new states, governance is within the reach of the people even to the 
peripheries.”(SSI/Civil Servant/Head of Service1/Akure/2016) 
 
This view is strongly suggestive of the importance of the creation of more states as a means 
of engendering development on a local basis.  Historical analysis is based on the level of 
development during the first republic (1957-1966) with the federal structure consisting of 
four regions and provinces. In this period, the regions and the provinces exercised 
considerable political and fiscal autonomy. The first republic, with the four regions 
arrangement, is said to have experienced unprecedented development, with the arrangement 
of the local council strictly under the regional governments. Local councils built roads, 
schools and an efficient health sector, particularly in terms of sanitation.  From each of the 
regions exercising considerable power over the resources generated from their regions, 
development programmes evolved that enhanced the quality of life of the people within their 
geographical regions and the country at large. One common feature observed during the 
fieldwork is the romanticising of the first republic as the perfect system or paradigm for 
development. This is captured in the response of a lawyer respondent when asked about his 
views on Nigerian federalism, he indicated that while initially the federal structure reflected 
true federalism, the current system does not reflect any notion of paradigm federalism at all. 
He stated that:  
“Unfortunately when we moved from parliamentary into a federal state at 
the beginning we had a true federalism when we had three regions . . . each 
region developed it's own central government at it's own level and it was the 
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unique opportunity for Nigeria to practise it's federalism, but unfortunately 
it was truncated by the military regime . . .  What we have today cannot 
truly be called a federal state at best is called a pseudo federal state.” 
(SS1/Lawyer/Akure/2016) 
 
For the majority of the respondents the parliamentary system of the first republic (1957-1966) 
offered a good platform for citizens’ participation in the process of governance, giving, as it 
did, more autonomy to the regions with special roles for the traditional rulers and the local 
government police. While describing the Nigerian federal structure and its dominant features, 
a senior lecturer on political institutions, governance and public policy and administration at 
the University of Ibadan, argued that the Nigerian system does not permit autonomy of other 
government tiers because the federal government has taken over the responsibility of the state 
and the local governments. On that basis, he said, federalism in Nigeria has failed. For him 
the clamour by some state governors to have state police, calls  for self-determination and 
secessionist threats is a clear indication that the federalism is not working. 
 
5.4.4  Power relations: asymmetrical power and fiscal relations. 
The idea of the 1976 local government reforms was to strengthen the constitutional status, 
create an autonomous tier of government with direct funding from the centre, distribute an 
increased share of federal revenue, establish a permanent system of local government and 
implement such systematic and uniform reform measures nationwide. However, despite their 
recognition as a third level of government in practice there have been misgivings about their 
actual autonomy as a distinct level of government (Chapter Two and Four).An assessment of 
the notion of asymmetrical power relationships is conducted in two ways; firstly by the 
exploration of the theoretical understanding of this notion and, secondly, by an investigation 
within the context of service delivery. By a comparison of current practices in Nigeria and 
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other federalist models, the respondent lecturer from the University of Ibadan argues that 
there is no de facto decentralized federalism in Nigeria but instead that Nigeria practices 
quasi federalism, as a system without decentralization. He states; 
“The kind of federalism we are practising could be best described as 
quasi federalism, in other word...there are lot of issues with it, once 
there is no decentralization, there is actually no 
federalism.(SSI/Academic 2/ Ibadan/2013) 
 
A senior civil servant respondent corroborated this assertion when he described the federating 
units as a sort of administrative units of the federal government.  He observed that in practical 
terms the federating units lack the powers that are required to function properly in terms of 
fiscal powers and fiscal responsibilities. He therefore suggests that:   
“. . .   each authority should have a taxation authority to be able to tax 
people in its jurisdiction; the federal government can tax the people within 
its federation and each state can tax people within its own jurisdiction so 
there are two taxation authorities; the third tier should subsist within the 
state that should depend on each state how it wants to administer its tax.” 
(SSI/Academic 2/ Ibadan/2013) 
 
In the same vein, another respondent, in describing the issues of federalism and the autonomy 
of the constituent units, advocated decentralization of functions such as social issues, health, 
and education among the local and state governments. He stated; 
“To a large extent to become autonomous in decision-making, is the only 
thing that federalism centralizes. It is in defence, currency, foreign policy, 
that is mostly what the central government should be involved;. . . social 
issues, health, education and the rest of them should be  governed by the 
states and local government.”(SS1/Civil Servant2/Akure/2016) 
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The foregoing suggests that absent the control of ‘social issues, health, education and the rest 
of them’ at the local level, the principle of autonomy within a federal arrangement is 
compromised.  
 
Whilst the Nigerian constitution does confer some degree of autonomy on the sub-units for 
the most part they do seem to lack complete and effective autonomy. Accordingly the powers 
of the states are intentionally whittled down. A former civil servant respondent in Ondo State 
noted: 
“There is no state or local government in Nigeria that is autonomous from 
the Federal government. It makes no sense of federalism. For instance at the 
end of the month we all go to Abuja to converge to share money; right, it is 
not even sharing money, it is to take our own piece from what is deemed fit by 
the federal government.”(SSI/Retired Civil Servant 2/ Akure/2016). 
The majority of respondents seem to agree that the lack of autonomy affects the capacity for 
creativity and that incentive to promote economic growth and development is lacking in the 
component units. This notion tallied with the response of one interviewee who claimed that 
the current federal arrangement suppress development because the federal government is 
routinely alleged to dictate policy to the sub-units. One implication of exercising this 
substantial power over the federating units is that some of the decisions and interventions in 
the state are misplaced. Examples were given of infrastructural projects and infrastructural 
programmes that are inappropriately sited. The same interviewee noted that, “The Federal 
Government determines what goes to each state. It determines what states should be a part of 
something and what states should not be a part of it.”(SSI/Retired Civil Servant 2/ 
Akure/2016) 
A further issue arising from this structural arrangement is the dependence of the state and 
local government governments on the federal government. Although the constitution confers 
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considerable power on the states, it appears that these powers are, in practice, tactically 
withdrawn by other provisions of the constitution.  I considered why it is apparently so 
difficult for the states to exercise this power within the purview of the constitutional 
provision, and for the federal government to resist what is considered to be undue 
interference. A former governor respondent of a state in the south west region explained that 
with the enormous resources at the disposal of the federal government, and the unequal level 
of reliance on allocations from the federal government by the states, required to survive and 
carry out even the most basic statutory functions, it remains a very difficult balance to strike 
absent the political will. He notes that the federal government has the arbitrary power to 
withhold funds from state government and that creates an inequality of power. The level of 
the weakness of the state is further expressed by an academic giving as an example based on 
the powers of the state governor on security matters:  
“If we look at the constitution of the country, the Governors are supposed to 
be the chief security officer of their state; if you are the chief security officer 
and you don’t have the wherewithal to control the security apparatus at 
your disposal, then what is the whole essence of being 
autonomous?”(SSI/Politician 2 / Ila Orangun/2013) 
 
Despite the fact that the state legislators are empowered to make laws for the state, they have 
little or no coercive authority to enforce the law, having to rely on the federal police to 
enforce the laws of the state. It is noted that the states are empowered to legislate on residual 
matters however, the enforcement of such laws is based on the acceptance or convenience of 
the state commissioner of police, but who doesn’t operate under the laws of the state 
government. The police commissioners take orders from the Inspector General of the Police 
(IGP). The IGP takes orders from the national president as it is the president who appoints the 
IGP even though the appointment must be confirmed by the senate. The implication therefore 
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is that there are two authorities within the state; the police commissioner is therefore, 
arguably, an extension of the presence of the federal government hegemony in the states. This 
particular situation has ripple effects in the Nigerian federation. In the first place it further 
questions the autonomy of the state governments. This situation leads to inadequate policing 
of the states and, equally, abuse of security power.  
 
It is helpful to note that there are some reservations expressed by the stakeholders on the 
issue of state police. There is no consensus among the state governors on the issue; while the 
states governed by elected officials in political and ideological opposition to the federal 
government canvassed for state police, the ruling party controlled states are clearly against it. 
However a fundamental concern in this situation is whether the politicians are reasonable 
enough to operate the state police properly and without using the as a coercive tool against 
the population. There was also very significant concern amongst some of the respondents that 
the politicians would use the police against their political opponents at the state and local 
government levels in favour of their own political agendas. The author observed that the issue 
of the police may have political dimensions. In the first strand of interviews, one of the 
interviewees (a politician then in opposition) was so strongly committed to devolution of the 
Police Force that he was a fervent advocate for state police. However, in the follow up 
interview he expressed little interest in the establishment of a state police force because his 
own party then controlled the federal government and, by extension, the police. 
 
This example shows how the federal government might be taking advantage of what are 
considered to be federating organs. Enough of the respondents interviewed expressed concern 
when interviewed about this issue as an example of the difference between ‘federating 
government agencies’ and ‘federal government organs’. The federating government organs 
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are the organs of the mechanisms of the entire nation, while the federal government agencies 
are those that are directly linked to the bureaucracy of the federal government and 
distribution of its power through devolved or federal agencies. The lecturer respondent argues 
that this trend has been a clog in the effective management of Nigerian resources and one 
which has impeded development. He gives examples to illustrate the meaning of ‘federal 
government organs’ and ‘federating government organs’ thus, 
“There are many aberrations in the system, for example, if you take INEC, 
INEC is supposed to be a federal body, but today INEC is a federal 
government body, and they are two different things, INEC before Jega
17
 
came, was behaving as if it is a federal government organ, not a federating 
organ, and it is supposed to be a federating organ. Most of our institutions 
are like that; the institutions become, organs of federal governments, and 
not federating institutions all because the way the constitution came. It is a 
military constitution, and you know what the military is about- command 
and obedience, which in the strict sense of it is part of the bureaucracy of 
the first tier of the government and not the organ of the federation.” 
(SSI/Academic 2/ Ibadan/2013) 
 
An observation from the communities visited is that the people find it difficult to draw 
anything but blurred lines between the functions of the federal government, the state 
government and the local government. They believe that each of the tiers of government is a 
service provider ranging from the primary education to health care and rural roads. The 
notion of preferring the federal presence and seeking federal help is prevalent.  This situation 
creates chaos and confusion in the process of good governance and development.  
One respondent noted that this situation is responsible for much of the abandoned or non-
functioning infrastructure around the country.  The former head of service in Ekiti State 
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 Professor Attahiru Jega, was  the Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC)..  
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presented a scenario of such instances:  
“Federal Government would say; Ekiti we want to build an agriculture 
centre, it will be in the Federal Government Budget, the Ministry of 
Agriculture in the state would not know, the Ministry of intergovernmental 
relations will not know, the contractor will just get the job in Abuja, gets his 
money, settle[bribe] some people in Abuja and just disappear. Nobody 
knows whether a contract has been approved or not in the state.. . . You will 
be surprised to see the number of projects they would have claimed to have 
been executed in Ondo, through the award of phony contracts” (SSI/Civil 
Servant/Head of Service1/Akure/2016) 
 
The implication of this position is that local communities are completely left out of the 
concept stage, planning and implementation of such programmes, notionally designed for the 
benefit of the local populations.  
 
Beyond the provision of infrastructural access, the author noted the prevailing perception of 
the federal government amongst the local people in the communities visited. They tend to 
view the federal government as a remote entity, but with enormous political power and 
economic resources. Furthermore, it is  being perceived as  the senior partner and superior to 
the state, with absolute power exercised on an arbitrary basis. Conversely some people feel 
more secure with the presence of the Federal government rather than the State government 
due to a lack of belief and trust in local politics. A former Governor interviewee suggests that 
this view originates in the military incursion into the federal system arrangement, in a 
situation where the Head of State and his Military Council had absolute power. An in-depth 
examination of this notion could be linked to the ways the activities and manner in which the 
federal government uses some parastatal entities in the exercise of the central authority of the 
federal government; a good example is the police force.  
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Despite the enormous power that all the participants believe the federal government 
possesses, many are of the opinion that the federal government is of little real practical value 
in terms of local service delivery. One of the interviewees explained that; 
“When we were governed by the Alliance for Democracy Party, (AD) between 
1999-2003, our Governor then was Chief Adefarati, we felt we were not 
reaping the dividends of democracy because we belong to the opposition 
party. In 2003, we overwhelmingly voted for PDP, with Dr.  Agagu as our 
Governor, between 2003-2007. In a strict sense of it, we wanted to align to the 
mainstream politics, the party at the centre for the purpose of development. 
But after four years, we discovered that there was no difference. We realised 
sooner, that we got a better deal under Governor Adefarati, that was why we 
voted Agagu out in 2007, although the election was rigged, thanks to the 
judiciary that restores the mandate.”(II/Local Resident 2/ Bolorunduro/2016) 
 
This underscores the conflicting views of the place and function of the Federal government.  
It is instructive to mention that in the  Ese- Odo local government, the feeling is quite 
different. There are more overt expression of bitterness, of being cheated and short-changed 
by the system. This is engendered by the infrastructural development and environmental 
degradation, despite being an oil producing area. This has resulted in agitation for self-
determination, resource control, and militancy amongst the youth. One of the interviewees 
noted that; How do we talk of accountability when the people don't even know the true 
amount of money accrued from oil derivation?(II//Local Resident 2/Sabomi/2016). 
 
Despite the fact that the work of the OSOPADEC is predominantly commended by the local 
residents of this local government, there is still some unrest. OSOPADEC was set up to use 
40% of the 13% oil derivation for the State, to address infrastructural and developmental 
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gaps, related  to the  effect of oil exploration in the area. When the issue of accountability of 
OSOPADEC was raised by the author with the an official of OSOPADEC, he revealed that 
even the Commission is not giving information on what that it exactly amounts to every 
month, after allocation. Neither is such fund remitted to the accounts of the Commission, or 
any such designated account in the State, and it is equally difficult to access such information 
from the Accountant Generals’ office. Furthermore, when the author probed into how the 
money from the 13% is being disbursed and utilised, an official of OSOPADEC elaborated 
on the politics and difficulties involved in the 13% derivation to the state as follows  
When the new government came in there was an initial intention of remitting 
funds as appropriate, but they are yet to change that, I guess with paucity of 
funds, the derivation fund is taken as part of overall earnings for the state, 
meant for general needs of the State, especially payment of salaries, and 
servicing of public service. I think that has led to continual increase in gap 
deficit in the oil region, increasing levels of agitation, lack of trust, and 
militancy, leading to increasing calls for self determination. (SSI/Civil 
Servant 3/Akure/2016/2017). 
 
From the interviews conducted in these local governments with local government officials 
and with the officials of OSOPADEC, the author recorded a reportedly very high level of 
youth unemployment, resulting in a constant demand for youth employment opportunities, 
skill acquisitions, and the creation of paths for such disadvantaged sectors of the populace to 
access the rentier economy and the material benefits it brings (see Karl (2004); Omeje 
(2008); Collier (2009) chapter four). The way some youths have   succeeded in receiving 
economic support by taking up arms for militancy purposes, has resulted in an increasing 
willingness to involved oneself in militancy as a way of accessing wealth. 
 
 
  
195 
 
5.4.5   Local government as a means of good governance and development. 
Almost all the respondents were of the general view that local government is potentially a 
force for good and beneficial development. However, there seems also to be the consensus 
that local governments as they are presently constituted are not functioning to the optimum 
level. The view of a member of the caretaker committee respondent in one of the local 
governments captures this succinctly; for him the local governments foster development since 
they are closer to people. To this extent, he is of the opinion that there should be more local 
government and development centres and even devolves a little further to town level. He 
stated: 
“If you take a local government, for example, you have smaller units and 
towns; all of these have being driven in the pre-colonial era by Obas (the 
local chiefs or the paramount rulers); that is a kind of autonomy so we can 
move to that by saying you are a local development area within the local 
government; it's only then we can truly accelerate our 
development.”(SS1/Politician 4/ Ikaro/ 2016/2017) 
 
Respondents from the local governments were quite enthusiastic about the idea of creation of 
more local government entities. For example, the interviewees from Akoko South West, 
Ifedore, Ese Odo and Ose areas were very interested in creating more by partition of existing 
authorities.  For example the respondents from Ose premised their view by reference to the 
topography and landmass of the present local government area; for them their remit covered 
too large an area with the consequent difficulties in sharing development evenly.  
 
Development in this instance means accessible schools for children; health care facilities and 
job opportunities. When asked whether local government should be scrapped, because it is 
believed that it is not functioning properly, none of the respondents were for the idea because 
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of the importance of the local government to the localities. One respondent was of the 
opinion that the local government should in fact be additionally empowered so as to function 
properly and foster development. He stated as follows: 
“There are those who are saying that local government should be 
scrapped... there is practically nothing local government can do when their 
fiscal strength; administrative strength is taken over by the state; we need to 
see them as autonomous units”(SSI/Local Resident 2/ Iwaro Oka/2016). 
Nevertheless that same respondent indicates clearly that there are few independent functions 
left to local government. The Nigerian constitution does not provide for the independent 
jurisdictional function of the local government. He expressed it in this way; 
“Local government has no clear function and jurisdiction, no independent 
functions . . . In the Nigeria constitution, there are only two . . . That is why some 
constitutional lawyers would continue to say we don’t actually have three tiers of 
government we only have two tiers, the centre and the state because the constitution 
has nothing for the local government..”(SS1/Lawyer/Akure/2016). 
 
It is important to note that the desire for the creation of more local government has other 
motivating factors rather than just development. Political motives also underpin such desires. 
Some of these local governments are home to more than one ethnic group. As such there is a 
rivalry and struggle for political appointments between the members of the competing 
factions. This situation could be considered as a microcosm of the nationwide clamour for 
creation of more states, not just for the purpose of development, but for the purpose of 
inclusion.  A good example is Ese-Odo and Ilaje Local Government Areas. These demonstrate 
the rivalry between the Ilajes, and Ijaws, and the two ethnic groups: the Ijaw Arogbo and 
Apoi. Furthermore, within these ethnic groups there are different interest blocs. For example, 
the appointment of the Chairman and Secretary of OSOPADEC in 2017 became a contentious 
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issue amongst the Ilajes who are comprised of predominantly two groups; (1) Ugbo kingdom 
and (2) Mahin Kingdom. The Ugbo grievance resulted from the appointment of a chairman, 
from Mahin Kingdom of Ilaje, and the secretary, from Ese_ Odo, were not from the 
mainstream Ilaje bloc of the Ugbo kingdom, essentially the oil producing area. Despite heated 
local protest the appointment was confirmed. 
18
 
    
5.4.6  Strength and limitations of local governments 
The general opinion on this question was that local government has been undermined by the 
state government theoretically to achieve optimum performance. From an interview with a 
youth leader and a representative of the town development committee in Ose (Ifon), the 
weakness of the local government lies primarily in the fact that there were no properly 
elected personnel running the affairs of the local government in his area; he perceived 
therefore that this did not provide any accountability. The present situation is that the state 
government uses caretaker committees to run the affairs of the local government. The 
deduction therefore is that the state government still wants to control the local governments, 
as explained by a category two community member below; 
“Somebody who is voted for and is put in position like that should be 
responsible to everybody and he will perform. Another area why I think any 
state government will prefer a care taker committee is the fund coming from 
above, the federal government pays this money to the state government, the 
state government may not be disposed to give everything to the council; he 
would hold up to some out of the money. If it were a local government 
council elected, the government will not have the right, they will only have 
to call a sort of meeting and tell them what is allocated to the local 
government. The state government will not be able to control it fully except 
                                                 
18Nigerian Tribune: “Chairman of OSOPADEC Inaugurated Despite Protest by Ugbo Youths In Ondo”  April 
10, 2017 Edition.  
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there is understanding between the governor and the chairman.” (II/Local 
Resident 2/ Bolorunduro/2016) 
 
At the time this interview was being conducted, there was already a local government 
chairmen elected into the office six months earlier. When sought, clarification on the 
difference between a caretaker committee and elected local government officials, the 
respondent was of the opinion that the local government chairman and the councillors would 
always do the biddings of the state governor, despite having been democratically elected. 
This might suggest that many people in the local government areas seem not to appreciate the 
difference between a caretaker committee and elected officials.  
 
The respondents emphasise the role of the local government as the tier of the government 
closer to the people in order to address problems such as infrastructure in primary schools 
and healthcare centres. Bearing in mind all roles mentioned, some of the respondents still feel 
that the local government is not close to them and that they are not involved in the planning 
and implementation of the projects. To some extent this might be accounted for by the apathy 
and failure to engage in the political process (more common in category 2 respondents). One 
of the respondents in Bolorunduro, Akure North, said that the Nigerian local government is 
not theirs as it has abandoned the community. He stated thus, “It is unfortunate that the organ 
that is so far from the people, we don’t see the local government officials often. They have the 
responsibility of taking care of us, but we always feel abandoned at the grassroots.” (II/Local 
Resident 3/Bolorunduro/2016) 
 
Despite the challenges set out above that respondent also agreed that the community has seen 
the benefit of the work done by the government, including the provision of amenities such as 
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police posts and the development of infrastructure projects such as schools and hospitals. 
However he did emphasise that proximity either to the state capital of the local government 
headquarters is coincidental in whether development projects are actually carried out. The 
author observed that in almost all the communities there are community development 
associations that lobby the government for development projects and also through communal 
efforts build basic amenities like schools, health centres and similar projects. A respondent 
member of the caretaker committee in one of the local governments argues that the local 
government administration in Ondo state has been fairly well managed. According to him, 
there have been developments in terms of commissioning of health care centres, sinking of 
boreholes, completion of primary school buildings and creation of market and town halls.  In 
line with the position of the member of caretaker committee, some respondents are of the 
opinion that local government administration has been well managed since Governor 
Olusegun Mimiko took over office as Governor in 2009. Even so local government has 
effectively been administered by a caretaker committee appointed by the state governor, an 
action contrary to the constitution.  
 
In each of the local government areas visited, there were communities where the state 
government had recently built new schools and health centres; none of the respondents knew 
of the cost of the buildings, all the same they were happy that they were the beneficiaries of 
new development. Evidence such as this illustrates the lack of any clear-cut distinction 
between the projects of the state government as opposed to projects managed by local 
government. 
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  5.4.7 Effectiveness of Local Government personnel: technocrats and politicians.  
The executive arm of the local government is made up of the chairman, vice Chair, 
supervisors and the secretary. The management cadre is made up of technocrats who are civil 
servants. As observed earlier, for seven years the local government in Ondo was administered 
by the caretaker committees appointed by the governor. In such a case it is easy for state 
governments to manipulate local authorities to the advantage of the state government and 
even for the personal gains of state political leaders.  In those circumstances the executive 
arm of the local government can best be describe as a ‘surrogate’ executive, described by one 
category two respondent as having been ‘handcuffed’.  
 
In Akoko North and at Iwaro Oka the chairman of the community development committee 
states that most citizens seek help from the local government offices. The state of the roads, 
for instance, has improved due to the local government initiatives. However, based on his 
experience, he revealed that the local government does not address complaints; he 
summarised the position thus, “.. . if you go to the local government and make a complaint 
they will refer you to the state government,”(II/ Local Resident 4/ Ayegunle Oka/ 2016). In 
examining as to why local government has failed to address this issue, the respondents 
seemed to agree that in most cases the local government has no capacity to resolve the 
problems simply because the local government relies so heavily on the states. Another 
respondent community leader in Ose accused local authorities of a degree of cruelty since 
after identifying the needs of community residents, they rarely take initiatives to address 
pressing problems. He stated, “In the past we go there and tender our intensions then 
whatever they can do they would assist.”(II/Local Resident 1 /Ifon/ 2016). Another 
respondent community leader asserted that it is true that the community leaders are aware of 
the challenges facing the community but are impotent to deal with them. One member of a 
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caretaker committee of one of the local governments responded during the interview by 
saying that at present there are no agriculture, health and education programmes that the 
government is doing, that anyone can benefit from.  
 
There is however one common issue about the local government workforce: it appears that 
the local government is the highest employer of labour in the community, there is therefore, 
over staffing and redundancy, hence one of the respondents, who is a retired permanent 
secretary observes that  the staff and workforce in the local government is so enormous that 
what they get hardly covers salaries and personnel emoluments; with that in place he argued 
that they cannot  fund any meaningful development in local government. 
 
5.4.8:  Level of Participation in Electoral Process 
Respondents from the six local governments stated that they were interested in exercising 
their franchise during elections. However, for about eight years there was no local 
government election in Ondo State and the last time the public they had the opportunity of 
electing candidates into local government council was in April 2016.  Nevertheless certain of 
that the respondents were sufficiently politically aware of their civic duty to vote and about 
55% of the respondents claimed to have voted during the last presidential and gubernatorial 
elections. It was also observed that there is apathy and cynicism about voting and although 
certain respondents see voting as an exciting opportunity, they may not be convinced that 
their votes count.  Some were also of the opinion that election time is the time for them to get 
something back from the politicians in terms of wealth promised by the politicians during the 
election. This popular notion and attitude reinforces the argument that political clientelism is 
prevalent in the polity and this shapes the nature of Nigerian federalism. Further examination 
of the relationship between institutions and actors as posited by Pieterson (ibid) in the review 
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of literature in understanding the Nigerian federal system is important. A national 
newspaper
19
 reported that the last gubernatorial election conducted during and after this 
fieldwork alleged that voters were induced with money before voting.  In addition it is said 
that community leaders compel community members to vote for community-endorsed 
candidates.   
 
The election monitor’s report of the November 2016 gubernatorial election reveals that that 
the election turnout was generally quite low across polling stations visited. The voter turnout 
based on accredited voters was 35.5%. This was compared to other states that had their 
gubernatorial election within the same time frame. It is reported that the turnout in Ondo 
State is about 1% less than for the Bayelsa State; 2% less than Kogi State 2015 governorship 
election and about 3% more than the 2016 Edo governorship election while the turnout based 
on total votes cast was 35.25%.It is clear that these figures are less than the voter turnout in 
the 2012 Ondo State governorship election (38.1%) and the 2015 presidential election in 
Ondo State (38.8%). It is however noted that this is relatively average turnout and should not 
be interpreted primarily in terms of voter apathy but as a relatively true representation of the 
voter turnout
20
. 
 
 5.4.9 Decision- making at the community level 
The local government reforms of 1976 anticipated clear and defined relationships between 
local governments and their communities. Local governments were seen as local institutions 
of modern government that will be 'responsive to local wishes and initiatives', and provide 
'appropriate services' and undertake 'development activities'. They were also expected to 
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Vanguard Newspaper ‘Ondo Election: Akeredolu leads’ November 27, 2016. 
20
National Daily Newspaper‘Election Monitor report on 2016 Ondo Governorship election’ January 11, 2017. 
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'mobilise human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public' 
and provide a 'two way channel of communication' between local communities and the 
institutions of government. In these responsibilities, local government officials perceive that 
the difference between local government and government at higher levels is that the latter 
'deal with files' while local governments ‘deal with people'.  
 
The general response was that the people are not involved in the decision making of the local 
government; however, more often than not, the local government officials inform the people 
of some decisions. The principal of a secondary school in Iwaro-Oka stated that the local 
government and councillors do not generally involve the people from the local community in 
projects they intend to carry out. It was also noted that the respondents in the local 
communities were not happy about the fact that they are not carried along in deliberations 
and decisions, and they expressed hopelessness about the situation. From other respondents 
across the local government areas it was observed that, there is a platform that gives the 
community the opportunity to engage with local government officials through a community 
development forum. However, in two local governments, respondents recollected that there 
was an attempt in the past by the state government to engage the community in project 
initiation and implementation. A women’s’ group leader in one of the local governments, 
giving her personal testimony based on experience, indicated that before project initiation, the 
local governments first involved the community. She recounted that:  
“The ministry of community and rural development consulted with the 
community. It is call three I's, they come to the community and go round to 
ask what they need. The community will gather and they will talk to them. 
There are different issues mentioned then, but I do not know the parameters 
that were used to select a priority and do it. Like when they came to my 
village they built a hall for us. (II/Local Resident 3/Ipogun/2016) 
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In an interview with another community leader, it was observed that there were other ways 
through which the community convey their concerns to  the local government chairman or the 
councillor about their problems. This included written complaints, delegations and making 
personal contact with the chairman. The respondent however expressed disappointment since 
the chairman and other local leaders rarely seemed to address the complaints presented. He 
said, “. . .  it is not only during electioneering period that we suppose to see these people, 
they are supposed to come to us as we normally go to them.” (SSI/Local Resident 3/Sabomi/ 
2016) 
 
Communication and the lack of transparency were found to be a significant factor in the 
process. People in the communities were often unaware of how local government is managed 
and how to approach their representatives or officials. Respondents claimed that the local 
government officials rarely disclose details of the allocations made by the local government. 
The response of one them best captures the issue in this succinct response: 
“This will not be known to outsiders but in the council because those who are 
responsible will be called together and discuss how they are going to 
disburse every money that comes from the federal government through the 
state government”.(II/Local Resident 4/Bolorunduro/2016) 
 
5.4.10 Responsiveness of the elected officials  
From the fieldwork it is noted that the chairman and the councillors are perceived as service 
providers. They are supposed to be part of the society. However, many of the respondents 
complained that the Chairman of the local government is usually aloof after the election, 
having abandoned the electorate by breaking election manifesto promises. Some of the 
respondents claimed that this is usually the case because of the personal demands for 
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assistance by huge number of the community. Most of them might not even reside in the local 
government area but may be in the state capital Akure. One of the interviewees, a youth 
leader in Ese Odo, at Sabomi/ Igbekebo clarifies the role of elected officials in the local 
government (in particular the councillors) in planning for the community. After the ward 
representatives hold discussions in caretaker committees, they then engage the community. 
Another respondent from another local government commented about the relationship 
between the councillor and the chairman and the community in general suggesting that in 
contrast to previous regimes the current caretakers in local government have abandoned the 
communities. To quote him: 
In Mimiko’s regime there was no elected local authority except for the 
caretakers. It was recently they had elections, and now we have the 
chairman and the councillor in place, so the impact has not been felt much. 
In the past the councillor do covert, bridges, grade the road to farms, 
government us to do that in the past, but this present government has not 
done anything. There is no impact of the council in the town for the past 
eight years. (SSI/Local Resident 2/ Iwaro Oka/2016) 
 
It might appear that the people are more comfortable with access to local government through 
local councillors however, they can do little without the approval of the chairman of the local 
government so the chain of command is often an inhibiting factor in the process of 
representation. 
 
 5.4.11 Quality of primary health care and primary education. 
Primary Education 
The three issues examined in the quality of free primary education were; (1) the 
infrastructure; (2) personnel, and, (3) enrolment the schools.  In the headquarters of the each 
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of the local governments, save for cities such as Akure, Ondo, and Owo, which have a 
considerable number of primary schools, the average number of primary schools in each 
community is two, so in total within the local government areas the average number of 
primary schools is between forty six and forty eight.  
 
The innovation of the previous governor in the building of what is called the ‘Caring Heart 
Mega Schools’, built across Ondo State, is generally applauded by the residents of the towns 
that benefited from them. However, the consensus view is that the quality of primary 
education is poor, an assertion based on overcrowded classrooms. Random sampling method 
was used to select fifteen schools in three local government areas for study, namely Ifedore, 
Akoko North East and Ose.  An average of forty to fifty pupils in the classroom is well above 
the optimum ratio of thirty pupils to a classroom with a single teacher. However the 
overcrowded situation of the primary school signifies that enrolment in the school is high. 
There are also private nursery primary schools in almost all the rural communities and the 
respondents reveal that the existence of private schools is engendered by the lack of 
confidence in the public school system. Respondents also reveal that parents often withdraw 
their children from public schools and enrol them in the private school where they feel that 
they children can access quality education.  
 
All respondents agreed that the quality of primary education is still generally poor. Apart 
from the insufficient schools and classrooms the respondents also raised the issue of the 
quality of the teachers in the primary school system and absenteeism in rural communities as 
reasons for discontent. It is generally acknowledged that poor incentives offered to teachers 
who work in the remote villages is a negative feature in the system resulting in 
disenchantment and disappointment.  
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One important finding is that despite those negative factors there is an administrative 
structure in place in local government that helps in the control and management of primary 
schools that is the local government education authorities, (LGEA) under the general 
supervision of the area education office (AEO). However the respondents didn’t see any 
particularly beneficial impact of this management structure.  
Primary Health care 
The issue here is to investigate if there are functional health care facilities, and to ascertain if 
they are affordable. Depending on the population of the community the communities have 
general hospitals, comprehensive health centres, basic health centres and maternity centres. 
All respondents agreed that the people have benefited from the sitting of these facilities in 
their communities though it is recognised that the accessibility of such health facilities is not 
easy for people living in urban and semi urban areas. One important aspect of the 
effectiveness of primary health care delivery is the relatively low percentage of maternal and 
infant mortality. The state government programme tagged ‘Mother and Child Hospital’ is 
spread across the eighteen local government areas throughout the state and this initiative has 
drastically reduced maternal and infant mortality. The respondents did however identify two 
major hindrances in the public sector; the first is the inadequacy of medical personnel and 
health facilities in the semi urban and rural centres; the second is the limited involvement and 
participation of the community in primary health.  
 
 5.4.12  Means of improving the function of local government 
To improve the situation and function of local government, numerous suggestions were made 
by the interviewees, the main one being that of sensitizing the citizens and the community to 
be more politically engaged and enlightened. This, according to all respondents, would help 
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people be of aware of their social responsibilities and encourage them to hold their 
representatives accountable by using their voting power to recall underperforming leaders. A 
community leader noted; 
“Before anything can be done our citizen/community need to be sensitized 
you cannot place something on nothing it will not stand we need to be 
politically enlightened to that people will be conscious of their social 
responsibilities and we have to wake up to it.”(SSI/ Local Resident 5/ 
Sabomi/ 2016) 
That individual contended forcefully that pressure groups, non-governmental organizations, 
community leaders and politically empowered individuals should create political awareness 
among the citizens. He went on to say that creating that awareness is the shared responsibility 
of enlightened individuals, NGOs and pressure groups. In forcing officials to be responsive to 
their duties the question of recall of representatives was put to the respondents and while 
some claim outright ignorance about it, others who claimed to be aware of such constitutional 
provision feel that it is practically impossible. Aside from the rarely used constitutional 
provision of recall, respondents offered recommendations on what can be done to improve 
the function of both local and state government. A member of a caretaker committee of the 
local government suggested that local government autonomy can improve the effective 
functioning of the local government. He suggests that without the overbearing nature of state 
government control, local government can allocate resources appropriately and foster 
essential development. To cite from his verbatim quote given in interview, “I recommend 
local government autonomy, Let it be autonomous.”(II/ Local Resident 4/ Ayegunle Oka/ 
2016). 
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5.4.13 Performance of Local Government Governance between 1998 and 2015 
Opinions vary greatly on the performance of local governance between 1998 and 2015. Some 
respondents suggest there are little or no improvements at all in local governance; conversely 
some argue that local government performance has been good but has not been satisfactory. 
One discussion with an interviewee revealed that from 1998 to 2016 there have been 
improvements in Nigeria in terms of technological advancement, reduction in child mortality 
and improved medical practices. A member of a development committee goes on to suggest 
that there had been improvement in the functioning of the local government since 1999, but 
cites the caretaker principle as an obstacle. He stated with confidence that, “there is 
improvement in any case like a lot of developmental projects taking up by this new present 
regime through the local government chairman is unprecedented, I believe we are 
improving.”(SSI/ Local Resident 5/ Sabomi/ 2016).He did however acknowledge that despite 
the strong local government administration in 1999, the current one has generally achieved 
relatively little.  
 
5.4.14 Other community representatives: the role of the traditional institutions in 
development. 
Traditionally the chiefs and royal heads in Nigeria represented the community. That position 
remains to an extent in that they continue to lobby and influence local government and where 
projects are undertaken. Chiefs influence councillors on a personal basis and to some extent 
that influence percolates upwards into local government. The respondents were unanimous in 
stating that the local chiefs should be even more involved in the administration of local 
government.  One respondent notes that:  
“Another interest outside the council that may help the community is the 
royal heads by the Oba and the chiefs; the chiefs come from the quarters 
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and the wards and they can influence, if it is a possible, a project the local 
government wants to do.(SSI/Local Resident 2/ Iwaro Oka/2016). 
 
Apparently the respondents agree that traditional councils do influence the elected local 
authority and that such influence manifests itself at the state and even the federal level. 
Whereas the traditional council might influence local government operations, the 
Obas/Baales generally play a neutral role and as such, they cannot hold the government 
accountable, only exercise subtle influence. 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
This chapter contrasts some of the fundamental arguments and positions in contemporary 
literature on Nigeria federalism, political economy and development. As noted in the 
previous chapters a significant proportion of the literature suggests that the political and 
economic structure of Nigeria is dysfunctional. That dysfunctionality has been identified as 
the principal source of poor governance in the country, reflected in lows indices of 
development.  The fieldwork suggests there are two modes of Nigerian federalism, which 
may be termed formal and informal factors. The formal factors include the architecture within 
which the federal system operates whilst the informal factors include behavioural patterns of 
political actors that drive the process of governance.  
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Although the informal factor of Nigerian federalism evidence many defects, most notably the 
influence and self-interest of unscrupulous politicians, the formal factors of structure, rules 
and normative settings is designed to regulate and control the informal factors so that the 
formal structure prevails. Based on the evidence however this researcher suggests that that 
balance is not much in evidence, with the result that the informal factor dominate and 
regulate the formal factors.  
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Chapter Six 
Findings and Discussion 
 
6.0  Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the findings resulting from the data set out in chapter 
five, an analysis of the fieldwork and a comparison of such findings against the literature 
referred to. It consists of five distinct themes which include; factors perceived to account for 
the shortcomings in the Nigerian federal structure; institutional and political reasons for the 
poor performance of decentralisation in Nigeria; problems encountered in the implementation 
of decentralisation in Nigeria local government system; necessary conditions for effective 
decentralisation for effective decentralisation in the Nigerian local government system; and, 
measures to be adopted in improving the decentralisation in the Nigeria local government 
system. 
 
These principal topics focus on the main research question which revolves around the extent 
to which the current structure and practice of federalism has contributed to the poor 
governance and underdevelopment of Nigeria. Subsidiary issues include whether the transfer 
of authority, resources, accountability and the development of an open local political process 
and local political and administrative institutions, are working in ways that address local 
priorities in the manner inherent in genuine federalism.  A considered assessment of the 
issues will include reference to the evidence and a factual assessment, based on that evidence. 
It will consider whether local governance brings the expected benefits, intangible and 
tangible, respectively in terms of better schools, health systems and infrastructure and the 
empowerment of the population and social service delivery that enhances the lives and 
welfare of the population across the entire state.  
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The fieldwork was designed, by scope and content, to elicit from the respondents the impact 
of the current structure and practice of federalism on governance and development in Nigeria. 
It focussed on both the immediate and subjective experience of the respondents and, when 
expressed, their objective assessment of the state of the transfer of political power into the 
regions by the implementation of federalism based on the constitution. Certain respondents 
also commented on the constitution itself as the power underlying and fuelling federalism in 
Nigeria. Following that analysis and discussion the author will come to conclusions as to the 
central research question. 
 
6.1 Patterns and Themes 
The primary data, collected by means of the fieldwork disclosed several recurring themes and 
patterns are conveniently grouped into two categories. The first are those issues which relate 
directly to the structure and architecture of Nigerian federalism while the second includes the 
popular perception of the Nigerian experiment with federalism.  
 
 6.1.1 Findings  
The presentation of results is purely qualitative, verbatim quotations gathered by face-to-face 
interviews and content analysis being used to present such data. Necessary inferences were 
drawn from some of the findings which corresponded to varying degrees with the literature 
review, referenced in previous chapters, while observed similarities and differences between 
the present study and such literature were reconciled using appropriate research tools and 
methodologies. 
 
In general it is observed that the three main aspects of decentralization (administrative, fiscal 
and political) involve some level of devolution and sharing of power, resources and 
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responsibilities among the three tiers of government, (federal, state and local). The extent of 
the arrangement of such quasi devolution in theory is based on the constitution, and its 
practise remains a contentious issue for a number of the respondents, especially those within 
category one, those perhaps who expresses a more informed view on the topic. The research 
identified differences between the theory and practise of federalisation which are perceived to 
be largely the consequence of the intrigues of political and economic rivalry among the 
constituent units of federation and the defective structural arrangements. 
 
It is informative to note that the debate on Nigerian federalism is intricately woven around 
political and economic issues of; stability of the polity; cohesion; distribution; allocation; and 
economic growth focusing fundamentally on the formal institutions as the main means of 
achieving these ends. At grass root levels however it is far more simply measured by what the 
citizenry perceives as the benefits delivered by the federal form of government, down through 
the tiers and onto the ground where the reality of a general lack of infrastructure is felt most 
keenly. Equally it is right to say that when projects are delivered at such levels there is praise 
for the delivery process such as by the women’s’ group leader but in general the spirit of 
disappointment and the sense of failure of the system prevailed. This is summed by the 
respondent (Chapter 5) who referred to ‘phony contracts’ are being let out by state 
government.  
 
The processes and workings of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria have been adjudged by 
Freinkman (2007) and Khemani (2001) to be laced with conflicts, fundamentally arising from 
(i) structural organisational problems, (ii) fiscal relation problems, (iii) shortage of qualified 
manpower(iv) political and bureaucratic corruption and, (v) the prevailing political culture. 
The consequences, according to Khemani (2001) are poor service delivery and the dearth of 
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development in all sectors of national life. This was generally made out by the field research. 
An example (Chapter 5) is that of the former head of service delivery in Ekiti state who 
referred to the mystique surrounding projects that rarely come to fruition because funds 
perhaps earmarked for such a project is diverted elsewhere. 
 
6.1.2 The de facto federal structure of Nigeria 
All the evidence shows that Nigerian federalism is overtly centralised.  This finding 
corroborates previous investigations which showed that the Nigerian federalism is more 
unitary than federal in nature (Onwudiwe and Suberu 2005:94; Elaigwu 1998; 6-7; 2005; 69). 
This is position is corroborated more by the politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats who 
were interviewed than the category two respondents who take a more parochial view but 
nevertheless appears to be valid and provable. There exists a very strong central government 
and very weak constituent units. One of the interviewee notes that this is based on how 
Nigerian federalism is conceived and has been operating de facto. He also referred to the 
bane of the federal system being the constitution out of which federalism was created and the 
on-going struggle for political reform leading to local autonomy as an impediment to fully 
functional federal government Such opinions suggest that the principle of autonomy within a 
federal arrangement is compromised from inception. In principle the constitution confers 
some degree of autonomy on the sub-units but, in reality, the sub units seem to lack 
autonomy whether by reason of the failure of effective power sharing by the federal 
government or the failure of the local government to act efficiently and in harmonious 
independence from central government. Another interviewee, a former head of service  in one 
of the southern western states, was of the view that because of how Nigerian federalism is 
conceived, the powers of the federating units are intentionally whittled down.  
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That lack of autonomy, and thereby the capacity for creativity based on identified local need, 
and the incentives to promote economic growth and development is notably lacking in the 
sub units because it is said that the federal government routinely dictates policy to them. One 
implication of exercising this dominance over the federating units is that there are some 
projects and developmental programmes that are inappropriately sited in some states. A 
senior official of the civil service in one state noted in interview to the effect that it is the 
federal government that makes decisions about where to site projects. His view, based on 
close experiences, therefore was that the practice of federalism was token only and therefore 
arbitrary. 
 
In some of the local government communities there are abandoned projects. For example, the 
uncompleted primary and health buildings in Ifedore LG and Ifon LG. In Ese Odo there are 
abandoned roads projects such as the Sabomi- Igbotu road. Such projects are purportedly 
funded by the federal government and whilst there is speculation about the reasons for such 
abandonment, the general air of secrecy ensures non-disclosure. Popular opinion amongst the 
local citizens, evident in the literature is that this is due to the overlapping functions of 
federal and state agencies in service delivery with the result that control is shared and falls 
into the gap between the two sides. Again the respondent from Ekiti is cited for his 
experience in exactly this circumstance where the miscommunication between federal 
government and the ministry of agriculture resulted in the complete failure of the project to 
build a centre of excellence for agriculture. a much needed resource.  
 
An obvious feature of the de facto federalism is the dependence of the state governments on 
the federal government not only for resource distribution but policymaking.  Although the 
constitution confers considerable power to the states in the constitution, it appears that these 
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powers are, in practice, tactically withdrawn by other contradictory provisions of the 
constitution. Reference is made to the respondent who called for the constitution to be 
scrapped because despite the notion of three tier federal government it purports to create it 
effectively only delivers two tiers by virtue of the constraints in the constitution itself. A 
former governor of a state in the South West, Osun State, explained in interview that 
considering the enormous resources at the disposal of the federal government, it remains a 
very difficult thing to distribute those resources to the regions. This, he said, was the 
undeniable political reality of contemporary Nigeria. It results in a significant imbalance in 
the allocation of legislative powers between the federal government and the states as 
federating units, with the overloading of the exclusive legislative list at the expense of the 
concurrent and residual lists (Bolaji Akinyemi 2004:4-7; Jinadu 1994: 57; Elaigwu 2002:78). 
Second, there is an overlap and duplication of functions which has brought wastage, 
corruption and a lack of development. An example of the dominance of the federal 
government was provided by a former governor who lobbied for a series of bridges between 
Shagamu and Lagos but who failed due to the refusal of the federal government to sanction 
such expenditure. It is therefore clear, based on the results of the interviews, that there is 
imbalanced allocation or distribution of legislative powers among the three government tiers 
in Nigeria. This finding is in line with the studies by Bolaji Akinyemi (2004:4-7), Jinadu 
(1994: 57) and Elaigwu (2002: 78). 
 
Nigeria federal democracy has witnessed constitutional crisis/conflicts since 1999 due to 
inherent flaws of the constitution; conflicts range between Governors and their deputies, 
president and the vice president;on security matters between the governors and the Police 
Commissioners; crisis of local government creation-between state governments  and federal 
government; conflict between the executive and legislative arms of government and the 
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lingering problems of fiscal federalism(Suberu and Osaghae 2005:69;BolajiAkinyemi2004:4; 
Wunch and Olowu 2010:3). From this it is clear that Nigerian Federalism face numerous 
challenges. Nigeria has a defective Structure because it is highly centralized government and 
a situation whereby the federal government exercises enormous powers over the state and 
local governments. Moreover, the subjugation of local governments under the state 
government reveals a defective federal structure. 
 
Amongst those interviewed, there appeared to be little ambiguity about the importance of the 
federal constitution as the prerequisite for any successful federal arrangement. In the same 
vein, there seems to be a consensus, that the lack of capacity of Nigerian governments 
(federal and state) to translate the enormous resources in their control into economic growth 
and development is a consequence of a defective constitution. Section 5(3) of the 
Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria 1999 for instance, still contains the original first 
republic limitation on executive power of the state so that its executive authority shall extend 
to all matters with respect to which the legislature of the Region has for the time being power 
to make laws but shall not impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the 
Federation or to endanger the continuance of federal government in Nigeria.  As stated in 
Chapter 5 that provision contains an in-built veto without definition of what is meant by 
impeding the federal government or who judges whether any act by a state is deemed to have 
done so and by reference to what standard.  
 
An example of the exercise of the overbearing power of the federal government was the 
manipulation of the gubernatorial election of 2007 in Ondo State. The leading contestants 
were Dr. Mimiko of the Labour Party (in opposition to the incumbent party) and Dr. Agagu 
of the People’s Democratic Party (the ruling party at the federal level). The generally held 
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view of the citizens of Ondo State and the reports of the  Election observers was that the 
Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) plainly rigged the electoral process in favour of 
Dr. Agagu.  This became evident when his victory was announced in Abuja while the voting 
slips were still being counted in Ondo State. Dr. Mimiko challenged the outcome and it was 
declared to be unlawful by both the Election Tribunal  and then the High Court.  The Appeal 
Court upheld the first instance decisions of both, during which time Dr. Agagu acted as de 
facto governor of Ondo State without lawful mandate.  
 
 In another instance, in Osun State, the former Governor, Chief Bisi Akande (interviewed by 
the author) reported on use of the police force in support of the federal ruling party candidate.  
By his account, his opponent had one hundred and fifty anti-riot policemen who caused 
intimidation amongst opposition party voters at the point of the polling booth.  In his view 
such intimidation was an obstruction in the process of a free and fair election and unlawful 
using the federal government organs and agencies.   
 
Such incidents went some way to justifying the demands of the then opposition party, that the 
police forces be decentralized so as to limit the power of the federal government in such 
matters. However, it is notable that after the historical opposition electoral victory of 2015, 
this item has apparently disappeared from their legislative agenda. 
 
The overbearing posture of the federal government is not however limited to the conduct of 
elections. For instance, under former President Obasanjo, in 2003 withheld the Lagos State 
fiscal allocation for two years. It was supposedly justified on the basis that the decision of the 
Lagos State government to create 37 local government development areas, (LCDAs) was 
unconstitutional.  These actions on the part of the state government and the federal 
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government put to test in a very practical way the relative powers of the two tiers of 
government and their relationship arising under the constitution.  The matter went to the 
Supreme Court which made two principal findings. The first was that it upheld the 
constitutional legality of the LCDAs; the second finding (the natural consequence of the first) 
was that the withholding of the allocation was constitutionally illegal and the Federal 
Government was therefore ordered to release the funds. The federal government disobeyed 
the rulings of the Supreme Court, and when it disobeyed the matter, the federal government 
went back to the Supreme Court to insist on withholding the allocation however, the 
allocation was eventually released under the Presidency of Late President Umaru Yar’Adua.  
 
As noted in the fieldwork report, the practice of the federal government gives the impression 
at the grass root level that it is a behemoth. Such is the de facto state of federalism in Nigeria. 
To make it work the general opinion is that the constitution must be amended to reflect basic 
principles of federalism, i.e. true devolved autonomous local government. One of the 
respondents, a civil activist and development expert, agreed with the popular notion that the 
constitution is at the heart of the failure of federalism, and added a new dimension to the 
debate by arguing for a fourth tier of government to ensure that resources find their way 
equitably into all parts of the country. Whilst that is outside the scope of this study it is 
illustrative of how the problem of delivering federalism on the basis of the current 
constitution is perceived. 
 
6.1.3 The prevailing political culture  
The findings of this study show that federalism has translated into at least, a degree of 
political stability in which some socio-economic development has occurred. To suppose 
otherwise, when Nigeria has oil wealth would be manifestly false, but the debate remains 
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about the extent of that development as against what was reasonably anticipated. This view is 
supported by several studies that found that federalism in Nigeria has achieved the purpose of 
promoting political stability and cohesion (Diamond 1999:152; Horowith 1985 602-613). 
Olowu too has found that political federalism, through the creation of the sub units, has 
reduced the tendency of secession and reduced threat of political instability (Olowu 1991). 
 
The political objectives of the state are manifest in the powers that are devolved to the local 
government or the administrative units and they assume greater participation in development 
planning and management, so promoting national unity by giving groups in different regions 
in a country a greater ability to participate in planning and decision making, and thus increase 
their stake in their own political stability. This view is supported by (Rondinelli et al 1984: 
10). Conversely some scholars have argued that fragmentation of Nigeria over the years have 
considerably reduced the tendency of secession and disintegration this creating a more settled 
political climate. For example, Suberu (2010) suggests that the fragmentation inherent in the 
federal system has created a situation where no single constituent unit of the federation is 
large enough to challenge the authority of the federal government, threaten secession, or 
dominate other states. However the existence of very vocal and sometimes militant insurgent 
groups, which threaten secession and violent ethnic and religious uprisings, run contrary to 
that supposition but even so an argument exists that the rationale behind state creation has 
delivered some political stability, Another important issue is that it may appear that as more 
states are created, such states are becoming smaller and weaker with the central government 
becoming comparatively stronger (Diamond, 1987).  
 
The level of engagement in the political process depends very much on the individual’s 
political culture, (see Chambers and Kymlicka (2002) in Chapter 2.8.)  Factors that adversely 
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influence the political culture include, apathy, fear, and a lack of conviction that any 
engagement in the political process is meaningless in a system, which is essentially corrupt, 
and whilst promises much delivers little. Almond and Verba (1963) talk of political culture 
being influenced by ‘parochial’ and ‘political’ orientations. Parochial political culture 
describes those participants in the process in terms of disengagement and naivety. Participant 
political culture suggests a greater deal of involvement in and between specialized institutions 
and the citizen or active groups of citizens interested and engaged in the political process 
because it affects them directly. There is the third class of political culture and that is the civil 
culture as a subset of political culture, considered as a participant group culture such as that 
of political parties or activists, the common feature being engagement in the political process.  
 
Elaigwu, (2007) indicates that it is almost impossible to generalize in describing the 
prevailing political culture due to the diversity of cultures, ethnicity and religions in Nigeria. 
The self-interest of political actors is a factor that has a dramatic effect on the political 
landscape and culture and breeds a culture of corruption and expectations of poor service 
delivery and ‘phony contracts’. It is the view of this researcher therefore that the political 
landscape in Nigeria has reached some level of maturity but that the failure of the system 
itself (and the principal participants in the process) engenders unrest and the rise of political 
instability.  
 
 6.1.4 Extent of administrative decentralization  
Administrative decentralization involves the transfer of responsibility for planning, financing 
and management of public functions; the structure of governance, public personnel, 
administration and intergovernmental relations to devolve entitles charged with the 
administration of such functions, properly accountable to its citizenry. The essential rationale 
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for administrative decentralization is to move such functions to those tiers of government for 
a better and qualitative service delivery where is it most needed. Among the supporters of 
decentralization are, Adamolekun & Ayo (1989: 157-176) and Afigbo (1991: 13-29). 
 
This research shows that degree of transfer of authority to the local government of Ondo 
State is both incomplete and badly managed. This calls into question the type of 
decentralisation that is in operation and although the constitution envisaged full devolution of 
powers, in practice the type of administrative decentralisation in operation more resembles 
delegation of duties with accountability facing backwards to central government. It is a 
political fact that local government in Ondo State was administered by the caretaker 
committees appointed by the Governor for more than seven years.  That meant that almost all 
the functions of the local government were taken over by a combination of the federal and 
state government. In light of this some scholars (and particularly technocrats) have argued 
that the principle of local government should be scrapped because during that period it was 
shown to have no effective purpose. In addition Nwabueze’s (2003:123) submission that an 
inclusive model of intergovernmental relations which features a hierarchical relationship 
between the central government and the other tiers of government, as well as dependence of 
lower tier of government on the higher tier, is largely absent in Nigeria.  
 
Fiscal decentralization (as opposed to just administrative decentralisation) leads to enhanced 
balanced distribution of resources amongst the units of the federation and promote 
distributive justice through the devolution and redistribution of resources (Galadima 2007: 
59-72). This is a state that Nigeria has not attained because of the view that the present 
situation is on of quasi federalism. This study illustrates that proper and equitable fiscal 
decentralization faces numerous challenges, leading almost inevitably to the absence of fiscal 
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autonomy in local government. It is noteworthy a simple majority of the participants in the 
research expressed ignorance about the fiscal matters of their local government which is 
suggestive either or both of a lack of engagement or a lack of transparency at local 
government level about such matters.  
 
The opinion of the author, based on the results of the interviews, support previous researchers 
that the arrangement of fiscal allocation in Nigeria threatens initiatives, innovation and 
modern ideas of generating money for sustainable development (Diamond 1987: 21; Omeje 
2008:78; Suberu & Osagahae 2010;10). Other authors cite the centralization of revenue 
allocation within the context of Article 162 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria that leaves the States at the mercy of the Federal Government in terms of their 
ability to meet the needs of their electorate. (Ben Nwabueze 2003: 124-130; Suberu 2008: 
451-485). Moreover, the financial incapability of the Nigerian Government at the state and 
local government levels to carry out their assigned responsibilities, without recourse to the 
centre, as a result of their financial constraints, demonstrates a failed fiscal decentralization 
effort ( Nwabueze 2003: 124-130). 
 
The analysis of the principle of decentralization in this research shows that it is an essential 
mechanism for good governance and socio-economic development. For instance 
administrative and management objectives are expressed on the de-concentration of authority 
to react quickly to un-anticipated problems at local level, thereby doing away with multi level 
bureaucracy.  
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6.1.5 Institutional reforms required to improve socio-economic growth 
 
This study shows that Nigerian decentralisation at state and local government levels, is not 
necessarily reflective of the political communities at all levels. The narratives provided by 
most participants indicate that local government fails to meet expectations or represent the 
community in either a political or cultural sense. It is evident that what the political leaders 
have done is to expand local government so that resources may be diverted to diverse 
destinations and have done so in such a way, under military rule, that their political 
preferences have affected the entire process. This research aligns with the literature that 
recommends decentralization as a means of achieving good governance and development 
(Rondinelli and Cheema 1983; Smith 1985; Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird; 1998; Hutchcrorft 2001 
Prud’homme 1995; Wunsch &Olowu 1990).  
 
The results of this research represent the views of a number of the respondents (however 
eloquently or not, they were expressed) that Nigeria has not evolved into a non-extractive 
system of government because of the legacy of a colonial extractive system that failed to 
establish enduring governmental institutions. Based on the literature, it is clear that the 
colonial legacy may have laid the foundation for the corrupt attitude and mentality of a 
number of Nigerian political leaders, who see governance as a means of self-enrichment, self-
aggrandizement, the opportunity to build personal empires and the exercise of power over 
others. As a consequence institutional change is required and this research aligns with some 
of the literature recommending the restructuring of Nigerian federalism, focussing on the 
imbalances which have been identified. Nwabueze (2007) captures the aggregate view on the 
institutional restructuring of the federal arrangement when he points out that restructuring 
would fundamentally involve constitutional and statutory changes.  
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In summary such institutional changes would involve the preservation of the federal system 
as the best option for government in the Nigerian context. Constitutional reform would be a 
critical part of such restructuring leading to a review of the division of powers and revenue 
between central government and the localities. At the extreme, what Nwabueze (2007; 391-
443) termed the coercive forces supporting the present central government, would need to be 
dispelled. Such large-scale institutional changes undoubtedly constitute a major restructuring 
of the architecture of Nigerian federalism but unless and until achieved true federalism will 
not be achieved.  
 
This research further focuses on the economic imperatives of the renter state as an adverse 
feature of Nigeria’s institutional economy. Rent economy has not only changed the structure 
of revenue derivation and allocation, it has also affected the mentality of the people, i.e. 
‘renter behaviour’ or ‘renter mentality’ (Beblawi 1990). The ‘Renter mentality’ is evidence of 
the State being over dependent on export resources, with low or absence of revenue from 
domestic taxation so that citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to 
become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry 
with social welfare programs, becoming an allocation or distributive state, (Beblawi et al 
1990: 87-88). To this extent, the renter economy changed the ideal and idea of federalism in 
Nigeria, in terms of revenue generation and equitable distribution leading to socio-economic 
development. 
 
 6.1.6 The evolution of federalism in Nigeria 
In the paradigm federal state, as posited by Wheare (1964) the sub-units must be solvent 
enough to support the central government (Suberu 2010). The findings of this research show 
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that reliance of the sub-units of the federation on the central government and the state 
government is counterproductive. It is noted that it not only kills initiative for revenue 
generation, it also stalls appropriate developmental plans for the sub-units, and diminishes the 
political and economic space of the people. Based on responses provided by majority of the 
interviewees this study recommends political education in addressing failed decentralization 
in Nigeria. Apathy in voting patterns is reflected most in the voice and accountability 
indicator. The trend can be attributed to two main factors. The first factor is that the political 
culture of democratic political activism (apart from extreme groups) is lacking in Nigeria. 
The second is that the effects of centralization do not confer legitimacy on government and 
do not direct the involvement of the people in governance.  
 
One of the major problems identified by this research is the lack of understanding or 
deliberate distortion of what federalism entails in Nigeria. In the discussion about political 
participation, one of the interviewees complained that if people didn’t know or understand 
what was wrong, they not know how to vote. One of his mantras was that people have to be 
educated to take any meaningful part in the process but without development such education 
will not be freely available. It is noted that political education and enlightenment of the 
citizens is essential. This would help erase negative thoughts and scepticism of the political 
system in general (Amuwo, Suberu et al: 29). To this end, an emergence of new leadership 
with a new orientation and the right attitude will be of great importance in achieving the 
peace and stability that the introduction of federalism seeks to achieve.  
 
Elaigwu (2007: 313) argues that the future threat to the survival of Nigeria may not come 
from the vertical relations between the federal centre and sub-national states, but from the 
horizontal relations amongst Nigerians as the centre becomes increasingly a bigger political 
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prize, especially as the crises of allocation of scarce resources increases in tempo and 
aggressiveness. In a regional arrangement of government, there would be more cooperation 
among the provinces, where there is a cultural affinity and socio-political identity. To this 
extent, emphasis is placed on decentralization of not only the functions of government but of 
economic activity.  
 
The research does not entirely support the fact that the restructuring of the architecture of 
Nigerian federalism might be a difficult task to achieve, an argument other previous 
researchers have advanced. Suberu (2010) argues that past and recent efforts to achieve 
comprehensive constitutional change have proved unproductive in a context of rigid 
constitutional amendment rules and deep ethno-regional divisions over the precise modalities 
and specifics of reform. To this extent, he advocates non-constitutional renewal as an 
alternative path to political reform. This research does not, however, support the opinion that 
non-constitutional reform would genuinely transform the state. The constitution remains the 
bedrock of a successful federal state and this researcher therefore argues that structural 
(constitutional) reform and social reforms must be aligned. 
 
6.2 Key performance indicators in moving de facto federalism to fruition 
 
6.2.1 Leadership and political will 
 
One important factor that plays out in the present analysis is the divergent leadership culture. 
The problem of leadership in Nigeria has contributed greatly to the shortcomings of 
federalism for reasons ranging from tribal loyalties, ethnic differences and personal ambition. 
Virtually all its leaders, since independence, have acted in a way or that portrays them as 
advancing ethnic or sectional interest. Even the citizens, in most cases, analyse and perceive 
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the actions of those in governance through the lens of ethnicity or other sectional affiliations.  
The tendency towards poor political will is further reinforced by the attitudes of Nigeria’s 
political class who, in their inter and intra class struggles for political power and to 
consolidate their accumulation of wealth, aggravate existing or historic divisions by 
interpreting politics in terms of survival of ethnic or regional entities. Indeed, the series of 
leadership crises experienced since independence reflect this perspective. Also in this 
context, the practice of federalism only serves to advance individual rather than communal 
interests (Muhammed 2007).  
 
Considering the importance of good leadership in governance and development, most 
participants suggest that Nigerians must focus on effective leadership as a pre or co requisite 
to almost all other reforms. To support this argument, Elaigwu (2008) argues that federalism 
is not a sort of magic that will automatically usher in the values essential to peace, good 
governance and development, as he notes that what federalism cannot supply are values of 
fairness, justice and the accommodation of all such values in the system. Nigerian political 
leaders must hold these values at their core values.  
 
However, federalism may provide a conducive medium for realizing, in relative forms, the 
values of fairness and justice in public life, and political leaders must effectively use this 
medium (Elaigwu2007: 314-315). In this way, the leadership recruitment process must be 
tailored towards bringing out leaders that will be accountable to the people. For this to occur, 
the participatory space of the people must be enhanced, giving them genuine involvement in 
the processes of leadership recruitment and government and enabling their basic control of 
their politics, environment and economy. Although decentralization is instrumental in good 
governance and development, its application in Nigeria, based on most responses, has been 
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ineffective and has failed to bring inclusive development to Nigeria, let alone turn the country 
into a global economic force. Through historical institutionalist analysis, this study 
accentuated the ambiguous mix of devolution and de-concentration as a major source of 
decentralization’s governmental and economic underperformance in Nigeria. 
 
The desire for development, as indicated by most participants in this study, seems to underpin 
the competition for control of the state political apparatus and fiscal powers. To support the 
argument, Suberu (2011) proposes that access to political and economic powers seems to 
guarantee development. Hence there has been a consistent struggle amongst the sub 
units/regions to gain access to political and economic power. In achieving control of political 
and economic advantage over the years, other variables outside of the political process have 
been deployed. These variables fundamentally are religion, tribal sentiments and prejudices.  
 
The clamour for development appears to necessitate the struggles for political and economic 
advantages amongst the different sub units and regions within the framework of Nigerian 
Federalism. Despite this, most participants show that Nigeria has not witnessed the type of 
development that could commensurate with the kind of resources accruing to it.  To this 
effect, it appears that the economic and political control of governance may not necessarily 
translate into development, as supported by Suberu (2009).  Even at that, there is a consistent 
struggle for political and economic advantage of the central government. The political and 
fiscal evolution therefore raise fundamental questions in relation to the propriety of the 
federal structure and the extent to which the present structural arrangement can particularly 
serve the purpose of development.   
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6.2.2 Socio-economic development  
 
The overtly centralised and overbearing character of the federal government is argued to be 
responsible for the poor performance of socio-economic development of which education and 
health are key features. Further research suggests that it may not just be a constitutional issue 
but, also, an issue of perception and values. Indeed, these values and perceptions seem to 
actually drive the mechanisms of the Nigerian federal system. It should be noted that the 
federal government was able to take over all service delivery institutions through its takeover 
of the economic resources of the federation. The federal government has more resources than 
all the states and, invariably, the centre is financially strong, while the federating units are 
very weak. The strength of the federal government and the weakness of the state is more 
often expressed in the welfare packages/salaries of the federal workers and the state workers. 
The federal workers are better paid than the state workers. This gives the perception that it is 
better to work with the federal government than the state. This has strengthened the 
perception that the federal government is essentially more capable of dealing with financial 
issues than the state government. As a result, the trappings of the federal arrangement in 
relation to capacity and functions are lost on the general public. 
 
Most participants in this study suggest that the present profile of Nigeria on politics and 
socioeconomic development is at odds with the rich human and natural resources of the 
country.  Per capita Nigeria is one of the richest countries in the world (Suberu, 2009) and is 
ranked as the sixth country in the world crude oil production and the fourth world ranking 
country for Liquefied Natural Gas and several other mineral resources such as gold, tin, 
columbite, lead, coal and gemstones. Conversely it now ranks amongst the poorest countries 
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in the world in terms of the quality of life of the people (Suberu, 2011) and that gap requires 
both explanation and remedy. 
 
6.2.3 Education  
By section 18(1) of the 1999 Constitution primary education is fundamentally the 
responsibility of the state and local government, the legislative aim being that Government 
shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational 
opportunities at all levels. The general public seems to have implicit confidence in the federal 
government to respond to their needs, whereas, they seem to have less confidence in the state 
government to provide education, perhaps because they were not mandated to so by the 
constitution and have unclear devolved powers to do so.  
 
One fundamental flaw in the process is that teachers are better paid under the federal 
government that state or local.  This is arguably borne out of the confusion that is created by 
the intervention of the federal government in the primary school education via provisions in 
the Universal Basic Education Programme. This confusion has led to critical failures in 
relation to the capacity of the system to adequately respond to this critical stage in the 
education of children. Instead of federal government involvement or partnership with the 
states in order to enhance growth in the education sector, the present approach has only 
brought about failure.  
 
6.2.4  Improvements between 1998 to 2014 
For Nigerians the transition of 1999 was essentially the disengagement of the military from 
the political governance of the country. This disengagement signifies the emergence of a 
more decentralised system of governance based on a liberal democracy and federal 
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principles. In turn, this implies inter-governmental relations, based on constitutional 
provisions, rather than military decrees.  It is clear that the institutional changes in Nigeria 
during 1998 and 1999 present a substantial and viable basis for the assessment of the 
outcomes of such changes and reforms. 
 
In assessing the political conditions and the institutional structures as a hinge for economic 
growth and development, most of the literature on Nigerian federalism seems to suggest that 
the structural and institutional factors that are embedded within the social and political 
histories of the nation are vital in the understanding of the process of governance 
development countries (Tirtosudarmo 2008; Lewis 2007; Akinyoade 2008). The histories 
include the colonialism and nationalism, ethnicity and religion, the role of the military, the 
role of the elites (including the politicians, the technocrats and the political parties) and 
international factors (foreign loans, aids and investment). 
 
The Nigeria federal structure remains a complex architecture. The complexity of this 
structure of governance is derived from the intrigues on which its foundation was laid, and 
the very peculiar heterogeneous circumstances of the Nigerian state (Suberu, 2010). From the 
colonial foundation to the present configuration of the structure of government, there have 
been unresolved issues, as most participants suggested. To support this finding, Lewis (2007) 
asserts that these issues appear to border on the interplay of desire for political and economic 
survival and relevance amongst the ethnic nationalities. Consequently, this is played out in 
the struggle for economic advantage and political control of the state on one hand, and 
resistance of control and dominion on the other hand, amongst the ethnic nationalities that 
made up the federation. It is instructive, as Tirtosudarmo (2008) argues, to take into 
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cognisance that the ethnic struggle for political and economic superiority predates the 
colonial intervention and administration. 
 
In terms of the foundation for economic growth and development, Kohli (2004:327) argues 
that the failures in Nigeria’s industrialisation process can be traced back to the colonial 
period, in which British “effortless” colonialism laid the foundation of a distorted state and a 
commodity-dependent economy. Even worse, such effortless colonialism took place in a 
country that had not experienced the order and prosperity of a centralised state, with centuries 
of slavery having robbed it of their best, and having existed in relative isolation with a barely 
used written language, important for public administration (Kohli, 2004:326). To this effect, 
Lewis (2007) and Tirtosudarmo (2008) argue that the travails of development as responses to 
challenges and opportunities brought about by political independence, more often than not 
reflect particular circumstances that the country and its leaders have had to confront.  
 
6.2.5 Institutional Arrangements  
Nigerian decentralization can be best described as a mixture of devolution and de-
concentration of administrative, political and fiscal powers to the lower levels of government. 
Based on the responses provided by the interviewees, the practice is called quasi federalism. 
The legal and institutional framework of the Nigerian decentralization is ambiguous; the local 
government arrangement being the most problematic in Nigeria’s federal structure. The 
contentious nature of the Nigerian decentralised federal arrangement is particularly noticeable 
in the areas of constitutional provisions for the local government. As noted in the previous 
research, scholars like Olowu (1991); Elaigwu (2007); Nwabueze (2003); Diamond (1987); 
Suberu & Osaghae (2010) note that the ambiguity lies in the provisions of the 1999 
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constitution. On the one hand, a section of the constitution grants autonomy to the local 
government whilst, on the other, another section of the constitution removes the autonomy.  
 
Section 7(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution purports to guarantee the system of local 
government by democratically elected local government councils. By this provision the 
constitution puts the local government directly under the state government. Section 7 further 
empowers the state government to enact legislation with regard to the establishment, 
structure, composition, finance and functions of democratically elected local government 
councils. Additionally, the Fourth Schedule of constitution assigns some roles to local 
governments in the provision of critical basic services including primary education, health 
services and the development of agriculture. However, in practice, state governments exercise 
virtually unlimited jurisdiction in these same arenas. In many cases, the role of local 
government is largely relegated to mere participation in the execution of functions. Based on 
this provision, many state governors in collaboration with the states’ legislatures have 
dissolved local government councils, appointing instead their cronies and party loyalists 
while simultaneously refusing to hold elections for the local government councils. The results 
based on narrations provided by the interviewees indicate that the participation of the 
populace in governance at the lowest level of society is not guaranteed. 
 
The legislation in Nigeria largely hinders decentralization and development as described by 
the participants. Based on the narratives provided, it is clear that there is a severe imbalance 
in the allocation of legislative powers between the federal government and the states as 
federating units, with the overloading of the exclusive legislative list at the expense of the 
concurrent and residual list of legislative subjects, in addition to an overlap and duplication of 
functions which has brought wastages, corruption and a lack of development. These finding 
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corroborates the previous investigations by Bolaji Akinyemi (2004:4-7), Jinadu 1(994: 57) 
and Elaigwu (2002:78). 
 
From the results provided, it is clear that the federal government is involved in almost all the 
spheres of governance, suggesting excessive control. Respondents suggested that even when 
it shares responsibilities with the sub-units, there is a tendency toward domination by the 
centre. Consequently the legislative list has been a contentious issue. A study by Bolaji 
Akinyemi (2004:4-7) found that the activities assigned to the federal government and the 
shared responsibilities with the state and local government add some support to the view that 
Nigerian federalism is more of a centralised system of government, thus corroborating the 
present study. It also shows that there are various areas of conflict. Sometimes, the areas of 
conflict have resulted in the federal government and the state government getting involved in 
a game of passing off responsibility.  
 
Okojie (2009) notes that even though the Nigerian local government has been in existence 
since independence, local government councils have not been explicitly treated as 
autonomous, independent entities. Instead, they have been treated largely as subordinate to 
the regional governments in the first republic and subsequent state governments in 
succeeding republics. The states are supposed to take care of the interest of local 
governments under the portfolios of a minister or commissioner of local government. The 
case for autonomous local governments is made based on the narrations by the majority of 
the respondents.  
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6.3   Good Governance  
Good governance within any defined system of government is comprised of a number of 
factors which operate on an symbiotic basis and which combine to engender a system that 
functions in accordance with its design and objectives. A number of such factors are 
considered below; several of them being synonymous with many of the issues in part 6.2 
above, However principle of good governance justifies a section to itself because of its 
special importance. It is largely through good governance, which implies honesty and the 
faithful performance by political actors of their electoral mandate, all of which goes to create 
trust between government and the people.  
6.3.1 Accountability  
Nigeria’s voice for accountability is very quiet. Voice accountability is significantly premised 
on the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government through democratic institutions and democratic practices. These include 
independent electoral institutions, free and fair elections, the roles of political parties and an 
active civil society, freedom of speech and an independent judicial system. In Nigeria, the 
political elites control political parties, and the civil society is not very active in opposition. 
Based on the narrations provided by the respondents, poor voice accountability in Nigeria 
could be seen within the context of a weak democratic culture and non-adherence to 
democratic values. In the context of local accountability the respondent from Bolorunduro, 
Akure North talked of being abandoned by local government. Others talked of access to 
elected official being very poor so that the possibility of holding them to account were very 
limited. This was particularly the experience recorded by category two respondents, generally 
those at the outer reaches of governmental influence and coincidentally those perhaps with no 
voice at all. 
 
  
238 
 
6.3.2 The Electoral process 
This study reveals that the Nigerian electoral processes are flawed due to the political 
influence of the politicians themselves who seem to have embraced power for the benefit of 
the powerful minority rather than the powerless majority. For instance one of the 
interviewees referred to Nigeria having a presidential style of government in complete 
contradiction to the constitution. That observation corresponds with a study by Elaigwu 
(2007:9), which noted that the electoral process has been crisis-ridden since 1999 when 
successive governments failed to achieve legitimacy through the electoral process.  In support 
of that same finding, other investigators found that Nigeria continues to witness with growing 
disappointment and apprehension the inability to conduct peaceful, free and fair open 
elections whose results are widely accepted and respected across the country (Igbuzor, 2010; 
Osama & Aghemelo, (2010), Ekweremadu, (2011). Although the 2011 election was adjudged 
to be better than the previous two by both local and international observers, it was not 
completely free from corruption, controversy and violence and far from the ideal set out in 
Section 15(5) of the 1999 constitution whereby the State shall abolish all corrupt practices 
and abuse of power. 
 
It is commonly reported that political violence often erupts during Nigerian elections. Some 
candidates apparently hire young people to engage in violent acts, including intimidation of 
their opponents’ supporters or of voters believed to support opponents. Violence can also 
occur during the polling process, with the theft of ballot boxes and clashes at or near polling 
stations. The murder of political opponents and the kidnapping of family members of political 
opponents is also said to have taken place. 
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6.3.3 Political instability, civil unrest and violence 
It is informative to note that based on the findings in this investigation, Nigeria has a better 
rating of political stability than has been witnessed during previous elections in the midst of 
political upheaval and national change. Nonetheless, the upsurge of violence in the oil rich 
region of the Niger-Delta, which has a very poor development index, sectarian and religious 
violence and, lately, the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group has exacerbated political 
instability, violence and terrorism in Nigeria. 
6.3.4 Government Effectiveness 
Government effectiveness, based on the previous studies, is linked to the conflicting, overlap 
and duplication of legislative functions assigned to the tiers of government. These have 
brought about wastages, lack of coordination, corruption and lack of development. In 
particular the federal government has appropriated to itself functions and responsibilities that 
can be better implemented by the lower tiers of government. These include basic services like 
education, agriculture, housing, health and road construction.  
 
Overall, government effectiveness is determined by the measure of institutional strength and 
the quality of the Civil Service, assessed by the bureaucrats’ strength and expertise and how 
they are able to manage political alterations without drastic policy changes. Factors that could 
militate against government effectiveness include; government instability and government 
ineffectiveness due to the low quality of personnel in conjunction with excessive bureaucracy 
and red tape, all evident in Nigeria based on the results provided by the respondents. The 
testimony of the former head of service respondents in one of the southwest state was to the 
effect that in Nigeria there is no effective devolution to the councils.  
 
Existing research provides support for the assertion that the Nigerian civil service and 
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bureaucracy have problems arising from the federal structure and fiscal decentralization. 
These give rise to conflict in intergovernmental relations, and hamper effective planning and 
execution of government policies. The processes and workings of Inter-Governmental 
Relations in Nigeria have been pronounced to be laced with conflicts (Freinkman 2007; 
Khemani, 2001). These conflicts fundamentally arise from (i) structural organisational 
problems; (ii) financial problems; (iii) shortage of qualified manpower; and (iv) political and 
bureaucratic corruption. The attendant consequence is poor service delivery and a dearth of 
development in all sectors of national life (Khemani 2001). In trying to exercise their 
autonomy, the different tiers of government work almost at cross-purposes.  
 
The existing arrangements for policy coordination between the federal and state governments 
remain inadequate. Although there are organs for the planning of shared responsibilities, 
there is always conflict in the implementation of the programs. The prevailing coordination 
effort tends to remain at the planning level rather than in actual implementation. Because of 
this lack of coordination, the impact of joint responsibility does not engender the intended 
development results. To this end the lack of coordination has brought about corruption in the 
bureaucratic process and, furthermore, has been the source of conflict between the federal 
and state governments. Federal/State conflicts have invariably involved litigation and 
arbitration by the Supreme Court but seemingly without resolution.  
 
6.3.5 Regulatory Quality 
Many institutional and governance reforms have been carried out in Nigeria. However, 
instead of focusing on reforms largely based on regulatory policy and a legal framework 
affecting national and sub national government in taxation powers and charges, Nigeria’s 
reforms were more at economic reform, the civil service, the banking sector, trade policy, 
  
241 
 
micro and macroeconomics, public procurement, public expenditure management and 
privatisation (OkonjoIweala and Kwaako 2007). Although these reforms introduced some 
new policies aimed at improving good governance, economic growth and development, they 
did not necessarily touch on the legal framework of decentralisation.  
 
The Due Process Mechanism introduced in 2001, but taking effect in 2003, is the mechanism 
for ensuring strict compliance with the principles of openness, competition, cost accuracy, 
rules and procedures that guide contract award by the government. Due Process Policy is an 
agenda to ensure and sustain an open, transparent and competitive Federal Procurement 
System (Fayomi 2013). The present study confirms that poor public expenditure management 
has significantly hampered the quality of government capital projects, resulting in poor 
service delivery to citizens.  
 
That observation was made by one of the civil servant interviewees who was of the opinion 
that the states system did not provide the strength needed by the country as whole. Previous 
studies also support this view and show that oversight of public expenditure was further made 
difficult due to fiscal decentralization in Nigeria, which allocated about half of total 
government revenues to state and local government, with the remainder being allocated to the 
federal government (Igbuzor, 2010; Osumah & Aghemelo, 2010, Ekweremadu, 2011; 
OkonjoIweala and Kwaako 2007). While increased resource allocation to state and local 
government may potentially encourage more direct intervention in pro-poor programs, 
capacity constraints and the lack of transparency at sub-national level posed serious 
challenges (Ekweremadu, 2011). 
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6.3.6 The Rule of law  
Previous researchers indicate that there were serious questions about the constitution as it 
related to functions of the federal and state governments, one of the major problems being the 
penchant of the federal government to flout the judgement of the courts. In doing so they 
place themselves above the law, thereby flouting the rule of law, as it is generally understood, 
that is that no one (including the government) is above the law. A major case during this 
period was that between the Lagos state government and the federal government. Mbaba 
(2005) reports that, despite the judgement of the Supreme Court on the matter the federal 
government, was defiant of the judgment and effectively in contempt of court. This type of 
precedent creates a sense of immunity from the rule of law in many entities or persons with 
any authority over others. Such practices can oust the jurisdiction of courts so that nobody, 
not even the court can question such conduct. 
 
The findings reveal that the Nigerian judiciary is weaker in carrying out its constitutional 
functions. As a support, there was a general opinion the politicians cannot take the federal 
government to court to address federal government seizure of the funds allocated to the state 
government. This poor performance, based on supportive existing research, has therefore 
mainly been linked to this institution (Chukuma and Ebai 2012; Nwabueze 2007). Based on 
the Governance Assessment Framework, it is also clear that the score of Nigeria in the realm 
of the rule of law has been consistently poor and without signs of improvement. The 
percentile rank has fallen from 14.83 in 2000 to 12.32 in 2013. The weakness of the judiciary 
is linked to its dependence on the executive in fiscal matters, poor funding and disregard of 
judicial orders by the executive (Nwabueze 2007).  
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Although the constitution of the federal republic provides for the independence of the 
judiciary, the executive arm of the government has overbearing power over it. Researchers 
also support this finding, arguing that with this dependence on the executive arm of 
government it is difficult to guarantee the autonomy of the judiciary and this has resulted in 
poor and inadequate judicial infrastructure, low morale amongst judicial personnel, alleged 
corruption, delays in administration of justice and judicial services delivery and general low 
quality and poor output (Nwabueze 2007). This situation has to some degree affected the 
quality of the judgements of the courts (Chukuma and Ebai 2012). 
 
6.3.7 Corruption Control 
In furtherance of this principle the results of this research reveal that endemic corruption 
remains an enormous challenge for Nigeria. For instance, one interviewee, a civil activist, 
suggested that corruption was a major crisis point.  This finding is also supported by existing 
research on Nigerian corruption such as that conducted by The Institute for Development 
Research of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (IDR, ABU Zaria) in its final report on the 
survey of corruption in Nigeria (2003) notes that the main institutions of government in 
Nigeria are deeply and historically rooted in corruption and this fact has affected their 
performance in bringing about good governance and development. The report lists the 
following institutions as most corrupt in the country in descending order; (1) the Police, (2) 
political parties; (3) national and state assemblies; (4) local and municipal governments; (5) 
federal and state executive councils. Corruption is therefore endemic at all levels of 
government, depriving the three tiers of government of a substantial amount of revenue for 
development. Mandela stated to the effect that corruption is was order of the day. 
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Given that the internal revenue generation of most of the states is too low for the states to be 
self-supporting (Collier 2009; Omeje 2007; Elaigwu 2007; Adamolekun 1991; Suberu 2010; 
Olowu 2001; Suberu 2010) they depend therefore on the federal government allocation. 
Corruption at the top however limits the amount of resource available for distribution so that 
a reduced amount of money percolating down to the states not therefore translating into 
socio-economic development. At the state and local government levels, most participants 
agree that there have been recorded cases of corruption and mismanagement of resources 
levied against the state governors and chairmen of local government. In summary corruption 
in the states and local governments, significantly deprives the states and local government of 
resources of the opportunity to fund developmental projects. 
6.4  Conclusion 
An important observation in the debate on Nigerian federalism is the way scholars argue for 
practise of federalism, and at the same time critique the mechanisms of federalism within the 
Nigeria context, dubbing it an overall failure. However the conclusion of a majority of 
scholars on Nigerian federalism is not for it to be abandoned, rather how it is to be 
strengthened so as to engender political stability, unity and cohesion within the framework of 
political federalism and equity, justice, economic growth and development within the 
framework of fiscal decentralization. This is notwithstanding all of the identified weaknesses 
ranging from corrupt practices and all the factors which account for the lack of good 
governance on a national scale and accounting for an enormous reduction in available 
resources which should be distributed amongst the population.  
 
From the analysis of decentralization in Nigeria, this accords with the general perception 
amongst scholars and others. The limited developmental trajectories spring from poor design 
and practice of decentralization and the lack of devolution to local government results in poor 
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accountability and limited transparency, the principal causes underlying Nigeria’s failure. 
The hazy mix of devolution and de-concentration engenders excessive public spending, 
corruption, and wastage of state resources, ultimately explaining Nigeria’s socio-economic 
underperformance. Decentralization however would have many positive effects in the 
Nigerian context if performed in accordance with the constitution serving as an essential tool 
in diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy in 
a world of rampant ethnic conflicts and separatist movements.  
 
In general political theory, and proven by the examples quoted in this research, such as the 
Unites States of America, decentralization and federalisation, though not devoid of 
weaknesses, is an efficient structural mechanism for good governance and socio-economic 
development. However, if ambiguously applied, as is the case in Nigeria with its overlapping 
central and local government responsibilities, economic productivity becomes restricted, 
irrespective of human and natural resource wealth. An informed political culture and an 
increased level of education of the people would enhance the capacity to demand 
transparency and accountability. To this extent, decentralization of governance involves the 
empowering of sub-national levels of the society to ensure that local people participate in and 
benefit from their own governance institutions and development services. The central 
government must therefore be relieved of many shared functions. For example, the 
government should devolve services such as health, education and culture, public works, 
environment, land management and capital investment to the local government.  
 
In summary, the debate on Nigerian federalism, and based on the narrations provided by the 
participants in the field study, concludes that the practice of federalism in Nigeria enjoys 
some limited success because of its potential system of sound government, albeit worthy of 
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improvement by changes to the constitution.  Conversely the literature suggests that the 
practise of federalism has significantly failed, or that it has not sufficiently addressed the 
challenges of good governance and development (Suberu, 2010). This position seems to 
enjoy broad based support because it is perceived that the Nigerian federal structure has not 
responded sufficiently to the four classic challenges of the post-colonial world, namely (i) 
national unity; (ii) democratic stability (iii) socioeconomic development; and (d) endemic 
corruption.   
 
If therefore federalism is to succeed in Nigeria it is the informed view of the author that those 
challenges must be met and overcome by the institutional capacity to promote stronger 
leadership, accountability, transparency and development in Nigeria. In conclusion, the 
current challenges facing Nigerian federalism, in its present form render it dysfunctional and 
unfit for purpose and it will remain so until the prevailing political culture permits effective 
reforms 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Findings 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the summary and findings of the research, and reflects on the 
substantive theoretical, conceptual and empirical issues arising from the relationships 
between decentralization, governance and development, as revealed in the analysis of the 
primary data collected from the respondents in Ondo State, Nigeria. The theoretical and 
conceptual argument that the form and design of decentralization has the capacity to 
engender, that is good governance and development, is verified by empirical means by the 
application of the research results to the analytical tools and research methods considered in 
chapter two. However, the research goes further to argue that although the structure of 
government plays a significant role in achieving good governance and development, an 
appropriate political culture and activism is a pre-requisite for successful decentralization 
leading to full federalism; this was considered in detail Chapter 2.2 and Chapter 2.3 in which 
the forms of decentralisation were examined.  The author concludes with a discussion of the 
findings and the contribution of this research to governance and development, and the scope 
for future study originating from this study.  
In so doing regard has been paid to the history of the country, and the nation, in which 
colonial and military rule has featured so significantly. Important events in the national 
psyche of Nigeria (and which have directed and perhaps accounted for the nation’s 
development) are highlighted as moments to which critical juncture analysis applies and from 
which path dependency illustrates the future development of political institutions. What also 
emerges from this study, by application of historical institutionalism approach, is how current 
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state of federalism and its institution can be attributed to the ways in which such events 
structure and shape political behavior and outcomes.     Against such a background, and the 
fractured national identity that accounts for civil unrest and disobedience in certain parts of 
the country, there is an exploration of the multitudinous challenges which stand in the way of 
successful implementation of the of the Nigerian system of federalism. Such challenges 
appear to result in the failure of government to engender political and national stability and 
socio-economic development throughout the nation as a whole. A detailed study of the 
history of Nigeria’s political and social development thus far is critical not only to identify 
the adaptive paths taken by its political institutions, but so as to direct with the benefit of 
historical reactions to prevailing circumstances  the next steps. In addition the impact of the 
transition from an agricultural based economy to an oil based economy on the country 
generally has been considered with an assessment of how that seismic event shaped the 
course of the national development. It is particularly in this context that devolution of 
political rule in and out of military and colonial rule, the fundamental shift in the essence of 
the economy away from traditional national product to the oil economy with all the benefits 
(and (dis)benefits) experienced by the nation as a consequence, have impacted on the 
development of Nigeria as an effective federal country. 
The research highlights areas of weaknesses in the Nigerian federal system by means of 
empirical analysis of the primary data and a detailed review of the existing literature. To 
some extent it reflects on the ability of Nigeria to cope with and adapt to change. Historical 
political institutions were faced with change for which they may not have been inherently 
equipped to deal with. The obvious example was the shift in the shape and nature of political 
institutions to manage the change from military rule to civil self-determination. Having 
reached that critical juncture in the development of Nigeria as a nation, an application of path 
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dependency theory illustrates what has been done with such ability, power and right by 
means of the process adopted by the political culture to implement change, namely 
federalism.  An example is the genesis of the current constitution, born out of the first attempt 
at mature self determination within the principles of federalism, evolved by pragmatism and 
empirical judgments based on fact and national experience.  The premise of this study is that 
Nigeria has failed to fully implement its model of federalism, which  is intended to be 
constructive and instructive rather than destructive and indicates the value of this work to the 
debate generally. 
 
In that context the author adopts the historical institutionalism approach to identify reasons 
for the failure of the process of Nigerian decentralization following which he provides new 
thought on the means by which such underperformance can be reconsidered from different 
perspectives. Such perspectives include (rather than exclude) the standpoints of the key 
participants in the system of government by reference to the three tiers of government, the de 
facto form of governance and the intended recipients of the distribution of wealth by means 
of the process of federalism. Finally this thesis concludes with an assessment of what is 
achievable by the adoption of a shift in policy whether such shift be considered radical or 
simply based on the process of evolution. 
 
7.2 Summary 
Broadly speaking the Nigerian federation has experienced four phases, namely, colonial, 
civilian, military and post-military rule and civilian administration. Each of these phases 
(critical junctures in its history) has left indelible marks on both the nature and the operation 
of the country’s federation and programme of decentralization. Each phase caused stress 
which, in some cases, resulted in adjustments to the process as a whole, and  not always for 
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the better. Each of the developing constitutions served its immediate and limited purpose and 
context but none produced the formula for effective management of the coalition of states in 
the Nigerian federation. Such a constitutional form is realised  when individuals (be they 
states or the population at large) are prepared to cede limited powers to the central 
government who draws positive conclusions that such reform is both essential and achievable 
by an on-going process of political participation at all levels of government. 
It is an obvious truth that decentralisation can occur without federalism but the converse, that 
federalism cannot exist without decentralisation, is perhaps less often appreciated; that fact 
emerged from the interview process generally and is a theme which the author has exploited 
in his analysis of the findings of his research, specifically in Chapter 2.2, and in Chapter 6 in 
general. The principal underlying the research question is to the extent to which the current 
structure and practice of federalism has contributed to the poor governance and 
underdevelopment of Nigeria. A central premise of federalism is that all levels of government 
are equally empowered to perform their functions, a principle which requires the essential 
ingredient of effective central government. In Nigeria however the autonomy of each tier of 
government is often misconstrued resulting in   competition with each other and   seeking to 
frustrate the others. This may be a feature of the relative immaturity of the Nigerian political 
system though conversely it may be a result of the failure of federalism which breeds 
suspicion and a general lack of the cooperation essential for the working of a truly federal 
state.  From such divisions can come the failure of federalism at all levels, perhaps the most 
obvious feature being revenue allocation which has evoked intense controversy in Nigeria. 
Revenue allocation however is a function of good governance and even relatively small 
improvements in the means of governance and the more equitable distribution of national 
resource can go some way towards addressing such complaints. 
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In pursuit of a definitive view from which conclusions can properly and reasonably be drawn, 
the study has examined: 
1. the major shortcomings in the structure of Nigerian federal structure; see Chapters 5.4 
and 6.3 in particular;  
2. the institutional reforms that could transform the poor trends of socio-economic 
growth to a vibrant economy and sustainable development; such as is explored in 
Chapter 6.1; and, 
3. the extent to which decentralization can influence the effective operation of the 
different tiers of government; see Chapter 5.4. 
A study of these concepts and related theoretical issues constituted the foundation for the 
contextual analysis, the main theoretical foundations employed being functional theory per 
(Brown and Oates 1986; Burns 1994; Oates 1972; Stein 1990; Paterson, Rabe and Wong 
1986; Elazar 1991) and legislative theory (Peterson 1995) as expounded within Chapter 2.  
A comprehensive analysis of the Nigerian system was carried out, articulating arguments for 
and against Nigeria’s form of federalism both by reference to the literature and by an analysis 
of the interviews with the respondents in field. An exploration of the successful 
decentralization problems resulting from decentralized governance in Nigeria was also 
performed. Some scholars argue that Nigerian federalism has achieved the purpose of 
promoting political stability and cohesion, and forestalling the tendency for secession by 
different ethnic groups, per (Diamond 1999:152; Horowith 1985 602-613; Olowu 1991:3) as 
set out in Chapter 2. That however suggests that the most positive gloss is being placed on a 
system which is riddled with mediocrity and endemic with corruption. There are those, in the 
majority, who argue very forcefully that Nigerian federalism has failed to achieve its purpose 
resulting in a nation that is divided not only politically but in apparently irreconcilable 
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nationalistic terms. For them the Nigerian federal system is more of a unitary rather than 
federal system (Onwudiwe and Suberu; 2005:94: Elaigwu 1998; 6-7; 2005; 69). They hold 
that this is due to a severe imbalance in the allocation of legislative powers between the 
central government and the state and the local governments.  
In part this is based on the Nigerian Constitution itself (so that the issue is structural), which 
is said, in Chapter 4, to inherently weaken the process of the distribution of power between 
the principal and subservient tiers of government by the reservation of ultimate power to the 
central government. That imbalance in the distribution of power has contributed to a system 
of politics in which ethnicity plays such a large part. This is evident in the pressure from 
ethnic groups ranging from major players such as Boko Haram, Indigenous People of Biafra, 
to the minor and less vocal groups militating peacefully via the process of democracy for 
national sovereignty per, for instance (Elaigwu 1994: Nnoli 2008; 101: Osaghae 2011) as 
discussed in Chapter 2 and elsewhere.  Such issues were very much in the forefront of the 
minds of all respondents in interview and illustrate that such problems have both resulted in, 
and are the result of, poor governance and the poor record of development at the far end of 
the distributive process.  
 
In Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, decentralization has routinely failed to produce 
good governance and socio-economic development. Scale is a feature of that failure and with 
that in mind the researcher analysed the institutional and political contexts within which the 
federal system operates in the terms specifically of Chapter 5.4. To evaluate the performance 
of local governments, Ondo State was used as a representative sample population. The major 
shortcomings in Ondo are taken as typical of the lack of institutional reforms likely to 
transform the poorest regions into vibrant economies, so ensuring sustainable development. 
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In that regard the level of good governance and the participation of local government was 
scrutinised in detail (particularly in Chapters 5.4.5 to 5.4.10) and found to be wanting.  
 
The starting point was the assessment of the supposition that the form of the Nigerian federal 
structure is considered to be a principal reason for Nigeria’s inability to achieve good 
governance and development (Elaigwu 2007; Ekeh and Osaghae 1989; Adamolekun 1991; 
Nnoli 2008; Elaigwu 2007; Suberu 2010; Okpanachi 2010; Osagahae, 2010; Adebanwi and 
Obadare 2010), see Chapter 2.  The research examines the critical factors that are responsible 
for the failure of the Nigerian federal structure to sufficiently fulfil the rationale for its 
adoption, which includes a framework for national development, cohesion and peaceful co-
existence. There is focus on the formal and informal factors that are responsible for the poor 
performance of federalism in Nigeria, the formal factor being the legal and institutional 
framework of the federal arrangement as enshrined in the constitution. The informal factors 
include military heritage, religion, tribal sentiments/ affiliations, and class interests. These 
factors could be described as the bedrock and values that shape the institutional framework 
and drives Nigerian federalism.  
 
An examination of these factors was carried out using Ondo State as representative entity 
within Nigeria by comparing the preponderance of current research with empirical data 
collected using interviews as set out in Chapter 3. By the use of an historical institutional 
critical juncture approach, the research conceptualises the relationship between the structure 
of government (federalism and the type of decentralization; delegation or devolution) and 
good governance and development. Similarly, the author analysed the effects of politics and 
politicians on Nigerian federalism and the impact of the oil economy. Findings show that 
politicians, the military, and the oil economy all impact heavily on the nature and 
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developmental performance of Nigerian political and fiscal federalism. From those matters 
set out in Chapter 4.1, it can be seen that the roots of political unrest, ethnic and religious 
divisions and civic discontent in Nigeria are deep and historic. Many of the major disrupting 
factors that are so challenging of contemporary politics in the Nigerian political system are 
cyclical, having been the same compelling forces that so tumultuously led Nigeria out of 
colonial rule, through military domination and into the civil administrations that followed. A 
number of those factors have diverged, for instance in the way that the Boko Haram agenda is 
based on religion, ethnicity and a very fundamental difference in its view of politics and the 
way in which civil society is organised and ordered. A number of the respondents were of the 
view that such divisions were not capable of remedy leading to a sense of hopelessness and 
disillusionment in the system of government at all levels, see Chapter 5. 
 
Some of the literature referred to in Chapter 2 supports the view that despite the obvious and 
extensive challenges, the Nigerian federal arrangement has brought about good governance 
and development; further that the federal system has fundamentally been the bedrock for 
appreciable national unity and cohesion in Nigeria. It must be said also that when surveyed 
57% in the Igbo southeast to 87% in the northeast, agreed that Nigeria should remain united 
as one country on the present basis. Overall, about three quarters of Nigerians affirm a desire 
for national unity, while an equally overwhelming majority of the citizenry professes firm 
commitments to both group and national (Nigerian) identities. However the majority of 
informed commentators insist that such very significant issues regarding poor governance 
and the development record of Nigeria, which questions the suitability and the capacity of the 
present decentralised system to engender good governance and development. From the above 
it might be inferred that while most Nigerians might express the commitment to national 
unity, it is to a paradigm version of their society to which they refer, one which is corruption 
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free and effective in equal distribution of the national resource, by means of a Federal system 
that would substantially fulfil the good governance and developmental rationale for the 
adoption of a federal system of governance. This research analysed in Chapter 5 results 
therefore in new insights that might be used to transform the Nigerian federal state into a 
more viable structure for good governance and development.  
 
Since the introduction of federalism in Nigeria in 1945 there have been some significant 
changes to meet the challenges of governance. From the analysis in Chapter 4 of the legal and 
constitutional framework of Nigerian decentralization, the ambiguities in the constitutional 
provisions of the legislative functions of local government are obvious factors in the 
.imbalance in the allocation of legislative powers between the Federal Government and the 
States as federating units, with the consequent overloading of the exclusive legislative list at 
the expense of the national interest. There is also an overlap and a duplication of functions 
which has engendered wastage, corruption and constrained development. From the 
assessment of Nigerian federalism, this research argues that the Nigerian decentralization is 
de jure devolution and de facto de-concentration because of quasi federalism practices. This 
is made out as a theme running throughout the entirety of this study and is examined in detail 
in Chapters 2, 4 and 6.  
 
The implication of this mixed decentralization arrangement is that the sub-units are not 
sufficiently empowered politically, administratively and fiscally to perform efficiently the 
constitutional functions allotted to them. This is due to inadequate constitutional force and 
political subversion of the constitution so that the political arrangement does not give 
opportunities for the conditions that could engender good governance and development, such 
as voice and accountability, rule of law and public sector management. The situation makes 
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the states and the local governments to be mere appendages or subsidiaries of the central 
government. This arrangement questions the foundation of Nigerian federalism, because it 
contradicts some of the basic doctrines of federalism. A system by which the state authorities 
have to revert to central government for funding for assistance for development projects does 
not create equality and the full entitlement to federalised autonomy. This illustrates the 
problem in de-centralisation very comprehensively, where the central government fails to 
relinquish control over development finance, a position reinforced by the analysis of the 
fieldwork in Chapter 5, especially by interviews of category one respondents who had some 
specialist knowledge of such matters.  
 
The contemporary debates about Nigeria’s political and economic failures have routinely 
implicated the presumed pathologies, incongruities and liabilities of the country’s federalism. 
Federalism also assumes that within a federation, there would be differences in the capacity 
of sub units to raise revenue for their functions and services for reasons that are beyond their 
control. The provision of fiscal equalisation serves to remedy inequalities that may arise from 
varying revenue-generation capacities of sub national units of government. The provision, 
however, does not make the sub-national government subordinate to the central government. 
This then necessitates an investigation of the relationship of governmental tiers within a 
federal or decentralised state as was conducted within Chapter 2.  
 
The study therefore conceptualises the interrelationship between the structure of government, 
governance and development in what is purportedly a decentralised country.  It is argued that 
both formal institutions (structure of government) and informal institutions (political values 
or behaviour that drive governance) affect the outcome of decentralization, which in this 
context is good governance and development. Corruption is still so fundamental in the 
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Nigerian political culture that it is difficult to see the means by which it might be eradicated. 
There was consideration of the problem of corruption throughout this study with some 
particular focus in Chapter 6.3 in the context of good governance. The Nigerian political 
space has always been monopolised by a personalised and ethnically fragmented political 
elite that informs the behaviour that propels the process of government in Nigeria. So too is 
the Rentier economy, explained in detail in Chapter 4.1, an enormously significant factor in 
the continuity of the ethic of corruption, if that is not  a contradiction in terms.  
 
So too is the rentier economy a factor which has reduced the value of traditional production 
by means of agriculture in favour of the low hanging fruit of oil which, despite being in the 
hands of the state, is effectively controlled by outside national and private interests and the 
global market which is presently in decline or has reached a stage of stagnation. All of such 
factors contribute to the instability of the political and civil cultures on a national basis with 
the position being further exacerbated by continuing strife between competing religio-ethnic 
elements. Whilst there is constitutional provision for devolution, de-concentration and 
delegation, delineation of function remains a critical issue in system. This uncertainty at all 
levels affects good governance and development. It follows therefore that both state and local 
government authorities  must have autonomy deriving from devolved powers to have access 
to and to control its own financial resources. Absent that situation the better description of 
Federalism in Nigeria is quasi federalism, which suggests partial only commitment to the 
general principle of effective federalism.  
 
In Ondo State (typical of all Nigerian states in terms of its governance structures) those 
features which typify the failure of decentralisation and power sharing were noted from the 
research and the literature. The author’s own statement at Chapter 1.4 ‘If, despite the huge 
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revenue allocation from the centre there is still poverty, the relevance of local governments to 
the people in terms of good governance must be called into question’ becomes of particular 
significance in the context of measuring the ideals of federalism against the manifestation of 
its results on the ground in Ondo State. Those differences are signified by dysfunctionality 
and disconnects between all levels of government, from Federal to State links and trickling 
down through subsidiary levels of local government. Such disconnects have very real 
consequences, such as in the failure of service delivery which typify the inequality in 
distribution of the national reserve to the grass roots. It is reasonably postulated that such 
findings typify the national condition and nothing in the literature is suggestive otherwise or 
indicative of prevailing conditions in which such deficiencies are not present. An example 
from the public domain
21
 is that of the Oluwa Glass enterprise which was established by the 
Ondo State government with the support of the Federal government. It failed for the lack of 
funds to pay its workers but fundamental to that were the Nigerian diseases of corruption, a 
failure to distribute national resources, inefficiency at local levels and the failure of central 
government to prevent the loss of important local industry. 
 
7.3 Findings 
A limited comparison with decentralisation in, for instance Indonesia, is instructive where an 
assessment of the transition   from ‘New Order’  to ‘Reformasi’ was that Indonesia achieved a 
regime that established new political elements in the interests of the whole nation. It was 
done without displacing the incumbent elite; rather such political transition produced an 
atmosphere in which there was a shift in what had previously contentious popular interests so 
                                                 
21
 The Nation Newspaper “Oluwa Glass Industry As Metaphor”   http://thenationonlineng.net/oluwa-glass-
metaphor/ Dec. 28, 2016 Edition.  
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there was ‘room for all’. Such should be the paradigm state in Nigeria but for the reasons set 
out in this study there are significant points of differences between the two situations. 
 
The scope of the research question set out in the abstract ensured a detailed examination of 
the relationship between federalism, or decentralisation, and effective governance of the 
process of implementation of federalism in accordance with the 1999 Nigerian constitution. 
That examination threaded through the entire study and allowed for the conclusions drawn 
herein to the supported.  In addition it prompted an enquiry into the extent of socio-economic 
development in Nigeria arising from such political and social imperatives. The main aspects 
evaluated, by reference to the literature and fieldwork, were governance, socio-economic 
development, the development of federalism against the background of the Nigerian political 
culture, to include reference to the prevailing political economy, and the operation of fiscal 
federalism and development of democracy and decentralisation.  
 
The literature on federalism, governance and decentralisation is inclined towards the 
traditional approach that narrowly focused on government institutions, concentrating on the 
historic political machinery as the instruments of good governance and development. 
Specifically the literature seems to concentrate on the structure, the technicality of 
policymaking and the division of functions at each tier of devolved government, generally 
limiting comment on the informal sector and context in which the federal system operates. To 
this extent the increasing complexity of the interactions between central and sub-national 
levels of government and the need to explore the complex structures of powers, values and 
interests mean that there is need for more participatory approach to local governance by the 
people. This can only be cultivated through a new paradigm of a political culture which is 
inclusive of the population at large rather than exclusive. In this context what is notably 
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lacking is the impact of any equivalent doctrine amongst the Nigerians of ‘Pancasila’, (see 
Chapter 4.2) the cohesive philosophy that united rather than divided the Indonesian people, 
and served as the building blocks  of the new political culture of activism that enhanced the 
practise of decentralisation in Indonesia. Absent such an intangible cohesive force Nigeria 
will continue to be managed by the largely unaccountable political elite who inevitably fail to 
unite the populace. 
 
That present approach, of exclusion of the citizenry, based on the structural relationships and 
traditional approaches to local government in general, and central-local relations in particular, 
requires justification if local government is to survive. One basis for its continued existence, 
its raison d’etre, is by reference to the practical advantages to be offered to a majority of the 
citizenry. This does however require some ‘buy in’ by a greater proportion of the population 
than is witnessed at present where ignorance of the political system founds the political 
culture.  The alternative to the practical advantage approach is the abstract principle of 
'legitimacy' (originating in the constitution) and a popular acceptance and support flowing 
from an acknowledgement of the advantages of federalism. That however requires an even 
greater leap of faith by the citizens, that the principle of federalism will be achieved at grass 
roots without evidence that it is actually delivering. All of these points to an appreciation of 
the need for a better balance between the state at any level and its clients, the local populace. 
The problem of failed local development cannot satisfactorily be addressed from a ruling 
class perspective; in Africa the problems plaguing the majority of the population cannot be 
fully understood at the level of the ruling class alone. Therein lays one of the critical 
obstacles to full and effective federalism and it is not until there is political, and 
constitutional, reform that the objectives of the constitution will be realised.  
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In terms of constitutional reform there is little doubt that further decentralisation of local 
government is necessary for more effective grassroots reach or, seen the other way, better 
linkage of community level structures up to the institutions of modern government. It was 
said authoritatively that in rural areas with poor infrastructure and communications a large 
local authority reduces the pace of development. In response to this remoteness, there has 
been speculation that a 'fourth-tier' of government to provide that additional mechanism for 
delivery might improve service delivery. In this context it is noted (see Chapter 4.10 in 
particular) that the existing traditional patterns of territorial organisation provide ready-made 
machinery for extension of development responsibilities and planning down to the 
community level.  Indeed it is evident from the findings of this study that where legitimacy is 
accorded and local leadership is accountable, traditional rulers remain a veritable link 
between local communities and local government. This suggestion reflects what has been 
termed the statutory incorporation of autonomous communities. One informed voice suggests 
that changing structure is easier than bringing about a radical change of the underlying 
defects in government.  Structures however do not change overnight and recognition for the 
requirement for change and the adoption of the means of such change is a matter for 
institutional and democratic development. 
 
The creation of a fourth tier of government may however do no more than recreate the 
conditions which gave rise to it, and inevitably point to the necessity for a fifth tier as exists 
in the decentralised system in Indonesia. In Nigeria the remoteness of local government from 
their clients is much less a matter of distance in physical terms than in value terms. What may 
be needed is the de-concentration of the existing third tier of state activity in line with 
existing traditional structures and institutions down to village community level. By reference 
to the example of Indonesia where the system of governance has five tiers and operates 
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successfully there might be merit in such a proposal. However, as stressed throughout this 
study, the resulting political structure depends on the context and circumstances of each 
subject system and country.  
 
A practical solution to enable local government to sustain a local environment conducive to 
local development might be by not 'doing business' with local leaders discredited by their 
own communities or found to have been colluding with local leaders of whatever description 
to corruptly misappropriate local resources. It is however acknowledged that historic and 
inherent weaknesses in having the traditional ruler as the representative of the community 
might not fit into the concept of modern government. Nevertheless the use of existing 
structures will obviously assist in implementing change and an example is the Community 
Development Committees are a ready structure for this purpose. As presently constituted they 
are unrepresentative of community interests and have little influence in planning at the 
community level. It is in this context that the author considers that the integration of 
traditional structures into the formal sub-structure of local government might offer an 
effective channel of communication.  
 
The emphasis on the blend of traditional and modern structures derives from the proven 
relevance of such structures in participation and development in local communities as well as 
in conditions in the modern political sector where they have ably substituted for the formal 
structures. It is known that under conditions of local elections on non-party basis, for 
instance, modern and traditional structures within civil society can function as 'structural 
equivalents' performing the necessary functions in the modern political system which would 
otherwise be performed by political parties.  
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When villages become centres for local development, they will also become centres for the 
systematic moderation of the articulated values through accommodation. This will be 
valuable in diffusing the destructive political pressures presently focussed on the institution 
of local government. Local institutions with which local clients can easily identify would also 
have been created. This is the true meaning of bringing government closer to the people. 
These suggestions reflect a degree of pragmatism which consciously avoids the danger of 
analysis contributing to paralysis powerlessness and hopelessness for local clients of the state 
who are underprivileged. It is also evident that the insights drawn from the debate on the 
articulation of modes of production, as this relates to the ultimate impact of informal values 
on formal structures and functions, provide ideas with which to further explore, more 
systematically, different dimensions of the problem of local development in Nigeria. In 
respect of the overall institutional intervention of the local state in local community 
development, for instance, the centrality of power suggests the need to focus on aspects of 
local development that are amenable to influence and intervention. The community 
development committee is means of achieving participation and improving good governance 
at the local level. Such committees are very active in the different communities where they 
exist. The main problem however may be that of representation in the committees is not 
freely and democratically available to the larger population.  
 
Perhaps the two most important and fundamental factors which require resolution are those of 
the corruption endemic in the political system and the definition of good governance.  The 
first of those two elements will require a paradigm shift in the mentality of political actors 
across the whole political spectrum but it must be acknowledged that without that shift the 
future of the implementation of federalism in Nigeria might almost be said to be doomed. The 
second element, that of good governance of project delivery, which includes the delivery of 
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federalism itself, is a resource that can be acquired and managed by external agencies.  There 
needs therefore to be a clear definition of what constitutes good governance by reference to 
established but such standards are widely recognised and can be only be applied given the 
political will. 
 
This however is intricately entwined with the prevailing political culture in Nigeria, 
considered in depth in Chapter 4. In the conclusion to that chapter the author observed a 
perceived lack of ‘quality’ of political culture requisite for successful decentralization.  That 
lack of ‘quality’ might account for the lack of trust in the political institutions themselves and 
it is postulated from the research, and from the literature, that lack of trust is in turn a by 
product of the perceived lack of integrity of the institutions of state. It was not difficult to 
conclude in that context that non-violent political activism is a prerequisite for the changes 
required in both the political institutions and the political culture. 
 
From the literature one derives the general principle that federalism, as a constitutional form, 
is brought about when competing factions surrender certain powers to a coordinated central 
authority. One of the functions of that central authority is   to operate for the benefit of such 
factions as a whole, which comprise the nation state. A cardinal principle of federalism 
therefore is the functional arrangement between states for living and working together 
nationally while presenting a measure of separate identity.  In this way the 
religion/ethnic/political differences are preserved and honoured as distinct features of the 
nation. The author appreciates that the scope for the improvements identified herein, 
particularly socio-economic growth resulting in a vibrant economy based on sustainable 
development, can only be incrementally achieved over a significant period of time, especially 
when faced with endemic resistance to change from entrenched interests. However the 
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political history of Nigeria is a story of incremental change during recent history at critical 
junctures in Nigerian history, brought about by the exercise of democracy inspired by the 
desire to achieve a political culture that delivers benefits for everyone on an equitable basis.  
In addition such changes must happen, in conventional parlance, from the bottom up and 
from the top down, concurrently rather than consecutively particularly by way of a 
fundamental shift in prevailing political culture.  Nigeria will not become a viable federation 
unless and until the constituent parts (the states) are adequately empowered by enabling 
practices enshrined in the constitution that conform to acknowledged principles of federalism. 
The value of this study is that it identifies those issues that need to be addressed and offers 
some indicators of how the present socio-economic system of politics and political culture 
might be improved. The author has conducted a thorough examination of the specialised 
literature and provided a key into comparative studies into similar political systems that 
warrants further study. Such studies might identify points of similarity, and divergence, from 
which the design of the future of the political culture in Nigeria might be designed. It is 
submitted that the approach to the research and the study from an historical institutionalist 
perspective provides an original approach and an important and new contribution to the topic. 
 
The federalist debate in Nigeria is longstanding, passionate and inconclusive and is driven by 
a relentless focus on its failures rather than its successes. In the meantime little in the political 
structure of Nigeria (legislative and administrative) points to it being a fully functioning 
federal entity, paying lip service only to its self proclaimed description as such. In fact, it may 
be that it is only the de facto existence of the states that creates the semblance of federalism; 
in all other respects the country is a unitary state.  It is that perception which must change, 
based inevitably on the underlying performance of the federalist model, which must improve. 
Put even more forcefully: absent such change and Nigeria will fail as a federalist state. 
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Appendix 
 List of Interviewees 
Type of Interview/Identity/Location/Year 
 
II/Local Resident 1 /Ifon/ 2016    A former LG worker 
II/Local Resident 2/Ifon/2016    Chairman CDC 
II/Local Resident 3/Ifon/2016    A Local Resident (Chief) 
II/Local Resident 4/Ifon/2017    Youth Leader 
II/Local Resident 5/ Bolorundoru/2016   Member of CDC 
II/Local Resident 6/Bolorunduro/2016   Member of CDC Farmer 
II/Local Resident 7/Bolorunduro/2016                              Teacher in the community 
II/ Local Resident 8/ Ayegunle Oka/ 2016   Member of CDC Farmer  
II/Local Resident 9/ Alayere/2016    Head of Idoma Community 
II/Local Resident 10/Ipogun/2016    Woman leader of a Community 
II/Local Resident 11/Ijare/2016    Woman leader of a community 
II/Local Resident 12/Igbara-Oke/2016   Chairman CDC 
II/Local Resident 13/Igbara-Oke/2016   Youth Leader 
II/Local Resident14/Igbara-oke/2017    Youth Leader 
II/Local Resident 15/Igbara-Oke/2016   Member of CDC, Farmer 
II/Local Resident 16/Igbara-Oke/Ibuji/2016   A woman petty trader 
II/Local Resident116/Igbotu/2017    Youth Leader 
II/Local Resident17/Iwaro-Oka/2016    Youth Leader 
II/Local Resident 18/Ikotun/2016    Religious leader(Christian) 
II/Local Resident 19/Ikotun/2016    Member of CDC    
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SSI/ Academic 1/ Ibadan/2013 Senior Lecturer University of 
Ibadan 
SSI/Academic 2/ Ibadan/2013 Senior Lecturer, University of 
Ibadan 
SS1/Civil Activist/Development Expert 1/ Abuja/2013 Country Director of an NGO 
SSI/Civil Servant/Head of Service1/Akure/2016  Retired Head of Service 
SSI/Retired Civil Servant 2/ Akure/2016/2017   
SSI/Retired Civil Servant 3/Sabomi/2016 
SS1/Retired Civil Servant 4/Sabomi/2016 
SS1/Civil Servant 1/Akure/2016    Civil Servant 
SSI/Civil Servant 2/Akure/ 2016/2017   Civil Servant 
SSI/Civil Servant 3/Akure/2016/2017   Secretary OSOPADEC 
SS1/Civil Servant 4/Akure/2016/2017   Director OSOPADEC 
SS1/ Civil Servant 5/Igbara-Oke/2016   Ifedore LG 
SS1/Civil Servant 6/Igbara-Oke/2016   Teacher 
SS1/Civil Servant 7/Oka/ 2016    Akoko South-West LG 
SSI/Civil Servant 7/Oka/2016    Akoko South-West LG 
SS1/Civil Servant 8/Igbekebo/2017    Ese -Odo LG 
SSI Civil Servant 9/Igbekebo/2017    Ese-Odo LG 
SS1/Civil Servant 10/Iju-Itaogbolu/2016   Akure North LG 
SSI Civil Servant 11/Iju-Itaogbolu/2016   Akure South LG 
SS1 Civil Servant 12/Owo/2016    Owo LG 
SS1 Civil Servant 13/0wo/2016    Owo LG 
SS1/Development Expert 2/ Akure/2016   Program Officer of an NGO 
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SS1/Lawyer1/Akure/2016     Private Legal Practitioner 
SSI/Lawyer2/Akure/2016/2017    Lawyer and former Legislator 
SS1/Local Resident1/Alayere/Ogbese/2016   Religious leader (Christian) 
SSI/Local Resident 2/ Iwaro Oka/2016   Principal of a school   
SSI/Local Resident 3/Sabomi/ 2016    Member of CDC 
SSI/ Local Resident 4/ Iwaro/ 2016    Youth Leader 
SSI/ Local Resident 5/ Sabomi/ 2016    Member of CDC 
SSI/Local Resident 6/Sabomi/2016    A traditional Chief 
SSI/Local Resident 7/ Igbotu/2017    Community member 
SSI/Local Resident 8/Igbotu/2017    CDC Chairperson 
SSI/Local Resident9/Igbekebo/2017     Local Chief  
SSI/Local Resident 10/Ode-Irele/2016   A Community leader 
SSI/Local Resident 11/ Ode-Irele/2016   A Community leader 
SSI/Local Resident 12/Ode-Irele/Kiribo/2016  Youth Leader  
SSI/Politician 1 / London/Lagos/2013                   National Leader of political Party 
SSI/Politician 2 / Ila Orangun/2013    Former State Governor 
SS1/Politician 3/Abuja/2013     Senator of Federal Republic 
SSI/Politician 4/ Igbara-Oke/2016 Member of LG Caretaker 
committee 
SSI/Politician 5/Owo/2013 A female gubernatorial aspirant 
SSI/Politician 6/Owo/2013 A member of Yoruba Socio-
political organisation (Afenifere) 
SS/1/Politician 7/Ipogun/2016/2017 Local politician 
SS1/Politician 8/Ikaro/ 2016 Member of LG. Caretaker 
Committee. 
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SSI/Politician 9/Akure/2016 Member House of Assembly 
SSI/Politician 10/Akure/2016 Former Chairman Akure South 
LG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
